The Stripe Guy and the Stick Man

A review of Disordering the Establishment: Participatory Art and Institutional Critique in France, 1958–1981, Lily Woodruff, Duke University Press, 2020.

Lily Woodruff

The book cover shows a man walking in the street carrying a multicolored wooden pole on his shoulder. The place is Paris, the man is an artist named André Cadere and the pole he carries, “a round bar of wood” as he calls it, is his signature artwork. How to look at a round bar of wood? is how an art critic called the catalogue of a Cadere exhibition. Perhaps we should look first as the surrounding scene: for as the French intellectual Guy Debord put it, “That which changes our way of seeing the street is more important than that which changes our way of seeing a work of art.” The location can easily be identified as Parisian; with its Hausmann buildings and streets paved with cobblestones, it represents an ordinary urban scene featuring a fruit stall with empty wooden crates, a man standing at a bus stop with his leather bag resting on his side, and an elderly passerby carrying her shopping basket, minding her business. The main character walks a slow pace, head slightly inclined, with long hair and an intense look. His bar of wood draws a diagonal that cuts across the picture, forming a triangle with the vertical street light pole. André Cadere was, by all accounts, an original. He regularly turned up uninvited at art-world parties, or left one of his signature batons leaning against a wall in exhibitions in which his work was not meant to be included. As well as bringing his batons into the art world, Cadere also presented them in public spaces, including restaurants and subways, announcing ‘exhibitions’ where he would appear between specific hours every day over a certain period of time, engaging passers-by with discussions about his baton and art. “Establishing Disorder” was the title of such a public talk where the artist discussed his work without exhibiting any, inviting his public to leave the room and return to their homes as a way to contest the art establishment.

Reengineering society

Disordering the Establishment, by Lily Woodruff, focuses on French artists or groups of artists in the period preceding and following the social upheaval of May 1968. She provides a total description of their artistic careers by putting their works into historical context and providing the critical apparatus built by art critics and influential thinkers to apprehend their contribution to French contemporary art and ideological debates. The 1950s and 1960s heralded the age of the technocrat: the new elite of administrators and technical experts who applied tools of social science to reengineer and modernize society. Their collective power was anonymous, science-based, and diffuse: they sought to exert authority through control of information flows, design of incentives, and manipulation of the environment more than by direct order and administrative fiat. One key word of the times was participation: for de Gaulle, workers’ participation in management aimed at substituting cooperation to antagonism and offered a way out of the class struggle that was plaguing French society. More generally, the public was invited to participate in the decisions that affected them, including aesthetic choices and cultural policies. The notion of feedback, taken from the study of cybernetic systems, was used to advocate a loop between the public, policy makers, and cultural producers in order to bring art closer to the popular audience and make it more relevant to its concerns. Technocratic idealism drove the projects of many artists, critics, architects, and urban planners. The creation of the grands ensembles or HLM (habitations à loyer modéré) in the suburbs was a grand scale experiment that attracted considerable attention at the time. Critics pointed out the dehumanizing aspects of modern habitats and the alienation brought about by a conservative social order. Others attempted not only to describe bourgeois society, but to change it through a new praxis emphasizing autonomy, creativity, and  political engagement.

The Groupe de Recherche d’Art Visuel (GRAV) was not a group of researchers, but a group of artists doing research. It was active in Paris from 1960 to 1968. Eleven artists signed the original manifesto, but only six of them formed the core of the group, among which François Morellet, Julio Le Parc, and Yvaral. Following the belief of Victor Vasarely (father of Yvaral) that the concept of the artist as a solitary genius was outdated, they cultivated anonymity and declared themselves to be “more a group of paintings than a group of painters.” In their “acte de fondation” manifesto, they spelled out nine stratagems that the group would use to unify their artistic activities and research discoveries so as to generate a constant movement of ideas and ensure that no one individual would claim authority on his own work or that of the group. Considering the objects that they produced not as finished artworks, but rather as research, they conceived of their creation process as a continual progression based on trial and error. The group guidelines closely resembled the technocratic language of the era. Using Op art and kinetic art as a medium, they defended abstraction against the prevailing popularity of figurative art among French left-wing artists and critics, and argued that abstract art was not opposed to the principles of dialectic materialism. Their plea for an abstract progressive art took inspiration from models of scientific research. They referred to “topology,” a branch of mathematics that served as a popular metaphor during the 1960s, and used Gestalt theory and cybernetics to create spaces of “visual therapy” in which viewers might discover more about their own process of reasoning than about the art itself. The cool, repetitive regularity emblematic of GRAV’s works embraced a rational geometric abstraction that stood in stark contrast to what the artists saw as the stagnating expressionisms and figurations of the French art scene. While the initial focus of the GRAV artists stemmed from experimenting with visual perception, the group’s works expanded to examine notions of spectator participation. In 1966, they brought their kinetic sculptures to the streets in a cargo van touring central Paris, distributing explanatory texts and questionnaires to the public. They installed walk-through labyrinths that they conceived of as social experiments, but that disgruntled critics compared to the devices one would expect to see at a Luna Park. They eschewed the art gallery circuit and imagined that ideally their art objects would be available for distribution at Monoprix discount stores. But the democratic ambition of their participatory displays was in tension with the rational and technocratic ethos of their approach. As the founder of the Situationist International Guy Debord put it, “What they call the avant-garde of absence is nothing more than the absence of an avant-garde.”

