Critical Fashion Studies

A review of Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Social Media’s Influence on Fashion, Ethics, and Property, Minh-Ha T. Pham, Duke University Press, 2022.

Minh-Ha PhamThe fashion world has always espoused the latest trends in society and kept up with the times. It should therefore come as no surprise that fashion producers and commentators now speak of “ethical fashion,” “sustainable fashion,” or “fashion for good.” But what do these terms exactly mean? Who has the power to declare fashion worthy of these labels? What lies behind the glamour and glitter of fashion shows and catwalk fame? Unsurprisingly, there is also a radical wing of fashion critique (or critical fashion studies) that scrutinizes those corporate objectives and tries to hold the fashion industry accountable. Minh-Ha T. Pham is one of those critics that read fashion in relation to race, class hierarchies, labor, indigenous knowledge, creativity, and intellectual property rights (IPR). In Why We Can’t Have Nice Things, she examines the way social media users monitor the fashion market for the appearance of knockoff fashion, design theft, and plagiarism. Through what she calls “crowdsourced IP regulation,” she envisages the online activities of bloggers and Instagram users as a form of free labor mobilized in the service of fashion capital accumulation. Network vigilantes who are policing the border between authentic and fake fashion are engaged in racial work: copycat producers and consumers are always portrayed as Asians and reviled as morally defective, while creativity is defined as a property of whiteness, which gives Western fashion designers the privilege to engage in racial extractivism and legitimate cultural theft.

The sociology of fashion

 Although this book is grounded in media studies, it also uses standard tools and concepts of sociological analysis. Its sociological value is limited by the fact that the author didn’t engage in fieldwork or participant observation: she only observed fashion blogging netizens from a distance and through the media impact of their activities. Nor did she collect quantitative data about fashion imitation and IPR policing activities. Her terrain is digital, and she gathered most of her observations online. But her critical perspective on the fashion industry places her in a long tradition of the sociology of fashion, from George Simmel and Thorsten Veblen to Pierre Bourdieu and Nancy Green. According to Simmel, fashion derives from a tension between, on the one hand, the tendency of each of us to imitate somebody else, and on the other hand, the tendency of each of us to distinguish oneself from others. Veblen coined the word “conspicuous consumption” to characterize the acquiring of luxury commodities by the “leisure class” as a public display of economic power. Bourdieu conceptualized fashion innovation as a field of values, norms, and power hierarchies structured around the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, mainstream élégance and avant-garde. Nancy Green gave a historical description of the working conditions of immigrants in the women’s garment industry in New York’s Seventh Avenue and the Parisian Sentier, showing how labor organization builds on gender and ethnic differences. Minh-Ha Pham’s perspective is thoroughly global: her examples and case studies originate from the heart of the fashion industry in Paris or New York as well as from the periphery of indigenous communities in Mexico or from ordinary social media users in Thailand. Call it multi-sited ethnography without direct engagement, or doing fieldwork from a distance.

Imitation is supposed to be the sincerest form of flattery, but that is not how most fashion brands see it. For years, the luxury industry has been battling counterfeiters, investing heavily in technology, the internet, and AI to authenticate products. Brands have lobbied governments to seize and destroy fake goods, prosecute buyers and dealers, and managing online traffic to counterfeit platforms. However, legal action does not seem to be enough. For a start, in the fashion industry, intellectual property is not enforced as it is within the film industry and music industry. To take inspiration from others’ designs contributes to the fashion industry’s ability to establish clothing trends. Fashion copycat disputes rarely involve original designs: fashion is, after all, a copy culture, in which innovation feeds on imitation. With few legal basis to protect original works of authorship, fashion leaders turn to the public to defend them against imitators. In the early twentieth century, powerful fashion companies used the trade and popular press to create a popular sense of fashion legality. Today, social media users and environments do this work. For Minh-Ha Pham, crowdsourced IP regulation is extralegal work: rather than pay legal experts, fashion brands depend on social media users to stamp on knockoffs and copycats. The fashion industry reproduces downstream a practice that it uses at every step of its value chain: mobilizing unpaid or grossly underpaid labor, from the garment factory workers to the unpaid fashion interns and the models that are compensated in kind with the luxury goods they have to wear.

Crowdsourced IP regulation

In crowdsourced IP regulation, social media users are naming, shaming, and demanding boycotts against fashion copycats while defending and promoting alleged copycat victims. They are playing this digital vigilante role in good faith and with good intentions: most of them sincerely believe that they contribute to a more ethical fashion world in which creativity gets rewarded and copying is sanctiond. But according to Minh-Ha Pham, the denunciation of the copycat culture follows racial and colonial patterns. The copynorms that inform them are freighted with cultural assumptions and biases, whereby copiers are always construed as Asians and innovators as Western. Authentic and fake fashion, creativity and copying are racialized categories, not neutral facts. The Asian fashion copycat is ethical fashion’s quintessential racial other. It derives from deeply rooted ideas about, on one hand, Asians’ technical superiority and, on the other hand, their cultural and ethical inferiority. According to standard stereotype, Asians are incapable of creativity, they are condemned to rote learning and mechanical repetition. The premise of the Asian copycat is routinely accepted without question or qualification: fashion knockoffs are immediately perceived as made in Asia, as the products of cheap ethics and shoddy manufacturing. Google searches automatically associate copycat culture with China or South Korea. These countries are accused of having achieved development by imitation rather than innovation. Accusations of “bottom-up copying” bristle with moral indignation about the theft of creative property, hard work, and sales that should have benefited their rightful owners. Words like “copying,” “knockoff,” “piracy,” and “counterfeit” are laden with value judgements and potentially legal implications. Meanwhile, “top-down copying” receives much less attention, and “lateral copying” is mostly a concern within the industry that feeds on imitation and trend-making. Popular euphemisms for top-down copying include “creative inspiration,” “homage,” and “cultural appreciation.”

Several case studies in the book concentrate on this top-down copying and contrast the lack of sanction associated with it to the moral indignation and media campaigns raised by bottom-up imitation. In the exceptional cases where “top-down copying” is publicly acknowledged, the copying is often excused as an isolated lapse in judgement rather than a reflection of a broader cultural or racial pattern. In particular, indigenous knowledge and ethnic designs are considered as part of the public domain, constituting a “free bin” that Western designers can mine for their creations. For Minh-Ha Pham, cultural appropriation and cultural inspiration are two faces of the same coin. They rely on what she calls “copy rights,” the power to copy without being branded a copycat. Copy rights include the right to use and enjoyment and the right to exclude others. They provide some with the right to copy, to benefit from copying, and to exclude others from the same privileges. They constitute a “racial license to copy” that is part of the privilege of being white. Examples of such racial extractivim are numerous. Isabel Marant’s copycat version of the Mixe blouse, a traditional design from the Tlahuitoltpec people in Oaxaca, Mexico, led to a legal battle that classified the indigenous design as belonging to the public domain. The Maasai people of northern Tanzania and southern Kenya have experienced a similar pattern of legally sanctioned exclusion and extraction, being used in many media campaigns without receiving any share of the proceeds. The racial license to copy also protected the designers who launched “Navajo-inspired” collections, giving rise to a Navajo chic trend that didn’t benefit the Navajo people in any regard. In fashion’s parlance, “traditional clothing”, “folk costumes,” and “ethnic garb” are racially coded terms that de-skill non-Western designs as cultural and natural rather than artistic and intellectual.

Ppl knocking each other off lol

Whereas most websites dedicated to exposing fashion copycats “punch down” on cheap imitators and align with the interests of the luxury business, Diet Prada, an Instagram account with a massive followership, doesn’t hesitate to “punch up” or “punch laterally.” It plays the role of a whistleblower or an online watchdog exposing the structural problems that pervade the global fashion industry, particularly racism, misogyny, sexual predation, and labor exploitation. Diet Prada dares to name, shame, and, in some cases, flame industry giants. Its posts typically involve side-by-side comparison photos of two or more lookalike fashion garments or accessories. It also imitates the headlines of fashion magazines or uses internet memes to expose wrongdoings and express outrage. According to Minh-Ha Pham, Diet Prada is “a fashion insider that uses insider branding strategies and forms to articulate an outsider cultural political discourse about the inequalities sustaining the global industry of which it’s now a significant part.” Its refusal to consent to hegemonic ways also finds expression in absurd posts that poke fun at fashion, fashion policing copycat, and fashion copycatting itself by juxtaposing high fashion objects with mundane things, like a ham sausage adjacent to a Bottega Veneta shoe or a dog’s snout and a Saint Laurent dress. Its derisive one-line description, “Ppl knocking each other off lol,” has remained unaltered since its first post. Its status as an industry watchdog is now so established that fashion companies have instituted channels to communicate with it, eschewing the conventional language of corporate communication to publish off-the-cuff comments and candid reactions.

Apart from naming and shaming, another response to counterfeits is moving upscale. This makes perfect economic sense: according to market signaling theory, when counterfeits enter the market, authentic brands have incentives to upgrade their quality and innovate. A higher price signals a higher quality, while pervasive counterfeiting with low production cost could drive authentic products with lower prices out of the market (as in the “market for lemons” theorized by George Akerlof.) Chanel, Gucci, and Prada don’t really need to crack down on counterfeits: they control their own distribution outlets and have developed among their customer base a sensitivity to detail that allows them to distinguish between the authentic and the fake. Fashion is linked to elitism and fueled by the increasing wealth gap in society. This is why the notions of “democratic fashion,” or “affordable luxury,” are contradictions in terms. They were promoted at the turn of the century by television shows and feature films that made the rarefied world of high fashion relatable. With Sex and the City or The Devil Wears Prada, people who might never shop for luxury fashion were encouraged to become conversant in its language. Fashion imposed its brands and values upon a society that learned to distinguish between authentic taste and fake products, between high and low market positioning. This period also saw the rapid expansion of European “fast fashion” brands into US markets. After the 2008 financial crisis, terms like “cheap chic,” “recession chic,” and “credit crunch chic” were widely used to describe budget versions of designer fashions sold at stores like Zara, Target, and H&M. Cheap chic was as much a political fashion statement then as sustainable fashion is today. It promised to make fashion (the clothes and the industry) accessible to more consumers. More recently, fast fashion came to be associated with China and rejected as unethical: it became synonymous with cheap labor, shoddy quality, and environmental degradation.

Fast fashion

Minh-Ha Pham’s book encourages readers to take a broader view of the value chain in the fashion industry. It should include all actors who create value, including the “free labor” mobilized downstream to expose counterfeits and reinforce IPR protection. Could critical fashion studies be included in this broader industry environment? Does Minh-Ha Pham participate in the regulation of a sector she so vehemently criticizes? Like fashion bloggers, academic critics believe in the importance of fashion as a social phenomenon. They treat their activity as work and dedicate an important part of their time to monitoring the industry’s latest developments. By holding fashion accountable, they demonstrate that the fashion world cannot stand outside broader societal concerns pertaining to racial justice, gender equality, labor rights, and sustainable development. The fashion world is very sensitive about these issues, not because it is particularly virtuous (it was late to follow the #MeToo bandwagon), but because its business has always been to keep abreast of latest cultural trends and to align with the changing times. Corporations in the luxury business are very careful about the language they use and what is told about them. Any blemish in their corporate image translates into massive revenue loss and need for reputation repair. The Asia Pacific region has become one of the brightest spots in the global fashion economy: as the economic status of Asian women is growing globally, racial stereotyping of Asian groups is no longer acceptable, as any blunder can lead to devastating boycott campaigns. Reading Minh-Ha Pham’s book might help corporate executives in the sector become more aware of concerns about race, gender, and global justice.

Anthropology Post-1986

A review of Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary, Paul Rabinow and George E. Marcus with James D. Faubion and Tobias Rees, Duke University Press, 2008.

Marcus 2I am interested in the history of anthropology. But there is a great disconnect in the way this history gets told. It stops at the point when it really should start. Anthropology is rich with disciplinary ancestors and founding fathers. Bronisław Malinowski and Franz Boas laid solid foundations for the discipline, teaching their contemporaries that no society, including their own, was the end point of human social evolution. The discipline has a few founding queens as well: Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, who both studied under Boas, contributed to a fundamental reimagining of human diversity that allowed for the turn toward greater tolerance and inclusion in postwar America. History books go in great detail in discussing their contribution to the field and how a few great debates shaped the discipline. They highlight a Golden Age of anthropology in which the discipline was relevant, not only for other academic specialties, but for addressing the pressing concerns of the day. As of today, an anthropology major will give prospective students a valuable perspective on matters like diversity and multiculturalism, race and gender, globalization and political conflict, religions and secular beliefs, and much more. But history books all stop when the party gets started. They never mention the controversies and paradigm shifts that form the bedrock of contemporary research. The references they quote are absolutely of no use in writing current anthropology. Bibliographies of recently published articles rarely, if ever, mention publications antedating the 1990s. It seems as if the discipline reinvented itself at some point and discarded its former self.

Writing Culture

This point can be dated with some precision: it corresponds to the publication in 1986 of the collection of essays Writing Culture. There was a before and an after Writing Culture. This is not to say that this edited volume was a scientific breakthrough: it consists of ill-written essays that, read retrospectively, obfuscate debates and are most noticeable for what they missed—gender and feminism, race and ethnicity, and what will be known as the politics of identity are conspicuously absent from the texts. But the book published by the University of California Press achieved mythic status. As Tobias Rees recalls, studying anthropology in Germany in the mid-1990s, “We read the history of anthropology up to Writing Culture and… and there is nothing afterwards.” It is still mandatory reading in graduate courses taught at American anthropology departments. Writing Culture operated a linguistic turn by reducing ethnography to the status of a text, separated from the reality it was supposed to study and even from a scientific project of truth-making. It opened what was at times the rather dry prose of ethnographic writing to literary freedom. It led to a proliferation of personal confessions, literary essays, and subjective renderings of fieldwork that confirmed the status of the anthropologist as author but made very little contribution to the knowledge of societies they were supposed to study. Both Paul Rabinow and George Marcus were protagonists in this movement. Marcus coedited the volume (with Jame Clifford) and began a lifelong reflection on ethnographic writing and pedagogy. Rabinow entered an essay in Writing Culture in which he grappled with philosophical issues of modernity and postmodernity. Their testimony was collected by Tobias Rees, a young assistant professor, in a series of intellectual exchanges that form the basis of this volume, published in 2008.

In retrospect, Writing Culture appears more as a logical end point than as a new departure. It seemed to bring the history of anthropology to an end, putting the whole undertaking, its methods, its concepts, even its object, radically into question. While the early academic descendants of Boas and Malinowski had a clear sense of purpose, by the 1980s the discipline had become more fragmented. Anthropologists were haunted with a sense of embarrassment about the discipline’s colonial legacy and keen to refute it (even more so today.) They had realized that true “participant observation” was hard to achieve, since the mere presence of the researcher in a society tends to change what is being studied. They had also become uncertain about where the boundaries of their discipline should lie. A new and intense sensitivity to matters of power and conflict took hold of American anthropologists. Tobias Rees lists these political factors in his introduction: “the worldwide struggles against colonialism, the rise of the civil rights movements, the coming of affirmative action, the anti-war movement, the Chicago riots, new-nation building, minority movements, etc.” It has often been said that in the 1970s and early 1980s, anthropology in the United States turned left, standing on the side of the exploited and marginalized people, while the other social sciences turned right, espousing paradigms of scientific rigor and quantification. Anthropologists also increasingly turned their lens to Western society. But studying Western cultures left them entering territory dominated by economists, geographers, political scientists, and sociologists. So should they compete with these disciplines? Collaborate? As anthropology groped for answers, the discipline spawned numerous subfields: economic anthropology, feminist anthropology, medical anthropology, legal anthropology, science and technology studies, and so on.

Clifford Geertz’s influence

Writing Culture was written in the shadow of Clifford Geertz. Geertz’s formulation of an interpretative program for anthropology marked an important turning point in the history of the discipline. Conceptually, he proposed to understand culture as text. To be more precise, Geertz defined culture as a semiotic web of meaning that is open for interpretation and rereadings. “The challenge of fieldwork was, as he famously remarked, to look over the shoulder of an informant and to read the script that guides the native’s life.” As a result of this philological turn, ethnographies were increasingly understood as texts and thus as literary documents. Clifford Geertz was Paul Rabinow’s PhD advisor at the university of Chicago and sent him to do his doctoral fieldwork in Séfrou, a Moroccan town that Geertz had selected as the camp base to conduct an extensive survey of life conditions in Third World nations. The tone of some remarks made by Paul Rabinow in his conversation with Tobias Rees confirms there was bad blood between the two. Geertz famously criticized the tendency towards “I-witnessing” that manifested itself in Rabinow’s recollection from the field, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. But he was careful to specify that he was speaking of him and his like-minded colleagues only as they function inside their pages, not as “real persons.” In return, Rabinow made ad hominem attacks on his former professor in an essay, “Chicken or Glass,” in which he claimed Geertz was unable to read even a simple situation and could not tell whether a certain ritual was performed in relation to “chicken” or “glass,” as the only word he understood from an informant’s answer could have meant both. Part of their opposition was political: Geertz kept his political opinions to himself but he did not make a stand against the war in Vietnam, while Rabinow mentions that partly out of protest he started learning Vietnamese, “though the only course in English available then was a U.S. Army course.” In these conversations, Rabinow does not dwell on his grudge against Geertz, expressing regret that he and Marshall Sahlins did not engage the issues raised by Writing Culture in a constructive fashion: “by their despising the present, they essentially foreclosed their own futures. This was a loss to the discipline.”

Designs for an Anthropology of the Contemporary reads like a graduate seminar discussion—which it is, in a way: Tobias Rees brought Paul Rabinow and George Marcus in a conversation across generations about some of the directions anthropology took after 1986. Places, namely university affiliations, play an important role in the way the history of the discipline gets taught and research traditions are transmitted from one generation to the next. The foundation of anthropology in the United States has been construed as an opposition between Columbia, where Franz Boas and his students operated, and Harvard, where grand theory building took precedence over the careful gathering of data from the field. In the postwar period, Rabinow and Marcus describe a similar tension through the opposition between Chicago and Harvard. Marcus arrived at Harvard’s Department of Social Relations to witness its crumbling: “Talcott Parsons was still there, giving abstract lectures reminiscent of some heyday, but mostly to foreign students (…) such as Niklas Luhmann.” According to Rabinow, Geertz’s focus on culture goes back to Harvard, where he was trained by Talcott Parsons before joining the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations at the University of Chicago in 1962. Chicago had a broader view of anthropology, nurtured by interdisciplinary exchanges and the influence of the Chicago school of sociology. Meanwhile, anthropology at Columbia University turned more radical, with a generation of scientists such as Eric Wolf, Sidney Mintz, and Morton Fried falling under the influence of Marxism. Rabinow recalls that an entire cohort of students from the University of Chicago were chased out of New York: “They despised Geertz and Lévi-Strauss and they just saw it as some kind of, I don’t know what, right-wing thinking of some sort or other.” The history of anthropology at the time of Writing Culture and after was a story of an expansion of the discipline beyond these hallowed grounds. George Marcus moved to Rice University, where he chaired the anthropology department for twenty-five years before passing the baton to Michael Fischer. Paul Rabinowitz arrived at the University of California at Berkeley in 1978 and scored a big hit early on by writing the first book and anthology devoted to the French philosopher Michel Foucault.

The globalization of anthropology

Anthropology was a modest family affair back in the early days of Franz Boas and his students. By contrast, anthropology expanded rapidly in American higher education’s post-World War II boom. Nowadays nearly all American research universities, and many liberal arts colleges, harbor an anthropology department. Nor is teaching anthropology limited to the United States: European research institutions in the United Kingdom, in France and in Germany pursued distinct disciplinary traditions, while anthropology spread out worldwide and enriched itself along the way. This makes charting contemporary anthropology and delineating the new directions the discipline is taking a difficult enterprise. The profile of anthropology students and researchers also diversified: there are more women and more “halfies,” people whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage. Rabinow noticed other changes at Berkeley: “We’re seeing an entry into anthropology graduate schools of many people who have been through NGOs and have, in a bigger way, run through the crisis of the Peace Corps that we saw earlier.” People still choose anthropology as a major for existential reasons both personal and political. As Rabinow recalls, “I became an anthropologist in many ways because I felt, and continue to feel, profoundly alienated from the United States.” Despite all the talk on diversity, the idea of a right-wing or conservative anthropologist runs counter, if not to logics, then to the sociological reality of a discipline that has always taken the side of the excluded, the marginal, the downtrodden. Cultural relativism is embedded in the DNA of the discipline. If anthropologists are less ready to claim the moral and political high ground, they are still committed to an agenda of radical change and social justice. As Marcus notes, “anthropology encourages these sorts of strong feelings about public issues and the world.”

Despite anthropologists’ emphasis on an epistemological break before and after Writing Culture, there has been more continuity that they are ready to acknowledge. The 1980s generation wanted to get rid of the key concepts of the discipline—culture, fieldwork, participant observation, the native point of view—and invent new modes of sharing results away from the journal article or ethnographic monograph. But publishing in peer-reviewed journals, and submitting a book to a university press, remain the gold standard for hiring and promotion. Geertz’s dilemma—“How to get an I-witnessing author into a they-picturing story”—continues to challenge writers who face new obligations of ethical best practices and accountability. The premise that fieldwork is the discipline’s distinguishing bedrock remains as powerful today as it was before Writing Culture. Ethnography is not an endangered genre: young researchers continue to go to far-away places and immerse themselves for an extended period in the daily activities of local communities in order to get a better grasp of what makes them tick. Learning the local language is still a requisite, and having some knowledge of French is always a plus: if judged by the number of references to Michel Foucault and Bruno Latour, American anthropologists remain in the thrall of French Theory. The concept of culture has been discarded, but a renewed focus on identity and on the self has kept intact the preoccupation with symbolic expression, collective modes of being, and construction of the subject. There has been productive exchanges with adjacent disciplines: feminism, media studies, cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and science and technology studies, to name a few. But anthropology has not disappeared with the blurring of disciplinary boundaries and the disappearance of its traditional object. It has found a new lease of life “after ethnos” (to take the title of a 2018 book by Tobias Rees, which I reviewed here.)

The future of the discipline

Almost twenty years after these conversations that took place at Rice University in 2004, it seems to me that the evolution of the discipline has not validated the claims made by the two aging professors. People don’t turn to anthropology to know more about “the contemporary”: there are other disciplines that may be better equipped for understanding science and technology developments, emergent forms of life, or social precariousness. If anthropology can contribute to contemporary debates, it is mostly by cultivating its distinctive concepts, methods, ad research traditions. Anthropology has turned to the study of the “here and now,” rather than the “far away’”and “timeless,” but it has kept its attachment to localized communities and out-of-joint temporalities. Marcus and Rabinow made the remark that “anthropologists are increasingly studying timely phenomena with tools developed to study people out of time.” But anthropologists and the people they study have always been in and of their times. For most researchers, taking time out to do extended fieldwork remains the distinctive mark of the profession, its rite of passage and its rejuvenating spring. Marcus’ idea of multi-sited ethnography has not really taken hold, except when the research topic is itself on the move or dispersed in several locations. And Rabinow’s vision of so-called third spaces like studios, labinars, archives, and installations, many of them enabled by new technologies, hasn’t really replaced the traditional university environment. If anything, anthropologists are now more numerous in non-academic employment. Faced with the dearth of stable tenure-track positions, freshly-minted anthropologists have found job opportunities with corporations wanting better information about how to design and sell their products, and, controversially, an American military seeking to learn more about the “human terrain” where it fights. The US government and Microsoft are now reportedly the two biggest employers of anthropologists. Reports of anthropology’s demise have been greatly exaggerated.

Love Can Be Racist

A review of Racist Love: Asian Abstraction and the Pleasures of Fantasy, Leslie Bow, Duke University Press, 2022.

Racist LoveRacist Love starts from the position that love can be racist. This is an idea that many people may find difficult to admit. Of course, most people will acknowledge that racism can be at work in the sexual fantasies of old white men attracted to young Asian women. In the same vein, the way Asian American communities are praised as a “model minority” can also be called racist. But can the sincere love of a white person to his or her Asian partner be called racist? What about the unconditional love of a mother to her child in the case of interracial adoption? And even if racist love exists, is the fact that some white people, male or female, prefer Asian sexual partners different from the attraction other people feel for blondes or redheads? Where do you draw the line between a preference for physical attributes in a partner and racism? If transracial love is systematically tainted by racism, what about the love or attraction one may feel towards people of one’s own ethnic group? Can people of color be suspected of racist inclinations because they are attracted to persons outside their ethnic group, or is racist love the preserve of white people? How to deal with the case of non-Asian persons (say, Gwen Stefani) who are so attracted by everything Asian that they themselves identify as Asian? There are no easy answers to these questions and, especially in the French context, it is hard to engage a conversation on these issues. Speaking of racism usually elicits the topical response “I am not a racist!”, while using the expression “structural racism” tends to deprive people of their agency. Racism, like religious beliefs or political affiliations, are topics that are best kept out of conversations at the dinner table. 

Asian fetishism

The value of Leslie Bow’s book is is not to raise the issue of racist love in the abstract, but through the exploration of cultural artifacts, children’s books, collectibles, and artworks. These material objects act as substitutes for Asian people, displaying some of the traits Americans associate with Asian cultures. These ethnic signs can take the form of artifacts (fans, chopsticks, rice bowls, dress style, and textile patterns) or body parts (slanted eyes and other facial features, black hair, petite silhouette) that are detachable from the whole body to convey attributes of gender, youth, and ethnicity. Together, they express a racial imaginary infused with desire, longing, and intimate connection. They show that “race can be a source of pleasure” and not just rejection or apprehension. Racism can be made cute and charming, as in the Hello Kitty series or the geisha car in Pixar’s animated movie Cars 2. These inanimate objects “spark joy”, to use the terms of Marie Kondo, the Japanese lifestyle guru. They also reinforce racial stereotyping as a process of abstraction in which a quality ascribed to one member of a group then applies to all. One such Asian stereotype is the notion of inscrutability: Hello Kitty’s lack of mouth and facial expression offers a blank slate for the feelings of the viewer. Another prejudice is the association of Asian women with submissiveness and passivity. This stereotype affects Asian American women in their career, causing many to plateau, but also in their affective life. Asian female bodies are fetishized, oversexualized, and objectified in the fantasies of white males. Asian women deal with a very specific type of racialized sexism that makes them especially vulnerable. For Leslie Bow, attraction is the very form of anti-Asian bias, and translates into a specific desiring structure characterized by equivocation. Racist love can easily turn into racist hate: they are the two sides of the same coin.

Portraying differences among peoples using animal surrogates has always been a standard approach in children’s literature. It has also always been controversial: from the “fairy tale wars” of the 1920s to the Great Society programs in the 1960s and to more recent initiatives to expunge public libraries from allegedly controversial or inappropriate material, adults have always invested children’s literature with a great deal of phantasies and anxieties. Once thought as a tool for celebrating human variation and diversity, the practice of enlisting animal as racial proxies for child audiences is now seen by some as fraught with stereotypes and latent racism. As a critic notes, “we expect a white child to find it easy to identify with an animal but not with a Black character. Is the child further removed from a person of another race than another species?” More specifically, why are Asian characters always depicted as panda bears, ninja turtles, or karate chicken? Can biodiversity act as a metaphor for racial diversity? Do narratives about overcoming species bias encourage ethnic tolerance among children? For Leslie Bow, children’s literature mostly reflects adult concerns. Taking D.W. Winnicott’s definition of the teddy bear as an exemplary transitional object for the child, she asks: “by the same token, how do picture books represent transitional phenomena for adults, a site where racial fears and desires also find expression if not also release?” Illustrated books depicting animal characters and how they can get along across species are “racial transitional objects” for adults. Much like stories can help the child work through unconscious pressures, race-as-species characters reveal unconscious adult pressures to promote both color blindness and diversity. Whereas young children may relate more to human characters than anthropomorphized animals, adults prefer to envision democratic inclusion without the messy divisiveness of American racial history.

Transracial adoption

Nowhere is this urge to reassure parents more apparent than in the vast literature that has developed over the past twenty years around transracial adoption. Leslie Bow lists dozens of illustrated books addressing the experience of transnational adoption as transpecies parenthood, from the Ugly Duckling story to mama polar bear and the grizzly cub. Such books aim to reassure the reader of the adoptee’s integration into a loving family despite biological differences. But according to many adult adoptees, such books do not mirror the experiences of transracial adoptees. They present transspecies adoption as the happy resolution of a mother-quest narrative, whereas the reality of intercountry adoption more often reflects a parental quest for a child. They assume a complex chain of inferential reasoning, from visual difference to species, from species to race, from race to different human features, and then require the child to discount the importance of these differences that may not have been perceived in the first place. Adoptive animal parents are very often single and female, leaving the adult companion largely absent. Books emphasize maternal love and caring as the solution to all personal or societal concerns regarding family resemblance or discrimination. They reinforce adoptive parents’ refusal to acknowledge racial difference and racial tensions within the family. The authors of these books are almost exclusively adoptive parents, although a young generation of adopted persons is starting to produce graphic novels reflecting their experience of intercountry adoption for adolescents and young adults. One such book reviewed by Leslie Bow was written by an American-Born Chinese who takes the character of the monkey-king in the classic novel Journey to the West to express his feeling of inadequacy and physical difference.

Moving from anthropomorphic characters to racist kitsch, Leslie Bow explores an archive of mundane household goods personifying East Asian iconography: Asianized chopstick holders and rice bowls, kitchen timers and coin banks, luxury handbags personifying “crazy rich Asians,” and a Mandarin citrus squeezer made by Italian designer Alessi. Given the legacy of white supremacy in the United States, these objects may well be seen as a form of hate speech. They parallel the infamous history of Black mammy cookie jars and Black lawn jockeys that now trade on eBay as collectibles, often bought by African Americans who “collect racism” as pedagogic tools to remind viewers of a repressed history that still produces deep affective responses. In the American context, stereotyping is now recognized as a microaggression that negatively affects the mental health and well-being of people of color. Hence the prohibition of the Indian American mascots of sports teams, ethnic Halloween costumes, brand commodities playing with racist clichés, and various instances of cultural appropriation. Household goods with Asian faces elicit different responses: they are both offensive and inoffensive, an ambivalence that the author experienced herself through her reaction to some items: “I thought it was adorable.” The racist love of cute things characterizes America’s reception of the Japanese aesthetic of kawaii or cute style. For Leslie Bow, cuteness is the aestheticization of powerlessness. The racial cute veils pleasure in domination; it allows for the enjoyment of unequal relations of power, and invokes asymmetries of power underlying racialization. Addressed to children and young women, the kawaii aesthetic marks an association with dependence and innocence. It conflates Orient and accessory, Asian as thing or commodity. It takes delight in the diminutive, the passive, the inscrutable. For the author, “the pleasure surrounding cute commodities, their enactment of complimentary racial stereotyping, masks a fetishistic anxiety surrounding East Asia writ large.” 

Fetishistic anxiety

Fear and anxiety also characterize what the author defines as techno-Orientalism, the projection of an Asianized future fueled by perceptions of economic ascendency in Asia. She analyzes three examples of the embodiment of a posthumanist future centered on Asia: the field of social robotics dominated by Japanese companies and researchers; humanoid robots who disproportionately tend to be modeled as Asian and female; and fictions involving AI characters such as Alex Garland’s Ex Machina. According to Leslie Bow, “techno-Orientalism is tech feeling as anti-Asian bias.” It reproduces the fetishistic structure of feeling that she has identified as racist love: anxiety transformed into pleasure. Attitudes towards artificial intelligence and social robots are often depicted as different in East Asia, compared to western countries where growing dependency on automatons generates negative feelings. In particular, Japan has more robots than any other country with robots contributing to many areas of society, including manufacturing, healthcare, and entertainment. Humanoid robots commercialized by Japanese companies are built as companion machines that establish bonds of sympathy and trust with their owners. But superior research and manufacturing skills in East Asia do not explain why robotic technology is so often embodied as Asian and female. Asian female clones, robotic geishas, mecha women, and digital assistants are coming out of research labs and now populate the reception desks of department stores, the animated stands of gaming conventions, and the imaginaries of Hollywood movies. For Leslie Bow, these robotic dolls reproduce familiar tropes about Asian women: “innocent and passive yet willing to please; sexually desirable but curiously lacking sexual desire; marvelously enhanced yet emotionally fragile.” They reinforce the association between Asian women and modern slavery, sexual exploitation, and human trafficking. The attitude they encourage among their public is highly problematic: boys and adults are encouraged to touch the face, to poke the body, and to aggress verbally in order to elicit reaction. It is as if #MeToo and the obligation of consent never happened. “Our visions of the future are thus tethered to existing social categories and histories even at the moment we imagine transcending them.”

In her last chapter, Leslie Bow turns to contemporary visual art and media engaging fetishism. Asian fetishism is “the quintessential form of racist love”: race fetishism involves sexual objectification and the same processes of reduction and exaggeration bound to the stereotype. Asian women are reduced to hair, eyes, or skin; they are seen as a type in which one individual represents them all. For the author, “the Asian fetish represents a form of harm that reflects a presumably degrading fantasy of reduced personhood, an injurious affront to individuality.” Fetishism is pleasure that masks anxiety: this is the same structure of feeling that has been identified as racist love. Fetishism is not necessarily a bad thing: a case can be made for fetishism as a site of split identifications and queer desires. It can be turned into a productive site of artistic expression. Several such artworks are curated in the book: Laurie Simmons’s photographic series The Love Doll consisting of images of a life-size doll from Japan exposed in various locations and situations; Elisha Lim’s cake sculpture of high-heel boots; Hong Chun Zhang’s collective self-portrait Three Graces depicting Asian women as wholly hair; Japanese artist Mari Katayama creating self-portraits using her own disabled body as a living sculpture; and video artist Laurel Nakadate provocatively engaging lonely white men to convince them to be involved in her videos. In the same way she reacted to racist cute objects with a mix of attraction and repulsion (“I both hate it and love it”), Leslie Bow questions her fascination with fetishistic art, and her scholarly involvement in the field of Asian American studies more generally. Asian American as a category of political visibility is also a type, she remarks, and “my critical and pedagogical practice may inadvertently enforce taboos surrounding race.” What is the point of critique that offers us pleasurable images simultanenous with the message that it’s wrong to enjoy them? How to answer a student who, after a class discussion on race fetishism, requested: “Remind me again why that’s wrong?”

The Uncanny Valley

What’s wrong with racist love is that it can easily turn into racist hate. Hate and love are merely flip sides of the same coin of stereotyping. Roboticians talk about the “uncanny valley” phenomenon, the point at which our reaction to artificial human likeness veers from familiarity into repulsion. As the appearance of a robot is made more human, some observers’ emotional response to the robot becomes increasingly positive and empathetic, until it reaches a point beyond which the response quickly becomes strong revulsion. The tipping point on the continuum between racist love and racist hate is easily crossed. Witness the evolution of relations between the United States and Japan, or with China, over the course of the past century. America and Japan fought as bitter enemies during World War II; yet during the Cold War and beyond, Japan arguably became America’s closest and most reliable ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Sino-American relations show that the “responsible stakeholder” in the global economy can turn in less than a decade into a “strategic competitor” or an existential threat. Within the United States, the “model minority” will regularly transform into a target for envy and aggression. The slur can be indistinguishable from the compliment. This is why fetishistic love, racial scopophilia, and perverse spectatorship are suspect pleasures: they trigger profoundly ambivalent desires split between repulsion and attraction. Racist love is not located in vague and ineffable beliefs or in great conscious or unconscious prejudices—the sky of ideas—but it has a material, corporeal and organic reality. Throughout her book, Leslie Bow approaches it in the series of objects that surround people most closely: children’s picture books, home décor and kitchen tchotchkes, dolls and machines. She cannot hide her own attraction to this Asian paraphernalia; likewise, she suspects that her own investment in Asian American studies may itself be fetishistic. The structure of the fetish (“a story masquerading as an object”) is similar to the structure of feeling that characterizes racist love: anxiety transformed into pleasure, positive attraction as anti-Asian bias. It pursues a satisfaction that is impossible. As Leslie Bow reminds us, “desire is not democratic”: sexual attraction cannot be legislated in the same context as rights violations. Likewise, you cannot judge Hello Kitty figures and children’s books based solely on the criteria of adult critics and scholars: it would be missing the way they “spark joy” and elicit simple pleasures.

War Photos and Peace Signs from Vietnam

A review of Warring Visions: Photography and Vietnam, Thy Phu, Duke University Press, 2022.

Warring VisionsIn April 2015, the Institut Français in Hanoi held a photography exhibition, Reporters de Guerre (War Reporters), marking the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. Curated by Patrick Chauvel, an award-winning photographer who had covered the war for France, the exhibition showcased the work of four North Vietnamese photographers (Đoàn Công Tính, Chu Chi Thành, Tràn Mai Nam, and Hùa Kiêm) whose documenting of the Vietnam War was often overshadowed by photographers from the Western press working from the South. The poster for the cultural event at L’Espace used an iconic image: a black-and-white picture of North Vietnamese soldiers climbing a rope against the spectacular backdrop of a waterfall, taken in 1970 along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Đoàn Công Tính, the photographer, had caught a moment of timeless beauty and strength, an image of mankind overcoming physical hindrances and material obstacles in the pursuit of a higher goal. However, a scandal erupted when Danish photographer Jørn Stjerneklar pointed out on his blog that this iconic image was doctored. He compared two versions, the recent print that appeared in the exhibition and the “original,” which was published in Tính’s 2001 book Khoảnh Khắc (Moments). Tính apologized profusely for “mistakenly” sending the photoshopped image, claiming that the original negative had been damaged and that he accidentally included a copy of the image with a photoshopped background in a CD to the exhibition’s organisers. But in a follow-up article on his blog, Stjerneklar pointed out that even the “original” had been retouched, as evidenced by the repeating pattern of the waterfall, and was likely a montage of another photograph which is displayed at the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City. Stjerneklar’s story was picked up worldwide and ignited a lively debate around the presumed objectivity of photojournalism and the role of photography in propaganda.

Photography and propaganda

That photography was, and still is, part of propaganda in Vietnam was never a secret. Along with my colleagues, I experienced it firsthand during my term as consular counsellor at the French Embassy in Vietnam. When the Institut Français organized photo exhibitions at its flagship cultural center L’Espace in Hanoi, every picture had to be vetted by controlling organs of the government. The answer often came at the last minute, and many photographs were rejected on the basis of obscure criteria. Still, young Vietnamese photographers were enthusiastic about events organized by the French culture center. With the help of French photographer Nicolas Cornet and other professionals, young photography apprentices honed their skills in creative workshops and attended seminars on portfolio building. Some talented photographers held their first solo exhibition at L’Espace before embarking on an international career. In April 2023 (after I had left Vietnam), the Institut Français in Hanoi and its director, Thierry Vergon, initiated the first International Photography Biennale in Hanoi, a major cultural event placed under the aegis of Hanoi’s People’s Committee in partnership with a network of Vietnamese and international partners. More than twenty exhibitions organized on several locations allowed the general public and professionals to discover the wealth of contemporary photography and the treasures of heritage photography in Vietnam. A series of outreach activities were scheduled throughout the Biennale, including workshops to connect stakeholders, roundtables and debates, training sessions, film screenings, and portfolio reviews. The initiative was used by Hanoi City, part of UNESCO’s Creative Cities Network, to bolster its image as a regional hub for culture and innovation. Still under the strictures of a socialist government, a new Vietnamese narrative on photography is slowly emerging. It is based on creativity, not control, and its aim is to put Vietnam’s capital on the map for cultural professionals and creative workers. Alternative visions of Vietnam are seeping through the web of censorship and are flourishing in the rare spaces of unrestricted freedom offered by social networks or independent cultural venues.

Thy Phu’s book Warring Visions shows that creativity was also present in the photographs taken during the Vietnam War (known in Vietnamese as the Resistance War against America.) Vietnamese photographers working for the Hanoi-based Vietnam News Agency (VNA) were no less talented than their Western counterparts operating from the South. War pictures published by the Western press (or by Japan’s) were as much involved in political propaganda as the “socialist ways of seeing Vietnam” that filled the pages of Vietnam Pictorial, an illustrated magazine run by the communist state. War was fought on the front of images, both in Vietnam and within America. Propaganda pictures were also waged by the South Vietnam government, with less international success. For Americans, the Vietnam War still haunts the national psyche with the ignominy of defeat. The war was a watershed in visual history, and the many pictures taken by Western reporters and photographers laid the foundation for battlefield reporting and contemporary photography studies. But as Thy Phu notes, “in addition to overlooking unspectacular forms of representation, the Western press, then as now, neglects Vietnamese perspectives, emphasizing instead the American experience of this war.” The role of Vietnamese photographers, including the many stringers and fixers working for full-time foreign correspondents, is systematically downplayed, although some of them took the most iconic photos that were to shape the imaginaries of the war (such as Napalm Girl, the picture of a naked girl running away from an aerial napalm attack.) But placing the spotlight on photographs taken by Vietnamese war photographers is only half of the story. According to Thy Phu, we need to enlarge the category of war photography, a genre that usually consists of images illustrating the immediacy of combat and the spectacle of violence, pain, and wounded bodies. Pictures depicting wedding ceremonies, family reunions, and quotidian rituals are also part of the Vietnamese experience during the war. Drawing from family photo books from the Vietnamese diaspora, discarded collections found in vintage stores in Ho Chi Minh City, or her own family records, Thy Phu reconstitutes a lost archive of what war in Vietnam might have been like for ordinary citizens.

Socialist ways of seeing Vietnam

The canon of war photography, as well as its most basic principles, were established during the Vietnam War. Pulitzer-winning images exposed the brutality and injustice of war, its toll on the body and on the mind of soldiers, its devastating consequences for civilians and their living environment. According to the profession, war images should by no means be staged or manipulated. They should expose reality as it is, captured on the spur of the moment by a neutral observer. It will come as no surprise to learn that North Vietnamese photographers obeyed to different rules and aesthetic principles. The images that were taken by these propaganda workers are full of positivism and youthful energy. Unlike the photos taken from the South showing the terrible effects of war, the images taken by photographers from the North show young soldiers smiling in front of the camera or caught in the middle of disciplined action, images of incredible romanticism in the middle of war. The goal was, of course, to highlight their heroism in order to stimulate other soldiers and citizens seeing the images. Ideology informed the subject matter of these photographs and guided practitioners into what to look at and how to represent it. Harsh material conditions also shaped the way photographs were taken and circulated. The photographers were foot soldiers in uniform who had been selected from among Hanoi’s university elite and given a crash course training in journalism and photo reporting before being sent to the frontline. Communist allies abroad provided cameras and lenses that were made in East Germany and the USSR. Equipment and film were in such short supply that they were not issued to individual photographers but were stored at the headquarters of organizations such as the Young Pioneers, the Army’s photographic department, and the VNA. In such conditions of scarcity, photographers were forced to shoot sparingly, to compose and stage their images prior to shooting, and to improvise solutions to compensate for the lack of equipment. In the absence of flash bulbs, the flare of rockets fired against a dark sky provided the light necessary for nighttime pictures. Piecing together several shots created an improvised panoramic view without need of a wide-angle lens. War photos were displayed in makeshift jungle exhibitions or village fairs, along with propaganda posters, to uplift the masses and disseminate a “socialist way of seeing” things. Photographs were also distributed to foreigners beyond the Communist bloc, especially to members of antiwar organizations, some of whom received copies of Vietnam Pictorial, an internationally circulated illustrated magazine.

Reviewing past issues of this magazine, three central subjects stand out: the heroic struggle of soldiers, the toil of factory workers and farmers, and the sacrifices of revolutionary Vietnamese women. Beautiful portraits of women harvesting lotus flowers, of young girls playing in poppy fields, or children riding on the back of water buffaloes also adorned the color covers of Vietnam Pictorial, with vibrant colors denoting artificially painted photographs and reminding readers of the bright socialist future for which war was fought. For Thy Phu, the revolutionary Vietnamese woman was more than just an image: it was a symbol, embodying contested visions of women’s role in anticolonial resistance and national reunification. The battle for this symbol was fought on two fronts. On the leadership side, the figure of Nguyễn Thị Bình, the Viet Cong’s chief negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference in 1973, opposed the fierceful Madame Nhu, the de facto First Lady of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1963. Both used feminity for political aims, wearing different styles of áo dài, Vietnam’s traditional dress, as a gendered display of nationalism. In contrast to Madame Bình’s demure attire which singled her out as the sole woman at the negotiating table, Madame Nhu favored a more risqué style of áo dài and did not hesitate to pose in masculinist postures, such as in the famous closeup picture where she is seen firing a .38 pistol. Both camps also sought to glorify women’s contribution to nationalist struggle by enrolling them in mass movements. In the South, Madame Nhu founded the Women’s Solidarity Movement of Vietnam (WSM) in order to give women military training and enroll them in paramilitary groups assisting the armed forces. Women in uniform included Hồ Thị Quế (the “Tiger Lady”), member of the Black Tigers Ranger Battalion, pictured in full battledress looking fiercely at the camera. In the North, young women were recruited en masse in the Youth Shock Brigades, also known as TNXP, and sent to the frontline in order to assist male soldiers or build the Ho Chi Minh trail. The image of “girls with guns” or “long-haired soldiers” stood in stark contrast with the more traditional pictures emphasizing motherhood and family that were used to appeal to the solidarity of women’s antiwar organizations in the United States. But pictures offer fertile ground for projection, misrecognition, and reinvention: the Vietnamese revolutionary woman was reclaimed as a radical chic symbol for American feminist struggles in which she had no part. The Vietnamese Communist Party won the day in the fight over images and symbols associated with womanhood. But as French historian François Guillemot reminds us, Vietnamese women, who represent half of society, suffered more than their half as a result of military conflict and civil war.

Lost archives

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), now known as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, ultimately claimed victory in the war of images and symbols. As a result, war images from the South were censored, erased, and eliminated from the record. They survive as embodied performances of reenactment and remembrance in the dispersed archives of the Vietnamese diaspora. To illustrate the war as seen from the perspective of South Vietnam, Thy Phu takes the example of Nguyễn Ngọc Hạnh who was one of the most respected Vietnamese photographers of his time. He served in the French Army until 1950, then transferred to the Armée Nationale Vietnamienne, which in 1956 became the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). He attended the French Army photography school during the mid-1950s, was designated the official ARVN combat photographer in 1961, and ultimately attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, he was sent to a “re-education camp” with his fellow officers, but survived until he was released through the intervention of Amnesty International in 1983. He emigrated to the U.S. in 1989, where he passed away in 2017. Published in 1969 in collaboration with civilian photographer Nguyễn Mạnh Đan, his book Vietnam in Flames ranks in the top echelon of great Vietnam photobooks, right alongside Philip Jones Griffiths, David Douglas Duncan, and the best of the Japanese photographers. Hạnh made no secret that his photos were staged: he even explained in painstaking detail how he used drops of olive oil to place “tears” on one of his most notable photograph, Sorrow, the portrait of a lovely young woman weeping over the dog tags of her missing companion. As Thy Phu notes, manipulation has been a defining characteristic of war photography from the nineteenth century to the present. Indeed, some of the mots famous war photographs, such as Robert Capra’s The Falling Soldier, are said to be restaged or reenacted. Hạnh nevertheless insisted that his images are authentic documents that register the intensity of the emotions the war engendered. Photographs, like tears, are a social ritual. Whether they are authentic or inauthentic, induced or spontaneous, matters less than the fact that they are to be seen and recognized. As they circulate among the Vietnamese diaspora while they remain censored in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, pictures from Vietnam in Flames contribute to a sense of community through collective suffering, sacrifice, and remembrance.

The two waves of Vietnamese refugees, those who fled in 1975 after the fall of Saigon and the “boat people” who left the country from the late 1970s into the early 1990s, left behind all their personal belongings, including family pictures and photo albums. Those who stayed behind pruned their photo collections of all images reminiscent of the old regime: men in ARVN uniform, pictures betraying friendly connections with Americans, or scenes denoting bourgeois proclivities such as foreign travels and private vacations. Remarkably, however, thousands of those photos have resurfaced in the marketplace in the form of orphan images and albums separated from their original owners and stories. These are images that have been “unhomed”: scattered, lost, or left behind. Together they provide a counter-narrative of the war, a testimony of Southern Vietnamese experiences that have been erased from the record and banished from official history. How to deal with those missing archives, lost memories, and orphaned pictures? What can be learned of family pictures in the absence of a story, when the memories that bring photographs to life are missing from official records and even personal collections? In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, only a scholar is capable of speaking with ghosts. Similarly, only artists can speak to the ghostly presence of these anonymous faces. Thy Phu, who herself assembled a community archive of family photographs and the stories about them, presents the artistic démarche of Dinh Q. Lê, a diaspora Vietnamese artist now based in Ho Chi Minh City and whose work was recognized by major exhibitions in Singapore, Tokyo, New York, and Paris. Since 1998, Lê has been working on a trilogy of installations that feature family photographs, objects that fascinate him because he lost all of his own photographs in the course of his family’s forced migration. Images are stitched together to form fragile-looking, rectangular installations like mosquito nets, or they are cut into enlarged strips that are weaved to form a new picture, superposing the initial faces on the strips and an emerging bigger picture. In his 2022 exhibition at the Quai Branly Museum, one of the weaved picture represented Madame Nhu waving a pistol, an image still taboo in Vietnam but that the artist was able to reinterpret through his own eyes. In another installation, onlookers from the Vietnamese diaspora were invited to pick up images covering the gallery floor and to consult an online database that draws on crowdsourcing to identify lost images of their own family, merging the acts of collecting, remembering, and archiving.

War photography in the age of generative AI

What does Thy Phu’s book tell us about photography censorship and creativity in contemporary Vietnam? How can we interpret war photography in the light of warring visions, ragged memories, and contested identities? The first lesson I learned from Warring Visions is that the distinction between propaganda pictures and war reporting is artificial: in the end, what matters is not political intent, but what we make of it. War pictures will always be used for political purposes. But those that remain in public memory transcend the immediacy of a cause and express universal values, sometimes at odds with the intention of their sponsors. The second lesson is that we need to expand our notion of war photography. Vernacular pictures representing quotidian rites of family life also tell stories about wartime conditions, and these stories must be collected and made known. As a third lesson, we should think hard about authenticity and manipulation of images in the age of generative AI and deep fakes. The indignation that followed Jørn Stjerneklar’s blog article exposing the manipulation of Đoàn Công Tính’s poster in 2015 was in a way misplaced: war pictures can be staged, reframed, doctored, reenacted, and, yes, photoshopped. As historians of war photography tell us, this has always been the case, and we should anticipate more of the same in our technologically savvy future. In my perception, Vietnamese nowadays have a more relaxed attitude to Photoshop than people in Europe or in North America. When I took ID pictures in Hanoi, the result came heavily retouched, with bright eyes and rosy cheeks. To tell the truth, I like the picture more than the original, and I still use it on my identity documents or CV profile. This tradition of retouching pictures goes back a long way, as evidenced by the family portraits and painted photographs from colonial Indochina. It is also linked to the highest levels of Vietnamese statesmanship: as is well known, prior to establishing the DRV in 1945, Hồ Chí Minh led a peripatetic life and worked a number of odd jobs. According to the records of the French police, around 1915-17 he worked as a photo retoucher in Paris by day and meeting leading Communist agitators by night. It is said that this humble experience with visual restoration led him to grasp photography’s political potential. It also taught him to be wary of photography’s role for state surveillance and identity control: only one portrait remains from this period, recognizable by the chipped upper part of his left ear that allowed the French police to check the identity of the Vietnamese revolutionary leader who changed his name and civil status several times over the course of his career.

Parliamentary Abdications: 1933 and 1940

A review of Ruling Oneself Out: A Theory of Collective Abdications, Ivan Ermakoff, Duke University Press, 2008.

Ruling Oneself OutHow can a majority of parliamentarians vote to renounce democracy? Why would a group accept its own debasement and, in doing so, abdicate its capacity for self-preservation? What induces them not only to surrender power, but also to legitimize this surrender by a vote? Which conjuncture allowed democratically elected officials to rule themselves out and allow authoritarian leaders to take full control? This sad reversal of fortune happened on two occasions in the twentieth century. On 23 March 1933, less than one month after the burning of the Reichstag, German parliamentarians gathered at the Kroll Opera House in Berlin passed a bill enabling Hitler to concentrate all powers in his own hands by a majority of 444 to 94, meeting the two-third majority required for any constitutional change. On the afternoon of 10 July 1940, at the Grand Casino in Vichy, a great majority of French deputies and senators—569 parliamentarians, about 85 percent of those who took part in the vote—endorsed a bill that vested Marshal Pétain with full powers, including authorization to draft a new constitution. In these two cases, abdication was sanctioned by an explicit decision—a vote. Both cases gave authoritarian leaders all powers to sideline parliament, suspend the republican constitution, and rule by decree. Both 23 March 1933 and 10 July 1940 are dates which live on in infamy in Germany and in France. As soon as the events occurred, they were to haunt the elected officials who took part in the decision. To borrow Ivan Ermakoff’s words, these were “decisions that people make in a mist of darkness, the darkness of their own motivations, the darkness of those who confront and challenge them, and the darkness of what the future has in store.” Can we shed light on this darkness?

History and context

History is the discipline of context, and it explains an event by putting it into a broader frame. But how much context does a historian need, and how far back is one to investigate to put an historical event into a proper frame? In Ruling Oneself Out, Ermakoff chose to explain the handing over of state powers to Hitler and to Pétain by staying as close to the event as possible. He takes as chronological points of departure the German presidential election of 1932 and the French declaration of war in September 1939, giving a short summary of Germany’s descent into political chaos and France’s ignominious defeat. He concentrates on the moment of decision within the two national parliaments by making a blow-by-blow narrative of those two fateful days, trying to enter the minds of rank-and-file parliamentarians and to account for their every motions and expressions. This is different from the historian’s point of view which usually goes farther back in time and tries to put an event into a causal chain of explaining variables and historical determinants. For instance, in a historical essay written on the spur of the moment, Marc Bloch explained France’s “Strange Defeat” (L’Étrange Défaite) by listing all the personal failings and strategic mistakes made by political and military leaders during the interwar period. German historians have interpreted the rise of Nazism as a “belated post-scriptum” (ein spätes Postskriptum) to the cultural conflict (Kulturkampf) between German Catholics and the central state inaugurated by Bismark’s antichurch policies in 1871, or as the expression of a Sonderweg some see going as far back as Luther’s Reformation. Ermakoff’s goal is not to provide a historical account of the two events but to build a theoretical model, a “theory of collective abdications” that may apply, beyond the two cases of parliamentary suicide, to a broad class of collective situations and outcomes.

In the empirical sciences, and especially for the formal lenses of decision theory, context should be reduced to a minimum. The scientist builds a theoretical model and tests it on a constructed dataset, keeping as close as possible to a controlled experiment. Ermakoff’s study is context-rich and steeped in empirical detail. For him, abstracting the event from its historical context is a crucial mistake. The sources he uses for his enquiry are narrative accounts produced by the actors themselves. These testimonies are either contemporary or retrospective, spontaneous or in response to a request, public stances or private accounts. Especially letters and diaries written immediately after the facts are very helpful to debunk ex post rationalizations. They allow to reconstruct actors’ subjective states as they made their decisions. But all testimonies include a form of self-justification and self-deception. The actors rationalized their decision by portraying it as the only viable and acceptable course of action. The tactical reasons the delegates invoke for themselves are self-serving and often betray a willingness to deceive oneself. As Jean-Paul Sartre has shown, the consciousness with which we generally consider our surroundings is different from our reflecting on this consciousness. The historian has to dig deeper if he wants to examine actors in the process of making their decisions. He has to rely on a range of analytical tools—formal, quantitative, and hermeneutic— and apply them to a variety of historical sources. The theory he offers is primarily a theory of the case. Its scope is limited to the confines of the two historical events. No single determination or macrocausal explanation can account for the result of the two parliamentary votes. The outcome was not predetermined; events could have turned differently. The parliamentary votes of abdication were the end result of a process by which parliamentarians based their opinions on the behavior and declarations of their peers. The collective understanding of a situation is dependent on a series of interactions. In confining the analysis to the moment of decision, both theory and history gain in intelligibility and leverage.

Fear of retaliation, misjudgment, ideological contamination

Ermakoff starts by rejecting the three standard explanations for political acquiescence during these two fateful days: fear, blindness, or treason. Delegates who participated in the decision, and historians after them, argued that they made their choice because they were coerced; because they were deceived; or because they were complicit. The coercion thesis portrays abdication as a forced choice. Miscalculation calls into question the assumption that target actors correctly assess the implications and significance of their decision. Collusion lifts the hypothesis that the challenger and the target actors have conflicting interests. Each explanation holds a degree of validity. Threats and intimidation were certainly present in the context of 1933 Germany. Nazi thugs harassed their opponents with seeming impunity. On the day of the vote, several thousand Nazi activists demonstrated outside the Kroll Opera House, where the parliamentarian session took place. In the meeting room they filled the banks reserved for external observers. In France, the country was under the direct threat of an occupying army, and rumors of latent menaces also suffused the political climate. A vote of no confidence would have entailed Pétain’s resignation and a leap into the abyss. But when so much is at stake, actors can always choose to disregard the threats that are deployed against them. As Ermakoff underscores, they can decide to challenge the odds. At the final moment, the decision is theirs. Likewise, the explanation that abdication was based on misjudgement takes actors’ most common retrospective justification at face value. But Hitler’s intentions were clear for all people to see, and in France Pétain’s mouthpiece Pierre Laval had made it clear that a “yes” vote would mean an end to democracy and the republican regime. Besides, the coercion and the misjudgment arguments miss the fact that the two votes were by no means unanimous. Some parliamentarians took a stand and opposed the delegation of full powers to a single man. In Germany, the Social Democratic delegation unanimously voted against the bill. Despite all appearances in retrospect, acquiescence in March 1933 and July 1940 was not a foregone conclusion.

The third scenario, ideological collusion, takes the deterministic argument to its extreme. Nazism’s rise to power is sometimes interpreted as a result of a class alliance between the ruling elite and Hitler’s party in order to thwart communism and secure the interests of the capitalist owners of production. Similarly, the Vichy vote is seen as a conservative revenge against the Front Populaire that had won the elections and implemented labor-friendly policies in 1936. More generally, the period saw the commitment to democratic institutions dwindle, becoming either tenuous or dubious. German Catholic leaders, it is argued, surrendered to Hitler because they were not entirely immune to an antiliberal frame of mind and an organicist conception of the nation. In France, class-based motivations for a political revenge went along with a rejection of the political regime that had made military defeat possible. According to historian Robert Paxton, “there was no resistance simply because no one wanted to resist.” There is a degree of truth in this argument. Parliamentarians who voted “yes” to Hitler and to Pétain failed in their role to uphold the constitution and maintain democratic institutions. They gave the transition to an authoritarian regime the appearance of legality because they abdicated their political capacity. From a legal perspective, they had no right to give a constitutional blank check to Hitler and to Pétain. Lack of personal courage was ultimately the reason for the delegates’ acquiescence. But accusing a majority of parliamentarians of treason or dereliction of duty misses the point. The social scientist’s role is to interpret and to explain, not to judge or to vindicate. A more fine-grained approach to the mechanics of decision is needed.

Decision under stress

Another line of argument points to the irrational forces at play during the decision process. Delegates were under maximum pressure. Wild rumors were circulating. Fear and anguish spread like a disease. On February 28, the day after the burning of the Reichstag, Hitler had issued an emergency decree “for the protection of the people and the state” that abolished basic civil rights conferred by the Constitution. Germany was veering toward total chaos and civil war. Likewise, France after the defeat was totally disorganized. In Vichy, where authorities had gathered after a chaotic escape away from the advancing German troops, everything had to be improvised. The breakdown of parliamentary groups made interactions more random, more hectic, more informal, less structured, and less predictable than in routine times. In such circumstances, social scientists often emphasize the irrationality of crowds, herd behavior, panic movements, and contagion effects. The collective behavior of a disorganized group can influence people to act a certain way or lose their responsibility. Ermakoff agrees that the explanatory key to the outcome is to be found in the collective dimension of the decision. The focus should be on a collective process of decision making. Diffusion effects and the modeling of interactions should take centerstage, for in situations of radical uncertainty people tend to turn toward their peers to shape their own expectations. Yet what gets diffused is less an emotional state than a strategic assessment of the situation. Contagion, the diffusion of an affective state, is a misleading representation of group behavior, for it implies that the process is purely emotional, affective, and mechanical. Even if the process is nonlinear and the result suboptimal, there is no need to resort to the irrationality of crowds and to abandon the hypothesis of rational behavior.

The crucial factor underlying collective abdications were not threats, blindness, or ideological propensities but the dynamics of expectation formation that took shape among delegates in a context of radical uncertainty and as traditional coordination mechanisms had broken down. Witnessing their world crumbling, delegates turned their eyes to their peers. But they did not know where these peers stood. This situation is a classical setting in game theory, decision science, or empirical finance. And indeed, Ermakoff mobilizes many concepts from these disciplines. His theory of collective abdication builds on the three notions of sequential alignment, local knowledge, and tacit coordination, and uses concepts such as reference groups, prominent actors, action thresholds, tipping points, and common knowledge. Traditional historians may shy away at the evocation of these abstract notions, and may even recoil in horror at the sight of a book’s appendix full of equations and graphs. But Ruling Oneself Out is not a book written for theory’s sake, and its narrational structure remains faithful to disciplinary standards in historiography. It refers to many books written by historians on the two events, and particularly to Robert Paxton’s Vichy France. Historians will be on familiar ground, as game theory or decision science are only mobilized to interpret the historical narrative and analyze data. This sociology to the event stands in stark contrast to the cumbersome constructions of social scientists who only use empirical evidence to advance their theoretical claims. Sociology remains a historical science and cannot abstract itself from its temporal condition in order to offer an abstract modeling of social systems. Here, formal tools and abstract theories remain at the service of explaining the facts.

When democracies fail

Ruling Oneself Out offers many valuable lessons for today’s social scientists and committed citizens. The choice to concentrate on two episodes when democracies surrendered on their own free will is significant: it shows in particular that the failure of democracies was not a preordained conclusion. Things could have turned differently. Historical outcomes are not the result of deterministic forces and collective interests: individual decisions matter. And so does politics. In particular, parliamentarians are bestowed with a great burden of responsibility and accountability. Their decisions can make or break a constitutional order. They are the guardians of the democratic temple, and their failure in protecting the sacred treasure that they have in charge can have dramatic consequences. Ermakoff also offers a lesson in applied social science, or historical sociology. He used the best conceptual tools available at his time, without falling into the trap of theory fetishism of math graph envy. His book combines various methods of analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, which are rarely used together. It remains an historical account of two significant events, in which the lay reader will learn a lot. In this perspective, theory and evidence should go hand in hand. Being faithful to “how things actually happened,” to take Leopold von Ranke’s definition of history, does not imply a rejection of formal models or theoretical constructions. The role of parliaments offer a particularly rich material for theoretically inclined social scientists. Parliaments’ archives contain a trove of empirical data, both textual and statistical. They are open to the public, and easily lend themselves to participant observation or ethnographic work. A young French sociologist, Etienne Ollion, has recently published a book on the functioning of the French National Assembly using state-of-the-art narrative techniques and quantitative tools, including statistical techniques derived from artificial intelligence. I hope his book, Les candidats, gets translated into English.

A Flash in Japan

A review of The Flash of Capital: Film and Geopolitics in Japan, Eric Cazdyn, Duke University Press, 2002.

The Flash of CapitalThe “flash of capital” refers to the way the underlying structure of a national economy “flashes” or reverberates through the films it produces, and how cinema critique can highlight the relations between culture and capitalism, film aesthetics and geopolitics, movie commentary and political discourse, at particular moments of their transformation. A flash is not a reflection or an image, and Eric Cazdyn does not subscribe to the reflection theory of classical Marxism that sees cultural productions as a mirror image of the underlying economic infrastructure. Karl Marx posited that the superstructure, which includes the state apparatus, forms of social consciousness, and dominant ideologies, is determined “in the last instance” by the “base” or substructure, which relates to the mode of production that evolves from feudalism to capitalism and then to communism. Transformations of the mode of production lead to changes in the superstructure. Hungarian philosopher and literary critic György Lukács applied this framework to all kinds of cultural productions, claiming that a true work of art must reflect the underlying patterns of economic contradictions in the society. Rather than Marx’s and Lukács’ reflection theory, Cazdyn’s “flash theory” is inspired by post-marxist cultural theorists Walter Benjamin and Fredric Jameson, and by the work of Japan scholars Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian (the two editors of the collection at Duke University Press in which the book was published). For Cazdyn, how we produce meaning and how we produce wealth are closely interrelated. Cultural productions such as films give access to the unconscious of a society: “What is unrepresentable in everyday discourse is flashed on the level of the aesthetic.” Films not only reflect and explain underlying contradictions but, more importantly, actively participate in the construction of economic and geopolitical transformations.

 Reflection theory and flash theory

 The Flash of Capital concentrates on those critical moments of Japanese modern history during which the forms of both cinematic and capitalist categories mutate. The author identifies three such mutations of Japanese modernity: (1) between being colonized and being a colonizer nation of the pre-World War II moment; between the individual and collective of the postwar moment; and between the national and the transnational of the contemporary situation. Colonialism, Cold War, globalization: these are the three moments that Cazdyn addresses through thematic discussions of cinematic visuality, of film historiography, of literary adaptations, of amateur acting, of pornography, and of aesthetic experiments. Rather than a linear history, he prefers to concentrate on key moments of transformation during which formal inventions on the level of the film aesthetic figure a way out of impossible situations before a grammar becomes available to make sense of them. By paying close attention to the details of cinematic texts, he reads the works of Japanese directors and film critics as so many symptoms of the most pressing social problems of the day. Cazdyn borrows from Fredric Jameson and other literary critics the technique of symptomatic reading, a mode of reading literary and cinematic works which focuses on the text’s underlying presuppositions. A symptomatic reading is concerned with understanding how a text comes to mean what it does as opposed to simply describing what it means or represents. In particular, it tries to determine what a particular text is unable to say or represses because of its ideological conviction, but that transpires at the formal level through flashes, allegories, and aesthetic choices. The films that Cazdyn passes under review occur at historical junctures in which the social and political events are difficult to articulate. There does not seem to be an effective language with which to express the transformations taking place at key moments of Japanese modernity. But, as Cazdyn notes, “some filmmakers take more risks than others. They risk speaking in a language for which there is no established grammar.”

 Japanese cinema has a peculiar affinity with the history of capitalist development. The movie industry is literally coeval with Japanese modernity: in the case of Japan, the history of film and the history of the modern nation share approximately the same span of time, both emerging in the 1890s. In addition, the one-hundred-year anniversary of film in Japan coincided with the fifty-year anniversary of the end of World War II. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that almost every history of Japanese film has used the history of the nation to chart its course. The three moments that The Flash of Capital choses to concentrate on are key turning points in Japanese modern history. They are also periods when Japanese cinema was particularly productive, with successive “Golden Ages” that have marked the history of Japanese cinema for a worldwide audience. The 1930s, the postwar period up to the late 1960s, and the 1990s were times fraught with contradictions. The antinomies and tensions between colonization and empire, between the individual and the collective, and between the national and the transnational made an imprint of the films produced during these periods, both at the level of content and in the formal dimension of aesthetic choices and scenic display. It is interesting to note that these moments have also produced canonic histories of Japanese cinema, both in print and through cinematic retrospectives. Cazdyn conducts a formal analysis of six histories of Japanese films, two of which are themselves films. The first historiographic works in the 1930s and early 1940s set the terms for a theory of cinema that was heavily influenced by Marxism and by nationalism; the 1950s saw the publication of Tanaka Jun’ichirō’s monumental encyclopedia of Japanese movies and Donald Richie and Joseph Anderson’s The Japanese Film; and the 1990s was marked by the one-hundred anniversary of Japanese cinema, with yet another four-volume encyclopedia and a film retrospective by Oshima Nagisa. Among scholars and students in the West, Richie and Anderson’s book has been a constant reference and has gone through a series of republications; it is, however, distinctly anticommunist and heavily marked by the Cold War context.

Colonialism, Cold War, globalization

 Cazdyn begins his discussion of the first period with an Urtext of Japan’s cinematography: the recording in 1899 of a scene from the kabuki drama Momojigari by the actor Ichikawa Danjūrō (the stage name of a lineage of actors that goes back to the seventeenth century down to the present). Attending a screening held at his private residence, Danjūrō was shocked by his own image staring back at him and made it clear that the film should never be screened during his lifetime. But he later agreed that a presentation of the movie reels at an event in Osaka he was unable to attend was more satisfactory than a performance by another kabuki troupe. This episode set the terms—repetition, reproductibility, ubiquity, copy rights, distribution networks, mass production—by which the movie industry later operated. By the 1930s, cinema had become well entrenched in Japan. The early figures of the onnagata (men playing women’s roles) and the benshi (commentator integrated into the story), taken from similar roles in the traditional performing arts (kabuki, noh, bunraku), had given way to the modern talkie movie, a star system based on female actors, and genres divided between jidai-geki (period dramas) and gendai-geki (modern dramas). Film adaptations (eiga-ka) of literary works of fiction (shōsetsu) served to gain legitimacy for cinema as an art form, circumvent censorship, consolidate a literary cannon, and affirm the superiority of the original through fidelity-based adaptations. The writer Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, who had offered his own theory of adaptation through his successive translations into modern Japanese of the Tale of Genji, criticized the filmization of his novel Shunkinshō by pointing out the erasing of multiple levels of narration and identity that was so central to his work. When Tanizaki’s novel is reduced to mere narrative content, “all that remains are the most reactionary and conservative elements.” For the author, Tanizaki’s aesthetic choices, and the films produced by the first generation of Japanese directors, were inextricably related to the most crucial issues facing the Japanese nation in the 1930s: the rise of militarism and the backsliding of democracy, the colonization of large swathes of Asia, the rejection of Western values in favor of Japanese mores. Remaining silent about these issues, like Tanizaki in his novels or Ozu Yasujirō in his early movies, are charges that can be held against the authors.

 The second Golden Age of Japanese cinema, and a high point of Japanese capitalist development, arose from the rubbles of World War II, found its most vivid expressions in the 1950s and early 1960s, and culminated in the avant-garde productions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Out of this second period emerged not only a studio system modeled on Hollywood, but an impressive number of great auteurs that have become household names in the history of artistic cinema. Ozu’s challenging formal compositions, Kurosawa’s intricate plots, and Imamura’s nonlinear temporalities are immediately recognizable and have influenced generations of movie directors in the West and in Asia. The postwar period, which coincided with the Cold War, was marked by the subjectivity debate or shutaisei ronsō, which influenced popular ideas about nationalism and social change. For the postwar generation of left-leaning intellectuals, a sense of self—of one’s capacity and legitimacy to act as an individual and to intervene against the state and collective opinion—was crucial to keep the nation from ever being hijacked again by totalitarianism. But at the same time, the individual was summoned to put the interests of big corporations, administrative structures, and the Japanese nation as a whole before his or her own personal fulfillment, and to sacrifice the self in favor of economic development. In the context of the movie industry, the attempt to transcend the contradiction between the individual and the collective was resolved by positing a third term: the “genius” filmmaker who breaks out of the rigid structure and trumps the other two terms. The “great man theory” claims that an individual can rise up and produce greatness within—if not transcend—any structure. The same emphasis on the power of the filmmaker characterized film adaptations of literary works in the period. Encouraged by the Art Theater Guild, eiga-ka movies took liberties with the original text either by focusing on a particular section or adding content to the narrative. Shindō Kaneto’s 1973 adaptation of Kokoro, for example, deals only with the third letter of Sōseki’s famous shōsetsu, while in Ichikawa Kon’s Fires on the Plain the soldier-narrator of Ōoka Shōhei’s novel is shot and killed at the end instead of going to a mental hospital.

The withering away of the nation-state

 The era of globalization, the third period in Eric Cazdyn’s survey of movie history, marks a transformation in the operations of the nation-state and in the aesthetics of Japanese cinema. The problem of globalization is the problem of a globalized system in which nations are steadily losing their sovereignty but where state structures and ideological models cling to an outdated form of representation. The political-economic and the cultural-ideological dimensions do not move at the same speed: at the precise moment in which the decision-making power of the nation-state is declining, nationalist ideologies and identities are as strong as ever. Some authors combined a renewed emphasis on the nation with the full embrace of globalization. For Ōshima Nagisa, the enfant terrible of the Japanese New Wave, national cinema is dead, and Japan is being bypassed by the transnational forces of capital. In Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence (1983), he represents the Japanese from the viewpoint of the white prisoners of war. In L’Empire des sens (1976), the pornographic nature of the film does not lie in the content (although the actors Matsuda Eiko and Fuji Tatsuya are “really doing it”) but in the form of reception: the Japanese conversation about the film was almost entirely consumed by questions of censorship, while in France, where it was first released, the film was geared towards a general audience—and foreign visitors: Ōshima noted that one out of every four Japanese who traveled to France had seen the movie. For Cazdyn, a film that makes history is “a film that represents a transformation before it has happened, a film that finds a language for something before a language has been assigned, a film that flashes the totality of modern Japanese society in a way that is unavailable to other forms of discourse.” Rather than commenting on blockbuster movies and costly productions, he choses to read political allegories in experimental films such as Tsukamoto Tetsuya’s Tetsuo (1988) or the documentary films of Hara Kazuo such as Yukiyukite shingun (Naked Army, 1987). He even finds inspiration in adult videos, which he sees as a compromise between guerrilla-style documentaries on the left and reality TV on the right. He notes that approximately seventy-five percent of current adult-video films in Japan are documentary-style—that is, their narratives are not couched in fiction, but follow a male character walk the streets looking for sex and engaging women to that end. Similarly, in his documentaries, Hara Kazuo can often be heard asking questions and provoking situations. His films make change happen into the real.

Eric Cazdyn is well-versed in the history of Japanese Marxism and makes it a central tenet of his theorization of Japanese cinema. He refers to the pre-war Marxist debate between the Kōza-ha (the faction that remained loyal to the Japanese Communist Party and the Komintern) and Rōnō-ha (the faction that split from the JCP in 1927 and argued that a bourgeois revolution had been achieved with the Meiji Restoration). Another school of Marxism, the Uno-ha, was the school of the late Tokyo Imperial University economist Uno Kōzō, who was probably the single most influential postwar Japanese economist on the domestic academic scene. Uno drew a distinction between a pure theory of capitalism, a theory of its historical phases, and the study of concrete societies. He concentrated on the first, and dedicated himself to working through the most theoretical problems of Marx’s Capital, such as the labor theory of value, the money circuit represented by the M-C-M’ formula, commodity fetishism, and the recurrence of crises. Moving to the present, Cazdyn pays tribute to Karatani Kōjin, a contemporary philosopher and interpreter of Marx’s thought that has attracted a vast followership. Marxism has had a lasting influence on Japan’s intellectual landscape, and has impacted the work of many filmmakers in the course of the past century. Cazdyn recalls that many intellectuals joined film clubs in the late 1920s and early 1930s because they were some of the only places where members could read Marx’s Capital without falling prey to censorship and repression. But this utopian space was soon discovered, and by 1935 Marxist intellectuals were either behind bars, had retreated to their private space, or had embraced right-wing nationalism. Illustrative of this wave of political commitment is the Proletarian Filmmaker’s League or Prokino. Cold War histories of Japanese cinema have disparaged this left-wing organization by pointing out “the extremely low quality of its products.” Cazdyn rehabilitates the work of its main theorist, Iwasaki Akira, and of film documentarist Kamei Fumio, who treated montage as a “method of philosophical expression.”

New publics for old movies

What is the relevance of these references to Marxist theory and obscure works of documentary or fiction for contemporary students of Japanese cinema in North America and in Europe? Cazdyn highlights the changing demographics of the classes that enroll in his discipline: “Students were primarily attracted to the arts and Eastern religion in the 1960s and 1970s; in the 1980s, they were chasing the overvalued yen; and today, they are consumed by (and consumers of) Japanese popular culture—namely manga and anime.” He also notes that the study of national cinema as an organizing paradigm has lost much of its appeal. The academic focus is now on films that address issues of minorities in Japan—post-colonial narratives, feminist films, LGBT movies, social documentaries—or on transnational productions in which Japanese identity is diluted into a pan-Asian whole. But academics should not project their current global and professional insecurities onto the screen of cinema history. The demise of the nation-state, and the dilution of national cinema into the global, is not a foregone conclusion. Movies produced in Japan today do not seem to appear less Japanese than the ones made one or two generations ago. There is still a strong home bias in the preferences of viewers, who favor locally produced movies over foreign productions. Japanese films that are popular abroad do not necessarily make it big in Japan, and the art movie theaters or international festivals often include films that are completely unknown in their domestic market. The economic and geopolitical context matters for understanding a movie, but not in the sense that Cazdyn implies. The author’s knowledge of the real functioning of an economy is inversely proportional to his investment in Marxist theory. He confesses that his interest does not hinge “on the profits and losses incurred by the film industry in Japan.” But supply and demand, profits and losses, and production and distribution circuits matter for the evolution of cinema over the ages, and a theory that claims to conceptualize the link between films and their socio-economical context must grapple with economic realities, not just outmoded Marxist fictions.

From Occupy Wall Street to Black Lives Matter

A review of Policing Protest: The Post-Democratic State and the Figure of Black Insurrection, Paul A. Passavant, Duke University Press, 2021.

Policing ProtestLet’s begin with a tale of two cities. The first—let’s call it Gotham—is a city where crime and violent protest run rampant. Hoodlums and thugs control the streets. City Hall is corrupt and incompetent. Police officers are powerless. An anti-Western, anti-rationalist, racialist, segregationist ideology has declared war against individual freedom and freedom of thought. Vigilante groups have taken control of entire neighborhoods and established a reign of permanent violence, looting businesses, attacking representatives of public authority, setting fire to courts of law and to the premises of police departments. The chaos that accompanied the takeover of these Red Guards has caused dizzying increases in crime. Even so, influent voices are calling for the defunding of police and the abolition of prison. Law enforcement officers have to obey strict rules of engagement. They have to wear body cameras to record their interactions with the public or gather video evidence of their eventual mishandling of a situation. There are discussions about streaming these video feeds online, in real time. The second city—dubbed The Big Apple—is a place where a militarized police patrols the streets like an occupation army, clamping down on any form of dissent. Business interests have privatized vast portions of the public space, evacuating any undesirable people including climate change activists, protesters distributing antiwar pamphlets, or trade union picketers who could disrupt the consumer’s experience. With the full support of politicians, police forces have responded to a previous wave of crime with a zero tolerance policy they now apply to all kinds of public protest, in violation of the First Amendment of the American Constitution. This “Broken Windows” doctrine has had no effect on crime, but now justifies disproportionate use of force, excessive length of custody, and “shock and awe” tactics against protesters. People demonstrating for social justice or against racism are treated like criminals and are arrested without any legal basis. Democracy is undermined, and the government increasingly behaves like an authoritarian state.

A Tale of Two Cities

The first city is a fiction. It exists only in the alt-right world of alternative facts and post-truth reporting. The second city is how Paul Passavant describes the evolution of law enforcement and order maintenance in the United States. Policing Protest is a political science book that documents the rise of a “post-democratic state” in America through an analysis of the way police has become more hostile to protesters, thwarting the rights of free speech and free assembly enshrined in the American Constitution. It is based on legal analysis of court decisions, proceedings from civil actions against the NYPD, interviews with activists and with lawyers, reference to press coverage and books recounting the Occupy Wall Street movement, and textual analysis of video footage and testimonies. Although it uses standard tools of the social sciences, the research methodology does not include participant observation or questionnaire survey research, which constitute the Gold Standard in sociology. Passavant builds on a large previous scholarship highlighting a perceived decline in the guarantees offered to rights of free speech and assembly in America. Scholars have documented how policing in the United States became increasingly militarized in the 1980s and 1990s. Some point to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, as causing more repressive practices in law and policing. Others see evidence of a repressive turn as early as the 1970s, instrumented as a backlash against recently conquered civil rights. Still for others, police is inherently hostile to civil rights activists and anti-racist protesters. For the proponents of Afro-pessimism, anti-Blackness is a constituent element of policing in the United States. Passavant rejects both the essentialism of Afro-pessimism and the historicism of descriptions based on rational choice theory. For him, we should analyze the hostility against Black Lives Matter as a political antagonism, not an ontological condition. But police’s excessive response to protesting should not be seen as a rational response based on utilitarian efficiency. Passavant highlights the significance of affective attachment to “kicking ass” that goes beyond instrumental rationality of the neoliberal state. He describes the emergence of a “post-democratic, postlegitimation state shaped by neoliberal authoritarianism and haunted by the figure of black insurrection.”

Police abuse of force against protesters became a political issue in the United States at the end of the 1960s. Images in the media of civil rights marchers in Birmingham or Selma, Alabama, or protesters at the 1968 Democratic National Convention being attacked by police, or antiwar demonstrators being killed by the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University, shocked the national conscience. Formed in 1967 to investigate the causes of civil disorder that had culminated in the urban riots of the summer this year, the Kerner Commission attributed the race riots to lack of economic opportunity for African Americans and Latinos, failed social service programs, police brutality, racism, and the orientation of national media to white perspectives. The 426-page report became an instant bestseller. It set into motion reforms to make police more legally accountable and to steer protest policing into a more tolerant direction. Beginning in some cities in the 1970s, the “negotiated management” model of protest policing emphasized dialogue and collaboration between police departments and groups planning acts of civil disobedience as part of a demonstration. Under the new model, police should expect and tolerate a certain amount of disruption to everyday routines when citizens exercise their First Amendment rights. During protests, police should avoid using force, and refrain from making arrests except when absolutely necessary. Arrestees should be processed with diligence and a certain degree of leniency. This model was in sharp contrast to the previous model of “escalated force” emphasizing brutal show of force and early dispersal, which was perceived as inciting an aggressive response from protesters. But the Kerner Commission report and the new model of protest policing met with fierce opposition. In December 1967, the Miami police chief uttered the now-infamous phrase, “When the looting starts, the shooting starts.” Richard Nixon placed his 1968 presidential campaign under the banner of the “forgotten Americans,” the “non-demonstrators” who are “not guilty of the crime that plagues the land.” Conflating civil rights demonstrations, urban riots, and street crime, he set in motion a “war against crime” that was fought by his successors.

Broken Windows

In 1982, The Atlantic published the essay “Broken Windows” by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson. This controversial theory states that visible signs of crime, anti-social behavior and civil disorder create an urban environment that encourages further crime and disorder. Starting with the NYPD, police departments began to target minor forms of disorder with zero tolerance in the 1990s. According to Passavant, “the transformation of policing in the direction of zero tolerance, quality of life, order maintenance policing, and enjoyment of ‘kicking ass’ was at odds with the principles of tolerance and restraint informing the negotiated management model of protest policing.” A new style of protest policing, dubbed “command and control,” emphasizes inflexible regulatory practices, strategic incapacitation based on risk assessment and surveillance, shock and awe tactics of disproportionate display of force, extralegal intimidation of protesters, and punitive postarrest detentions. This shift from negotiated management to more aggressive and violent protest policing methods can be attributed to three interrelated crises: a crisis of democracy, an urban fiscal crisis, and a crime crisis. To illustrate the first crisis, Passavant takes the example of Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of public space, such as the exercise of free speech in shopping malls and urban centers, as the sign of a deeper crisis in political culture: commercial interests are encouraged at the detriment of democratic expression. To compensate the contraction of fiscal revenue caused by the exodus to suburbia, cities began to reorient their infrastructure away from residents and toward nonresidents who might visit city centers: consumers, tourists, and visitors attracted by sporting events or cultural manifestations. Lastly, the perception of a “crime wave” in the 1960s and 1970s led to the militarization of police and the abandonment of the negotiated management model of protest policing.

By looking at how the NYPD policed the 2004 Republican National Convention (RNC), Passadant argues that when cities host mega-events, they are left with a security legacy that persists after the event is over. This legacy takes the form of armored vehicles, military-grade weapons, or security cameras that become embedded within the fabric of the urban environment. In the case of New York, politically motivated intelligence gathering and needlessly punitive arrest processing practices were first institutionalized during the organization of the 2004 RNC. When a city hosts a mega-event classified as a national special security events by the secretary of Homeland Security, it becomes eligible for federal money to enhance security. The Secret Service becomes the lead federal agency for developing and implementing security for the event, coordinating federal agencies and state and local police. Cities want to avoid a breach in security at all costs. The fear a repetition of the events that plagued Seattle’s 1999 hosting of the WTO’s ministerial conference, when massive street protests disrupted the event and caused mayhem in the city. But being perceived as capable of hosting a mega-event is also a powerful marketing tool for a city, as it generates a large economic windfall in the form of increased tourism and commercial activity. Like New Orleans’ hosting of the Super Bowl after Hurricane Katrina, New York submitted bids for several mega-events after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and was successful for its hosting of the 2002 World Economic Forum and the 2004 RNC. The first event was a rehearsal for the preparation of the second, which in turn shaped the way the NYPD reacted to Occupy Wall Street and to Black Lives Matter. Post-event assessments emphasized the perceived psychological effects of major shows of force, the role of intelligence or surveillance like the use of “undercovers” to infiltrate groups of protesters, and the NYPD’s “proactive arrest policy” directed against potential rioters. Hosting mega-events therefore produces a multiplier effect spurring the securitization of policing and urban environments. Much as the “Broken Windows” theory encouraged a horizontal dissemination of policing practices, the vertical dissemination of surveillance and control after a national special security event shapes institutions and methodologies in police departments long after the mega-event is over.

From OWS to BLM

Occupy Wall Street (OWS) left in its wake a paper trail of civil actions against the NYPD and other police departments, who were accused of excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests. It was a legally literate movement, with “legal observers” embedded among participants to document possible violations of civil rights by the police and later defend activists in courts. NYPD was found guilty of trespassing the law on many counts. But court decisions came too late to remedy the NYPD’s preemption of constitutional rights in the streets. They also failed to make the NYPD financially accountable for their policing, as civil damages arising from judicial settlements were absorbed into New York’s citywide budget. The case of a public administration violating its own laws raises a broader question. According to Max Weber, the monopoly of the legitimate use of force defines the rational-legal state and is used in an efficient and orderly manner. But there was nothing rational or orderly in the use of force by the NYPD during OWS protests. The overwhelming numbers of police dedicated to street demonstration and their heavy anti-riot equipment were displayed to intimidate protesters and force them into submission. There were numerous acts of verbal abuse and physical brutality. Rules were applied arbitrarily: in some cases, police would conduct arrests for even the slightest infraction such as putting one foot into the street when only use of the sidewalk was allowed. In other cases, illegal or unruly conducts on the part of demonstrators were tolerated and even encouraged or provoked. For Passavant, the role of excess is indicative of an affective attachment to the repressive nature of neoliberal order maintenance policing. Some police officers enjoyed “kicking ass” and reveled in the disorder they were causing. The arbitrary, aggressive, and overwhelming police behavior was calculated in order to cause fear and anger among the otherwise nonviolent crowd. As an aside, “this also had the effect of diverting the Occupy movement away from its political purpose of protesting economic inequality to a preoccupation with the NYPD.” Polices forces were not alone in reacting affectively to demonstrations and in enjoying the disorder they were causing: videos posted on YouTube of police subjecting protesters to violent treatment have become viral, eliciting in their comment thread a range of reactions going from indifference (“whatever”) to sadistic pleasure (“LOL”).

The death of Eric Garner at the hands of the police on July 17, 2014, was one of the events that helped trigger the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. When the NYPD local commander was informed by text message that Garner was “most likely DOA” (dead on arrival), he responded, “Not a big deal.” In Ferguson, Missouri, where black teenager Michael Brown was shot multiple times and killed by a police officer on August 9, 2014, imposing a fine on poor and black citizens for minor violations of the law and then issuing a warrant when they failed to comply was a kind of “primitive accumulation” that provided the city with 25 percent of its fiscal revenue. This is a kind of police “who enjoys impunity, and who are supported by political subjects who enjoy their enjoyment of impunity.” Much as the NYPD sought to repress, intimidate, and defeat Occupy Wall Street, it treated Black Lives Matter as a political enemy to be defeated by any means necessary. The full spectrum of repressive measures were used against the BLM movement: battlefield tactics of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, deployment of military-grade weapons such as LRADs, surveillance by counterterrorism units and undercover police, interception or blurring of communication signals, preventive arrests and grueling detention conditions. According to Passavant, these reactions are haunted by the specter of black insurrection. The protests and riots of the 1960s continue to weigh on the present. At the same time, the responses envisaged at the time—addressing inequalities in education, housing, employment, and degrading conditions of welfare—have now vanished from the political horizon.

Echoes beyond the United States

The conflation of civic protest and violent riots presented in the opening vignette (the “tale of Gotham”) is not new. In the 1960s, conservatives complained that the civil rights movement was spreading “mass lawlessness and violence,” when in fact it was the disorderly response of the authorities that fueled unrest and turmoil. Should we trust empirical evidence or alternative facts? Unfortunately, when they originate in the United States, both facts and fiction are export products. They influence the way other Western states organize their police forces, and how they perceive protests as a result of a “woke” ideology of ethnic polarization. European authorities and commentators took different attitudes regarding the two social movements reviewed in Policing Protest, Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter. It must be remembered that OWS was met with a great deal of sympathy in Europe, where hostility to market forces and unfettered capitalism runs deep. European cities became the center of occupation movements that paralleled the protests in New York and other American cities. In France, a political manifesto penned by Stéphane Hessel, a respected figure from the left, Time for Outrage! (“Indignez-vous !”), sold more than one million copies in a few months. In Spain, the Indignados Movement led to the creation of the Podemos political party that entered a coalition government with the left-of-center Socialists. Occupation of public places and urban parks, in large part self-disciplined, was monitored by the police without any major incident. The BLM movement was met with more reservation and dismissal. Denunciation of structural racism and police abuse of force strike a sensitive chord in countries like France, where political leaders reject all references to “police violence” (the preferred terms are “response to provocations” or “excessive use of force”) and deny that systemic racism in French institutions can even be an issue. On the one hand, police forces and the governments that mandate them try to avoid unnecessary deaths at all costs. They fear death at the hand of the police can spark violent riots and turmoil, as was indeed the case in France in 2005 and then again in June 2023. On the other hand, the same evolution toward the militarization of law and order and the escalation in the use of force can also be observed in Europe. How can we reconcile the categorical imperative “Thou shalt not kill” with the brutalization of order maintenance methods? There are no definite answers, but the reflection proposed by Paul Passavant in Policing Protest also finds echoes in Europe.

Indian Software Engineers and the Power of Algorithms  

A review of Virtual Migration: The Programming of Globalization, A. Aneesh, Duke University Press, 2006.

Virtual MigrationA. Aneesh first coined the word algocracy, or algocratic governance, in his book Virtual Migration, published by Duke University Press in 2006. He later refined the term in his book Neutral Accent, an ethnographic study of international call centers in India (which I reviewed here), and in subsequent work in which he preferred to use the term algorithmic governance. What is algocracy? Just as bureaucracy designates the power of bureaus, the administrative structures within large public or private organizations, algocracy points toward the power of algorithms, the lines of code underlying automatic expert systems, enterprise software solutions and, increasingly, artificial intelligence. Power and authority are increasingly embedded in algorithms that inform and define the world of automated teller machines, geographical positioning systems, personal digital assistants, digital video, word processing, databases, global capital flows, and the Internet. In Virtual Migration, Aneesh made the distinction between three types of organizational governance: the bureaucratic mode (rule by the office), the panoptic mode (rule by surveillance), and the algocratic mode (rule by code). Each form of governance corresponds to different technologies, organizations, and subjectivities. This classification is loosely connected to Max Weber’s classical distinction between three types of legitimate authority that characterize human societies, especially as they evolve from simple to more complex social organizations built upon shared norms, values, and beliefs. The German sociologist called these three types charismatic authority, traditional authority, and rational-legal authority. Charismatic authority comes from the personal charisma, strength, and aura of an individual leader. The legitimacy of traditional authority comes from traditions and customs. Rational-legal authority is a form of leadership in which command and control are largely tied to legal rationality, due process of law, and bureaucracy. Proposing the new concept of algocracy raises many questions. Is the rule of code perceived as legitimate, or how is the issue of legitimacy displaced by a new form of governance that doesn’t rest on human decision? How does this lack of human agency affect the functioning of democratic institutions? Does it have an effect on social asymmetry, inequity, and inequality? What are the intersections between algocracy and surveillance (the panoptic mode) and organizational design (the bureaucratic mode)?

What is algocracy?

But first, it is important to understand that algocratic governance is a sociological concept, grounded in the standard methodologies of social science. It is not a computer science concept, although software engineers and scientists deal with algorithms on a daily basis. Nor is it a philosophical notion that an intellectual builds out of thin air in his or her cabinet. Sociology has a long tradition of theory-building that goes through the steps of observation, categorization, and association. Participant observation is one type of data collection method typically used in qualitative research and ethnography; it constitutes the golden standard in anthropology and several branches of sociology. Other methods of data gathering include non-participant observation, survey research, structured interviews, and document analysis. Based on the collected dataset, the researcher makes generalizations from particular cases, tests the explanatory power of concepts, and builds theory through inductive reasoning. In contrast to Neutral Accent, Virtual Migration is not based on participant observation but was conducted through a qualitative methodology the author characterizes as critical, comparative, and exploratory. Aneesh conducted more than a hundred interviews with Indian programmers, system analysts, project managers, call center workers, human resource managers, and high-level executives, including CEOs, managing directors, and vice-presidents, both in India and in the United States. He also observed shop floor organization and work processes in twenty small, mid-size, and large software firms in New Delhi, Gurgaon, and Noida. The conceptualization of algocracy came to him through a simple observation. When an Indian dialer in a call center answers the phone or fills in the “fields” on a computer screen, these actions are constrained by the underlying computer system that directs the calls and formats the information to fill in. The operator “cannot type in the wrong part of a form, or put the address in the space of the phone number for the field may be coded to accept only numbers, not text; similarly, an agent cannot choose to dial a profile (unless, of course, they eschew the dialer and dial manually). The embedded code provides existing channels that guide action in precise ways.”

In order to come to this epiphany, Aneesh had to immerse himself in fieldwork and grapple with questions that connect the local and the particular to wider transnational trends. The context provides some understanding of the challenges the researcher was facing. The rise of the Indian IT industry was boosted by the so-called Millennium Bug, also known as Y2K: approaching the passage to the year 2000, there was widespread fear that the “00” date that would start from the last midnight of 1999 could cause computers to malfunction, since they might interpret it as the 00 for 1900. India’s fledging IT companies sensed the opportunity and offered their services.They sent software specialists onsite to fix the computer systems of large US corporations, and operated from a distance through increased bandwidth and Internet cable links. This was also a time when outsourcing and offshoring of service activities became an issue in the United States. The transferring of jobs from the United States to countries with lower labor standards and environmental protection became a dark symbol of globalization. The effect of international trade and global economic integration on workers’ rights, human rights, and the environment was hotly debated. In Seattle during December 1992, four days of massive street protests against the World Trade Organization turned the city into a battle ground. Globalization was attacked from the right and from the left. The nativist right criticized the loss of manufacturing jobs and the tide of immigrants that were flooding American cities, disrupting the social fabric and diluting national identity. The social justice left denounced the erosion of workers’ rights in the US and the prevalence of child labor and over forms of exploitation in the Global South. One type of work, the staffing of call centers responding to American customers from places in India or other locations, came under the focus of the news media. The same forces that had destroyed manufacturing jobs and put blue-collar workers on the dole were also affecting the service sector and threatening white-collar workers. For some observers, like the journalist Thomas Friedman, the world was becoming flat. Something was definitely happening, but social scientists lacked the tools and datasets for interpreting what was going on. New concepts were needed.

Body shopping and virtual migration

In their analysis of globalization, economists have shown that commercial integration and foreign direct investment reinforce each other, thus being complements rather than substitutes. Aneesh started his research project from a similar question: “Initially I began inquiring whether online services were replacing on-site work, making the physical migration of programming labor redundant.” During further investigations, especially interviews, he realized that the situation was a bit more complex. In a typical situation, “a firm in India might send two or three systems analysts to the client’s site in the United States for a short period, so that they might gain a first-hand understanding of the project and discuss system design. These systems analysts then help to develop the projects in India while remaining constantly in touch with their client, who can monitor the progress of the project and provide input. Once the project is over, one or two programmers fly back to the United States to test the system and oversee its installation.” Aneesh then made the distinction between two types of labor: body shopping, or embodied labor migration; and virtual migration, or disembodied labor migration. Both practices are part of the growing transnational system of flexible labor supply that allows Indian firms to enter into global supply chains and achieve optimal result. Virtual migration does not require workers to move in physical space; body shopping implies migration of both bodies and skills. In body shopping, Indian consultancy firms “shop” for skilled bodies: they recruit software professionals in India to contract them out for short-term projects in the United States. At the end of the project, programmers look for other projects, usually from the same contractors. Some of them start looking for a contractor based in the United States and attempt to secure a more lucrative placement. The ultimate goal is to switch their visa status from the H-1B work visa to the Green Card: body shopping allows Indian workers to pursue the American dream.

Contrary to standard perceptions, “the biggest advantage of hiring contract labor is not low short-term costs; it is flexibility, and the resulting reduction of the long-term costs of maintaining a large permanent workforce.” With a widespread demand for programming labor in different organizations, software professionals are well-paid workers. They are both “expensive and cheap” for American corporations to hire. They allow the receiving company to trim its workforce, take these temporary workers into service only in times of need, and economize on long-term benefits—social security, retirement contributions, health insurance, and unemployment insurance—that must be provided to permanent employees. Contractual employment allows American companies to implement just-in-time labor and to decouple work performance from the maintenance of a permanent workforce. In the case of virtual migration, they can also achieve temporal integration and work in real time, round-the-clock, in a seamless way: “Since the United States and India have an average time-zone difference of twelve hours, the client may enjoy, for a number of tasks, virtually round-the-clock office hours; when America closes its offices, India gets ready to start its day.” The temporal sequencing of work across time zones allows corporation to “follow the sun” and gain a competitive advantage by dividing their work groups and assignments between India and the United States. But time integration is not as easy as it sounds: coordination is a complex business, and lots of valuable information get lost during the workload transmission from one team to the other. Temporal dissonance may also occur when an Indian team is obliged to work at night to provide real-time response to American clients, like in the case of call centers. Like Aneesh illustrated in his subsequent book Neutral Accent, people who perform nightly live in two worlds, straddled between time zones, languages, and cultural references. Night work alters circadian rhythms and put workers out of phase with their own society: “there is a reason why night work has another name—the graveyard shift.”

Algocracy is not algonomics

In writing Virtual Migration, Aneesh’s ambition was to disentangle sociology from economics, showing that they can take different and sometimes opposed perspectives on the same phenomenon. An economist would ask whether migration and trade are complementary or substitute, and look at trade data and labor statistics to test hypotheses. He would try to differentiate between short-term losses and long-term gains, showing that job displacements and layoffs caused by transnational economic integration is more than compensated by gains in productivity and increased activity. Aneesh warns against the danger of conflating the economic and the social where the social is often assimilated to the economic. Virtual workers or Indian programmers who engage in the body shopping trade are not only economic agents; their location of choice is not only motivated by economic interest. During interviews, “programmers continually long for the ‘other’ nation: they miss India while in the United States and miss the United States when they are back in India.” It is not only an opposition between material versus more social and emotional longings: “we also find high-level executives who enjoy material luxuries in India such as chauffeur-driven cars, plush houses, and domestic help at home and yet still try to maintain their permanent residency in the United States.” Similarly, discussions on organizational networks tend to be economistic, focussing on possible efficiencies, competitive advantage, coordination, and relative transaction costs for corporations. But for Aneesh, the language of “networks” often obscures relations of power and governance in the emerging regime. As he explains, “algocracies are imbued with social ideas of control as well as formal logic, tracing their roots to the imperatives of capital and code.” Computer programming has emerged as a form of power that structures possible forms of action in a way that is analytically different from bureaucratic and surveillance systems. Enterprise software systems developed by Indian firms are not merely the automation of existing processes. They also “produce the real” by structuring possible forms of behavior and by translating embodied skills into disembodied code.

One of the characteristics of algocratic governance is to reduce the space needed for deliberation, negotiation, and contestation of the rules and processes that frame actions and orient decisions. As Aneesh could observe on shop floors and in call centers, “work is increasingly controlled not by telling workers to perform a task, nor necessarily by punishing workers for their failure, but by shaping an environment in which there are no alternatives to performing the work as desired.” Programming technologies have gained the ability to structure behavior without a need for orienting people toward accepting the rules of the game. Software templates provide existing channels that guide action in precise ways: all choices are already programmed and nonnegotiable. This guidance suggests that algorithmic authority does not need legitimacy in the same sense as was used in the past. Max Weber’s three types of legitimate power supposed human agency on the part of the bearers of authority and for those under their command. But as authority is increasingly embedded in the technology itself, or more specifically in the underlying code, governance operates without human intervention: human agency disappears, and so does the possibility to make authority legitimate. This is not to deny that programming is done by someone and that human agents are still in charge of making decisions. Yet programming also becomes fixed and congealed as a scheme, defining and channeling possible action. Automation, or the non-human operation of a process, is not a problem in itself. It becomes a matter of concern when automated algorithms enter into certain areas where it is important for the space for negotiation to remain open.

AI alignment

Artificial intelligence brings the power of algorithms to a new level. The critics addressed to AI are getting more and more familiar. AI systems are non-transparent, making it almost impossible to identify the rules that led them to recommend a decision. They can be biased and perpetuate discrimination by amplifying the racial or gender biases embedded in the data used for training them. They remain arbitrary from the individual’s perspective, substituting the human subject with changing behavioral patterns and data scores. AI lacks human qualities like creativity and empathy, limiting its ability to understand emotions or produce original ideas. Surveillance powered by AI threatens individual privacy and collective rights, tipping the balance in favor of authoritarian states and oppressive regimes. In a not-so-distant future, artificial general intelligence (AGI) systems could become “misaligned”—in a way that could lead them to make plans that involve disempowering humanity. For some experts, AGI raises an existential risk that could result in human extinction or another irreversible global catastrophe. The development of AI has generated strong warnings from leaders in the sector, some of whom have recommended a “pause” in AI research and commercial development. What I find missing in discussions about AI security and “AGI alignment” is the lack of observable facts. We need empirical observations and field research to document the changes AI-powered algorithms bring to work processes, organizational structures, and individual autonomy. We also need to explain what algorithms actually do in concrete terms by using the perspectives of people from various cultures and backgrounds. Only then will we be able to balance algorithmic governance with countervailing forces and ensure that democratic freedoms can be maintained in the age of the rule by code.

Passing for White, Passing for Black

A review of Passing and the Fictions of Identity, Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., Duke University Press, 1996.

Passing

On September 10, 2020, the editorial director of Duke University Press issued a statement about Jessica Krug, a published author who for several decades had falsely claimed a Black and Latinx identity before being exposed as a case of racial fraud. The public statement was brimming with rage and indignation: “I have been sickened, angered, and saddened by the many years that she deployed gross racial stereotypes to build her fake identity,” the editor wrote. The feminist scholar was denounced as a case of deception and fraud, rendered more shameful by the fact that “early in her career, she took funding and other opportunities that were earmarked for non-white scholars.” Confronted with her lies, Jessica Krug herself issued a blog confession in which she disclosed her original identity “as a white Jewish child in suburban Kansas City” who, because of “some unaddressed mental health” issues, had assumed a false identity initially as a youth and then as a scholar. Using a word tainted by a history of antisemitism, she described herself as “a culture leech,” apologized profusely, and asked to “be cancelled.” It turned out Jessica Krug wasn’t the only case of racial impersonation in academia: over the forthcoming months, other scholars were exposed as having claimed a false racial identity, including another author who had manuscripts accepted by Duke University Press even after she was denounced as a so-called “Pretendian,” or a person falsely claiming a Native American heritage. In another statement, the same editor indicated that “for months now, we at Duke University Press have engaged in difficult conversations about how we can do a better job of considering ethical concerns as we make our publishing decisions.” But she did not indicate whether the academic publisher would take measures to check the self-declared racial identity of its contributors, or how it would proceed in doing so.

Policing race, unpolicing gender

I remember being amused and puzzled by these media statements. I saw them as a typically American story as we like to imagine them in France: a narrative following a pattern of public exposure, legal confrontation, personal confession, atonement for past sins, and redemption, as was the case of Bill Clinton in the Jessica Lewinsky affair. Only in the case of white people assuming a Black identity there was neither mercy nor redemption: the culprits were expected to expose their shame publicly before disappearing into oblivion. And indeed, following her confession Jessica Krug vanished from public view, never to be seen again: she was, in effect, cancelled. To a certain degree, I can understand the outrage of the Duke editor and other persons who had been fooled into believing the usurpated identity of racial impostors. But only to a degree: there are also convincing arguments to support the fact that racial usurpation is not such a big deal, and should be treated with leniency. Whom did Jessica Krug harm by pretending to be black? Does having benefited from earmarked resources justify the policy of cancellation of a scholar who may otherwise have brought useful contributions to the field? What if it was possible to “play one’s race” as one plays a role? After all, isn’t it a central tenet of critical studies that identity is a fiction and that social roles are performatively enacted? According to Judith Butler, whose Gender Trouble was published in 1990, gender is performance. Likewise, in Epistemology of the Closet, also published in 1990, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues that limiting sexuality to homosexuality or heterosexuality, in a structured binary opposition, is too simplistic. The discipline of queer studies that they helped establish is a broad tent: one does not have to prove one’s credentials as a gay, lesbian, or otherwise LGBTQI+ person to identify as “queer.” Likewise, in crip theory—the radical arm of disability studies—, a person is considered as disabled if she considers herself to be so. There are no checks of medical records or social security status: indeed, disability scholars deny doctors the exclusive right to declare who is disabled and who is not, and argue that disability status is biased against persons of color, people living in precarious conditions, and otherwise discriminated persons. Being disabled (or being queer) is a social construction, just like what is opposed to it, namely being able-bodied (or being straight). Why should race be treated differently? Are academics serious when they claim that race is also a fluid and reversible category?

The moral panic raised by racial usurpations of minority identity is a very contemporary phenomenon. To understand its roots, one has to delve into the American history of race relations, and to understand the academic context as it emerged in the 1990, especially in literature departments where questions of identity and fiction were most prominently raised. It was a time when the modern racial impersonators started their career, and when transracialism, although based in those cases on identity theft and deception, appeared as a feasible option. The book Passing and the Fictions of Identity, edited by Elaine K. Ginsberg and published in 1996, therefore provides a useful benchmark to assess contemporary debates in light of their foundational moment. The term passing designates a performance in which one presents oneself as what one is not, a performance commonly imagined along the axis of race, class, gender, or sexuality. In American literature, passing across race and across gender are thoroughly imbricated—most famously in the narrative of William and Ellen Craft, Running a Thousand Miles for Freedom (1860), in which the black couple escaped from slavery, she dressed as a white man and he posing as her servant, and in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) when Eliza, traveling to Canada, disguises herself as a white man and her young son as a girl. In the twentieth century, novels such as Nella Larsen’s Passing (1929) and James Weldon Johnson’s Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man (1912) added to the discourse of racial passing a third important sense of passing: the appearance of “homosexual” as “heterosexual.” Passing and the Fictions of Identity explores passing novels as a literary genre that complicates racial and sexual categories. It also considers passing across social status delimitations, as in The Life of Olaudah Equiano (1789) in which the narrator, an Igbo African and a former British slave, becomes a free sailor and a pioneer of the abolitionist cause. It addresses gender crossing through a close reading of The Woman in Battle (1876), an account of Civil War cross-dressing that presents itself as the autobiography of Loreta Velazquez, a woman who masqueraded as a Confederate officer and spy during the war. Passing novels also include The Hidden Hand (or Capitola the Madcap), a picaresque adventure tale first published in 1859, and James Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room (1956), in which national, racial, and sexual identities are presented as nostalgic constructions subject to a pathos of lost origins. Black Like Me (1961) is not a work of fiction but a realistic account of a journey in the Deep South of the United States, at a time when African-Americans lived under racial segregation, by a journalist who had his skin temporarily darkened to pass as a black man. Closing the book, Adrian Piper, a philosopher and a performance artist, offers her personal testimony as an African American woman who identifies herself as black but often passes for white because of her light-skin complexion.

The dilemma of passing

Passing for white is still a reality in contemporary American society, where African American identity was built on a history of slavery and segregation and where Blacks still suffer from racial prejudice and social exclusion. As F. James Davis writes in Who Is Black? One Nation’s Definition (1991), “Those who pass have a severe dilemma before they decide to do so, since a person must give up all family ties and loyalties to the black community in order to gain economic and other opportunities.” There is no forced “outing” of people who pass for white in the African American community: “Publicly to expose the African ancestry of someone who claims to have none is not done,” writes Adrian Piper. And yet passing is met with ambivalence and equivocation. In the novel Passing, one character remarks: “It’s funny about ‘passing.’ We disapprove of it and at the same time condone it. It excites our contempt and yet we rather admire it. We shy away from it with an odd kind of revulsion, but we protect it.” By contrast, at the time the book was published, passing for black when one is white was deemed a complete impossibility. Adrian Piper, who was suspected of doing so, reacts violently to such accusation: “It’s an extraordinary idea, when you think about it: as though someone would willingly shoulder the stigma of being black in a racist society.” Based on her own experience, she considers being black as “a social condition, more than an identity, that no white person would voluntarily assume, even in imagination.” The many instances of microaggressions, discriminatory treatment, racial slurs, or racist conversations she overheard even in an academic context considered as “safe” justify her point: raised as an African American by a committed family, but as a person who “looked white” and “talked white,” she involuntarily passed as white and thus was able to witness the racist behavior of white persons who lower their guard when they think they are among themselves (as in the Saturday Night Life routine when a whitefaced Eddy Murphy experiences the sight of relief as a single black man exits a bus full of white passengers.) In Black Like Me, John Howard Griffin expresses outrage and mortification at a variety of incidents that would have been commonplace to black Southerners living under Jim Crow: being turned away from hotels and restaurants, made the target of racial animosity and sexual objectification, denied banking privileges, rejected peremptorily from jobs, required to use segregated toilet facilities, and forced to sit at the back of the bus. Clearly under such conditions, no white person would willingly become black.

There are several reasons why passing became a popular trope in American literature, and why literary criticism took on the subject with an enthusiasm bordering on frenzy in the 1990s. Cross-dressing and assuming a fake identity have always been a familiar ploy in literary fiction, from picaresque novels of sixteenth century Spain to the theater comedies of Shakespeare and Marivaux. The American legacy of slavery and racial segregation added an element of drama to this familiar plot. The fictitious characters of the passing novel and the unknown thousands of very real black men and women who passed out of slavery moved from a category of subordination and oppression to one of freedom and privilege. According to the one-drop rule, any person with even one ancestor of black ancestry (“one drop” of “black blood”) was considered black (Negro or colored in historical terms). African blood is invisible on the surface of the body, allowing persons of mixed descent with a light skin and Caucasian facial features to pass as white. Crossing racial or sexual boundaries involves a suspension of disbelief that is at the heart of literary fiction: appearances are deceiving, identities are in flux, and nothing is what it seems. The visual force of passing, and especially the shock of its discovery after the fact, is extraordinary. Especially in the case of race, passing is not simply performance or theatricality, the pervasive tropes of recent work on sex and gender identity, nor is it parody or pastiche, for it seeks to erase, rather than expose, its own dissimulation. Unlike sexual identity which is not necessarily apparent, race is eminently visible, as if it were natural. Race is essential, communal, and public, whereas sexuality is contingent, individual, and private. The misperception of race is therefore surprising insofar as it contradicts the established belief in the strength of blood ties and genetic makeup. Racial passing resonates deep within the American psyche. Even though a significant proportion of white Americans, about 3.5 percent according to geneticists, are known to have some African ancestry, very few people who identify themselves as white are ready to acknowledge this heritage. According to Adrian Piper, “the fact of African ancestry among whites ranks up there with family incest, murder, and suicide as one of the bitterest and most difficult pills for white Americans to swallow.”

The fictions of identity

Through the contributions to this volume, passing was constituted as a literary genre and a productive space in which to interrogate identity in all its dimensions. According to one contributor, “passing is an act of resistance against dominant constructions of race, gender, sexuality, and identity.” As she explains, the discourse of racial passing reveals the arbitrary foundation of the categories “black” and “white,” just as passing across gender and sexuality places in question the meaning of “masculine” and “feminine,” “straight” and “gay.” For the editor in her introductory chapter, “just as the ontology of race exposes the contingencies of the categories ‘white’ and ‘black,’ so the ontology of gender exposes the essential inauthenticity of ‘man’ and ‘woman.’” Socially constructed identities seemed to connote an identity easily altered or cast off: one could be black or white (or Native American) by an act of volition, a conscious decision that would engage the rest of one’s life but that had no relation to one’s previous self. The facticity of identity made any experience of that identity necessarily inauthentic: “Passing is only one more indication that subjectivity involves fracture, that no true self exists apart from its multiple, simultaneous enactments.” It was accepted as a an article of faith that “identities are not singularly true or false but multiple and contingent.” There was no authentic self, but an assemblage composed by “a series of guises and masks, performances and roles.” Literature had first established passing as a trope, and literary criticism gave it its badge of honor. The 1990s were years of transformation in the humanities, and the university became a factory for ideas of gender transition and eventually of race fluidity. Under the influence of Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Judith Butler, and Eve Sedgwick, who are quoted at length in this volume, identities were read as fictions and constructed as fantasies. Race was compared to a “metaphor,” an “empty signifier,” a “mark empty of any referential content” or “the unheimlisch return of a desire” that could be as malleable as text. Then was a time to “construct new identities, to experiment with multiple subject positions, and to cross social and economic boundaries that exclude or oppress.”

In such intellectual climate, it is no wonder that some enterprising individuals took critical theory at its own word and decided to experiment in real life the theses that literary critics and social scientists had proposed on the cultural front. If all identities are in passing and race is a masquerade, why not assume a different racial identity and pretend one belonged to a minority of color instead of dull and undifferentiated whiteness? If race is a role we play, why not choose the character we wish to embody and play the part accordingly? Of course, assuming a different ethnic identity involves lying about one’s “true” origins. But if race is a lie, lying about a lie is not a lie: it is all performance. There were several motivations behind the choice made by some individuals, mostly academics and performing artists, to take on the identity of an ethnic minority. First, the stigma once associated with being colored started to recede with the civil rights movement and the promotion of ethnic identities. In the ideologically charged climate of the 1970s, Black was beautiful, Native Indian was noble, ethnic was chic. There was a whiff of marginality and radicalism in embracing the cause of ethnic minorities fighting for their rights. As the author of Black Like Me experienced it, one could not act as a spokesperson of a group in which one did not belong. He chose to step aside and to support black separatism from a distance; others preferred to espouse the cause with which they identified unequivocally, and to play the part until the end. As a second reason, this was a period when ethnic studies and other interdisciplinary fields emerged as new and exciting disciplines. For a promising academic, it was important to position oneself where all the action was. If this involved lying about one’s ethnic origins, so be it. Most of the time, the deception began with a lie by omission or a sous-entendre that may have been based on family lore. In a nonsuspecting environment, there was no hard questions asked, and no need to provide minute answers about one’s genetic makeup. In some cases, what began as a histrionic role became an acting career. Academics spend their life on a stage and impersonate a role in front of a devoted audience. They tend to embody the ideas they defend to the point their appearance becomes inseparable from their discipline. Teaching ethnic studies made one feel part of this ethnicity.

The backlash against transracialism

And yet, transracialism has few modern proponents, and academics who are found to have lied about their ethnic origins are subjected to public shaming and a strict policy of cancellation. “In Defense of Transracialism”, an article published by the philosopher Rebecca Tuvel in the academic journal Hypatia in spring 2017, was met with a barrage of insults and denunciations, and the journal’s editors had to publish an apology. How, then, are we to understand the backlash against racial trespassing and the cancellation of individuals who claimed an ethnic identity when in fact they were white? Why did race and gender follow different paths and ended up on opposite sides of academic debates, with transracialism denounced as wholly illegitimate while trans identities were recognized and even praised by gender theorists? First, the issue of passing involves not only an individual’s decision to change race, but also deliberately lying and deceiving about it. Academia is an industry that defines itself in large part by its ethical standards: having a career based on a lie makes other people angry and resentful. American ethics adds a layer or prudery and moral posturing to these manifestations of public outrage: remember that in the Lewinsky case, what was reproached to Bill Clinton was not to have had an affair with an intern, but to have lied about it. Denunciations of ethnic fraud also emphasize the fact that the culprits benefited from preferential treatment and financial resources originally earmarked to members of ethnic minorities: they “stole” these resources from others, who may have benefited from these affirmative action measures but could not. One may find this argument shallow and petty: there is more to academia than just money and a struggle for positions, and every social policy has its leakages. The resolution to curtail the phenomenon of passing also comes from the realization that it may have reached massive proportions. According to the 1990 census, two million Americans reported as American Indians and Alaska Natives. In 2000, almost twice as many gave the same answer to the questionnaire. Among them, in proportion, Latinos and highly educated adults as well as women were the groups most directly affected. Checking the “Native American” box is not only a means of gaming the university admission system: Native American cultures have experienced a kind of cultural renaissance, which increases the number of persons willing to associate with them. As a last argument, the reaction to Rebecca Tuvel’s article showed that feminists who support trans identities and queer studies are particularly ill at ease with the possibility of transracialism. They do not want to witness the contamination of gender debates with issues of racial transition. Policing race is also a way to police their own discipline and to erect barriers to avoid trespassing.

Hawai’i on Ice

A review of Cooling the Tropics: Ice, Indigeneity, and Hawaiian Refreshment, Hi′ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart, Duke University Press, 2022.

Cooling the tropicsMany public events in the United States and in Canada begin by paying respects to the traditional custodians of the land, acknowledging that the gathering takes place on their traditional territory, and noting that they called the land home before the arrival of settlers and in many cases still do call it home. Cooling the Tropics does not open with such a Land Acknowledgement, but Hi′ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart (thereafter: Hi′ilei Hobart) claims Hawai’i as her piko (umbilicus) and pays tribute to the kūpuna (noble elders) and the lāhui (lay people) who “defended the sovereignty of [her] homeland with tender and fierce love.” She describes her identity as “anchored in a childhood in Hawai’i, with a Kānaka Maoli mother who epitomized Hawaiian grace and a second-generation Irish father who expressed his devotion to her by researching and writing our family histories.” She expresses her support for decolonial struggles and Indigenous rights, and participated in protests claiming territorial sovereignty for Hawai’i’s Native population. How can one decolonize Hawai’i? How can Hawaiian sovereignty discourse articulate a claim to land restitution and self-determination that is not a return to a mythic past? What about racial mixing, once regarded with anxiety and now touted as a symbol of Hawai’i’s success as a multicultural US state? What happens to settler colonialism and white privilege when the local economy and the political arena are dominated by populations originating from East Asia and persons of mixed descent? Is economic self-reliance a feasible option considering the imbrication of Hawai’i’s economy into the US mainland’s market? Can the rights of the Indigenous population be better defended in a sovereign Hawai’i? What is the meaning of supporting decolonial futures that include “deoccupation, demilitarization, and the dismantling of the settler state”? Can decolonization be achieved by nonviolent means, or do sovereignty’s activists have to resort to rebellion and armed struggle? What would be the future of a decolonized Hawai’i in a region fraught with military tensions and geopolitical rivalries? What can a decolonial perspective bring to the analysis of Hawai’i’s colonial past and possible futures? And why is academic research on Hawai’i’s history and society so often aligned with the decolonization agenda, to the point that decolonial approaches are almost synonymous with Hawaiian studies in the United States? More to the point: how can a PhD student majoring in food studies and chronicling the introduction of ice water, ice-making machines, ice cream, and shave ice in Hawai’i address issues of settler colonialism, Indigenous dispossession, Native rights to self-determination, and decolonial futures?

Decolonize Hawai’i

Unbeknownst to most Americans, and to all non-US citizen but a few exceptions, there is a thriving independence movement taking place in the Hawaiian Islands today. It was borne out of an unlawful US-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893, it survived Hawai’i’s accession to statehood in 1959, and it is currently in opposition to the territorial encroachment by military infrastructure and other state interests over confiscated land and sacred sites. The Hawaiian soveignty movement doesn’t advocate a return to a mythic past. Simply put, Native communities demand respect for their traditional cultures, consideration for their role as stewards of the land, and empowerment to take part in all decisions that affect them. Since 2014, local activists have opposed the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT), a scientific endeavor with governmental support from Canada, France, Japan, China, and India. Slated to become the most powerful telescope on the planet, the stadium-sized facility threatens to desecrate one of the most sacred sites for Kānaka Maoli. Construction was temporarily halted due to a blockade of the roadway leading to the site, and further protests as well as legal battles prevented construction of the telescope to resume. Hi′ilei Hobart took part in the protests, helping to keep the basecamp of picketers provisioned with food and beverages. Participating in local struggles fed into her dissertation in more than one way. Firstly, it underscored the obvious: ice and snow are native to Hawai’i; they are not an imported commodity brought by Anglo-American settlers along with “civilization”. Those who tell the story of how ice first came to Hawai’i get it wrong: ice and snow have been there since time immemorial. During winter, snow frequently falls on the ice-capped summits of the island chain’s tallest mountains. But even confronted with this evidence, popular discourse continues to construe ice and snow as alien to Hawai’i, and to frame Maunakea―the site of the TMT―as a terra nullius unoccupied by the Native population and thus open for grabs and available for construction in the name of science and progress. Discursive logics have combined to produce Maunakea as “not-for-Hawaiians” (Kānaka Maoli were supposed to steer away from altitude, and the first individuals on record to climb the mountaintops were Westerners), as “not-Hawai’i” (outsiders picture Hawai’i as a tropical paradise of lush valleys and beaches), and as “not-Earth” (NASA used the desolate volcanic site for outerspace simulations of spacewalks on Mars and the moon). Cumulative efforts to frame Maunakea as empty and alien have resulted in disregard for Natives’ rights and belief systems.

The second lesson Hi′ilei Hobart could draw from her roadblock picketing is a better sense of the local cosmogonies that tie humans with nature and the elements in Hawai’i. For Kanaka Maoli, Maunakea’s snow, mist, and rain are not just atmospheric phenomena: they signal the lingering presence of gods (akua) and ancestors’ spirits who have been occupying the place even in the absence of humans. Local tales or mo’olelo kept by way of oral transmission carry foundation myths of the islands and mountains and attest to Maunakea’s central role in Indigenous place and thought, while animating the elements and other life forces with their own spirit and consciousness. Likewise, for the anthropologist, commodities are animated with a life of their own. According to Marx, a wooden table “does not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will.” Ice and refreshments in the tropics are imbued with values, desires, longings, and social hierarchies. They have a history that intersects with the history of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, and the militaro-touristic complex in Hawai’i. Discourses about ice encapsulate ideas about race, modernity, gender, and the affective sensorium. They help rationalize Indigenous dispossession and contribute to the legitimization of imperialism. As historian Eric Jennings has demonstrated, the concepts of freshness and refreshment marked colonial relationships in the tropics. The hill stations and colonial spas built by the French and the British in their colonial outposts were predicated on the idea that fragile European bodies could not endure tropical heat and had to periodically regain some of their vigor in high-altitude places where conditions of life in the homeland were reproduced. The same logic explains how ice and frozen refreshments were progressively naturalized in Hawai’i’s foodscape. First to penetrate the Hawaiian market in the nineteenth century, ice cubes were associated with masculinity, alcohol consumption, saloon culture, plantation ownership, and white privilege. By contrast, the more feminine ice water came to be seen as a means to achieve temperance, mitigating the warm climate, and cooling after effort. Ice cream was a symbol of whiteness, sugary sweetness, purity, leasure, and innocent childhood; for young women, who could frequent the ice cream parlor without being chaperoned, the fast-melting delicacy was also synonymous with freedom and romantic encounters. Born on the plantations, shave ice is associated with brown labor, rural life, Asian migrants, mom-and-pop stores, and nostalgia for simpler times.

Infrastructures of the cold

As a third lesson of the author’s fieldwork as an activist came the realization that American society depends on thermal infrastructures, from the cold chain to keep perishable foodstuff to air conditioning and big houses protected from outside temperature. Freezers and refrigerators are essential to modern survival. These infrastructures have become so embedded in everyday life that they fade into the background, and their very invisibility guarantees that structures of dispossession and extraction go unnoticed. This is what the author labels “thermal colonialism”, defined as the modes by which temperature was managed and organized to favor settlers’ interests and reproduce racial hierarchies. Americans have become quite literally “conditioned” to experience coolness or frozen taste in hot weather, to the point that they consider the “right to chill” as constitutionally guaranteed. But desire for freshness and refreshment has a history: it is not biologically determined. We realize the importance of infrastructures of the cold when they fail us: the fragility of the cold chain in Hawai’i reveals itself after a hurricane, when lines of supply are disrupted, or each time the islands brace for an emergency. When things fall apart, networks of care and resilience take precedence over market relations and commercial interests. This is what Hi′ilei Hobart realized in the encampment at Mount Maunakea as she filled coolers with ice and drained their brown water to keep foodstuff fresh and edible. Managing community food resource pooling made her aware of food insecurity and thermal dependence in a state that heavily relies on imported goods and processed food. As her food studies turned to food work, she realized that “all that is frozen melts into water” (to paraphase Marx’s famous quote) and wondered whether Hawai’i had a future beyond the ice age: “what place does refrigeration have within Indigenous futures that move beyond settler capitalism, when coldness has played such an intimate role in these systems of oppression?” Draining water from coolers also drew her attention to melt as a condition of our current times marked by climate change and the images of fast-disappearing glaciers. She also discovered the materiality of freshness and frozenness, which pointed to a different kind of political economy as the one she had envisaged as a graduate student: an economy that is not based on commodity fetishism and labor exploitation, but on user value and short “farm-to-fork” circuits of exchange. Commodity trade, Marx argues, historically begins at the boundaries of separate economic communities based otherwise on a non-commercial form of production. As Marx explains, the commodity remains simple as long as it is tied to its use-value: “A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”

Hi′ilei Hobart’s history of how artificial ice came to Hawai’i is heavily dependent on her sources. Scarce at the beginning, with a few advertisements and newspaper clippings (including publications in the local language, ‘ōlelo Hawai’i), they include a wider array of testimonies, photographs, business records, cookbooks, consumer goods, and personal memories as we move closer to the present. She first chronicles the great American ice trade, in which big blocks of ice harvested from lakes in the Northeast or in Alaska circulated the globe from 1840 to 1870, the year the first ice-making machines were introduced. The ice that went to the tropics was a luxury product, used in cocktails, to chill wines, and for service at fine hotels where American planters, Western missionaries, European tourists, and Hawaiian elites mingled. The ice importing business never really took off in Hawai’i: even though entrepreneurs petitioned the local rulers for monopoly rights and invested in storage facilities, the venture remained unprofitable and was interrupted in 1860 after two decades of sporadic shipments. King Kamehameha III had mixed feelings about alcoholic beverages and iced punches: ruling over a “semi-European” polity that was modernizing fast, he also leaned to the robust temperance movement championed by Western missionaries and patronage ladies. He eventually died in 1854 after drinking from a poisoned punch-bowl of iced champagne. Under the reign of the last Hawaiian monarch, King Kalākaua, Honolulu was a fast-growing city with all the trappings of a Western metropole. ‘Iolani Palace, the royal residence, had electricity, indoor plumbing, and telephones even before Buckingham Palace or the White House. Among these technologies, ice machines and ice factories came into operation in the 1870s, transforming a once-foreign commodity into a local product.

Entering the Ice Age

Hawai’i entered the ice age at about the same period as the United States: when home refrigeration, cold chains for perishable goods, ice cream parlors, and soda fountains connected Honolulu’s domestic life to global standards of modernity. But unlike in the mainland, the use of freezing technologies were subject to colonialist frames of interpretation and local resistance. Settler reports of Kānaka aversion to ice stood as indictment of their slow pace to civility. Native people’s first contact with ice cream, taken as extremely hot instead of freezing cold, was derided as a sign of inferior civilizational status. Hawaiian-language newspapers, however, refuted implications that Kānaka Maoli were confused about or afraid of ice, and advertised the lavish cosmopolitan banquets including icy desserts served at the ‘Iolani Palace. But haole (foreigners), ali’i (elite Hawaiians), and maka’āinana (local commoners) reacted differently to frozen tastes, reflecting hierarchies of class, gender, and racialized proximity to whiteness. The racist and classist distinctions manifested themselves after US annexation during the pure food battles of the 1910s. The newly appointed food commissioner decided to apply US legislation strictly to ban poi, a local dish alternatively described as a truly delicious paste with yeasty flavor or “a native concoction that tastes like billboard paste,” and to increase the butterfat content of ice cream to mainland levels, contradicting local tastes and recipes developed by Japanese and Chinese ice cream vendors.

Shave ice and its “rainbow” of flavors is now offered as a metaphor for the “rainbow state” and its multiethnic, postracial population. As a symbol of Hawai’is racial landscape, the rainbow offers an important vehicle for the affective, and often tense, sentiments of identity and belonging. How did a food practice brought by Japanese migrants come to epitomize a US state, and how did a sugar plantation economy built along racial lines produce a racially harmonious society in the only US state with a nonwhite majority population? Shave ice offers an alternative narrative to forms of refreshment oriented toward white leasure, like the ice creams or tiki cocktails fetishized by the touristic gaze. Historians trace the origin of shave ice to Japanese agricultural workers and plantation store owners who brought the food tradition of kakigōri from Japan. Born in rural spaces where non-Hawaiians put down deep community roots, shave ice offers an alternative story about race and refreshment, one that is not tethered to whiteness and the leisure class. Asian immigrant populations in Hawai’i, once systematically marginalized, have become a “model majority” characterized by upward class mobility and adherence to nationalist values. They dominate the local economy, to the point scholars have forged the category “Asian settler colonialism” to describe the ascendancy of working-class communities of color. Hawai’i is now considered as a laboratory for multiethnic harmony as well as a harbinger of what the whole United States could become: a postracial nation, turning its back on its history of Native Indian extermination and Black enslavement. These fictions mask ongoing structural racism against Native Hawaiians and other ethnic minorities (Samoans, Filipino-Americans…) The shave ice success story glosses over such divisions and obscures Kānaka Maoli claims for Indigenous sovereignty. For present-day Hawaiians, it also brings back shared memories of childhood and nostalgia for “simpler times” characterized by community resilience, rural life, and low economic wealth. Again, this nationalist narrative envisioning an ahistorical and uncomplicated past erases a history of racial discrimination and labor exploitation, and produces “Hawaiians” as an always already multiethnic category that excludes indigeneity or Kānaka Maoli claims to place.

Hawaiian futures

I don’t see much potential in an independent, sovereign, or post-statehood Hawai’i that would grant Indigenous people rights of self-determination and privileges of territorial ownership. There are other ways to tackle the deep structural inequalities and discrimination that affect the Native population. As the French have experienced in French Polynesia, recognizing Indigenous rights is not synonymous with granting full independence or a right to secession. Politics of atonement and official apologies may be aligned with the Anglo-saxon protestant mindset, but they have their limits: short of reparations and restitution, they leave intact the structures of power that have led to Native dispossession and do not advance the living conditions of Indigenous populations. Economic needs must also be addressed, and the responsibility of all leaders, oriented toward independence or otherwise, is to chart a course that guarantees economic growth and sustainable development. I see tourism as a chance for Hawai’i, and militarization as a necessity borne out of historical and geopolitical concerns. Americans will always remember Pearl Harbor. Hawai’i is America’s first line of defense and its most strategic outpost in the Pacific. The security of the continent hinges on the continued presence of military forces which, along with tourism, form the twin pillars of the economy. Envisaging a decolonial future for Hawai’i seems to me more dystopian than real. And yet, with all these caveats in mind, I still find potential for decolonial approaches in modern scholarship about Hawai’i or other territories in the Pacific. Other Pacific islands have acceeded to independence and have demonstrated the viability, resilience, and vitality of Indigenous sovereign states. In the case of Hawai’i, but also the other US territories in the Pacific (Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and American Samoa), solutions might exist toward or beyond US statehood without resorting to full independence. Besides, scholarship and politics are distinct endeavors. The challenge that decolonial studies must address is the decolonization of the mind. I see must potential in a decolonial perspective to the history of Hawai’i and other once occupied nations, and I learned much from reading Cooling the Tropics as much as I enjoyed reviewing it. One can quote Marx without being a Marxist; one can use decolonial scholarship without believing in a decolonial future for Hawai’i.