From enfant terrible to established artist

With the installation of his 260 truncated columns in the great courtyard of the Palais-Royal, Daniel Buren has become the symbol of the established artist. Commissioned by the Ministry of Culture, this work provoked an intense debate over the integration of contemporary art in historic buildings and about the imposition of aesthetic choices by an establishment of art administrators and policy-makers over a reluctant public. But in the 1960s and 1970s, Daniel Buren was the enfant terrible of contemporary art and the personification of anti-establishment. In 1969, he refused to have his work included in an exhibition of “Art in the street” because he did not want to be represented as one artist among others. He mocked the pretension of GRAV and kinetic artists to reach popular audiences in the cités HLM through imposed participation: “I am sure that it would be much more agreeable to be exploited.” Buren discovered the stripe motif that would become his signature while searching for inexpensive material on which to paint at the Marché Saint-Pierre in 1965. He was pursuing the “degree zero of painting,” an expression taken from Roland Barthes’ 1953 book Writing Degree Zero. In April 1968, Buren began pasting posters that he had commercially printed with his striped motif at various locations across Paris in what he called affichages sauvages, or wild posterings. The posters went up on palisades surrounding construction sites covered with advertisements, but also among other fly-posted tracts condemning the war in Vietnam and announcing meeting times for protests—Mai 1968 was to erupt the next month. Spurred by the student protests, he accompanied his works with a deluge of explanatory texts, written tracts, manifestos, and interviews in which he declared “the only thing that one maybe can do after having seen a canvas like one of ours is total revolution.” He saw French society as massively repressive and the contemporary art world as irretrievably compromised: he retrospectively described “a suffocating atmosphere, with the appearance of being tidy and policed, where avant-garde artists had an open table at prime minister Georges Pompidou’s place.” But his own work crucially depended on institutions for ideological support. While objecting to traditional ways of presenting art through the museum-gallery system, he cultivated his relations with galleries and biennales, creating pressing demand to show via the same system. As a sign that the times were changing, he began to produce decorative tape and wallpaper for private residences in the 1980s.

If Daniel Buren was the “stripe guy,” André Cadere is remembered as “the stick man,” the artist known for carrying a stick. He shared with the GRAV collective a taste for formalism and mathematics: his round bars of wood, of various size and length, were composed of colored segments repeating a combination sequence in which one deliberate error was inserted. He was less engaged than Buren in political talk; if anything, his status as a refugee exiled from his native Romania exposed him to the surveillance of the state police, and he has had enough of a taste of totalitarianism to appreciate democratic freedom as it was worth. The man with a stick was much less famous than the stripe-man, but he used his fellow artist’s fame to free-ride on his egoistic self-promotion. In 1973, he left a colored bar in an exhibition featuring Buren’s works and, when it was removed and hidden away in a closet, circulated an exhibition announcement instructing visitors to seek out the sequestered bar in the broom closet. Like Buren, Cadere produced a single type of iconic work based on a systematically repeated formula that negated the subjectivity of the artist and neutralized the significance of viewer interpretation. While Buren’s work from this period similarly played across the boundaries of institutional limitation, the highly visible and intentional attachment of the artwork to the body of the wandering artist was the feature by which Cadere argued his opposition to Buren. Whereas in situ works generally complemented the sites in which they were placed, Cadere’s juxtapositions based their critique on the cultural inappropriateness of the art object’s presence within and outside artistic contexts. Cadere’s guerrilla tactics was in line with his hobo lifestyle. He fashioned himself as a rogue art celebrity, building his identity on marginality and independence. Photographs (remember the book cover) represent him in various circumstances, with his trademark stick and intense look, but he was careful to distinguish between the artwork and its representation through documentary media. Cadere wanted his bars to be seen in their materiality, and insisted that his work was “exhibited where it is seen.” His round bars of wood are now displayed in museums and private collections, but they have lost their potential to disturb and to unsettle. 

Sociological Art

Though relatively unknown today, Sociological Art is thoroughly emblematic of the historical upheavals of the late 1960s and 1970s in France. The Sociological Art Collective was formed by Hervé Fischer, Fred Forest, and Jean-Paul Thénot in 1974 but each artist came to its positions independently by developing their own art projects. In 1971, Hervé Fischer invited other artists to send him their artworks which he tore up and disposed in garbage bags put on display in an art gallery. He also disposed of his own body by putting his head in a plastic bag or wrapping himself in vinyl sheets. For Fischer, tearing and throwing away was as much creative as it was destructive, and documenting this process of destruction was conceived as a work of art. Fred Forest, who worked as a telephone operator in the 1960s, organized his earlier works around the mediated participation of his audience. In Portraits de famille, he asked the residents of a suburban housing project to send family pictures at the dinner table, which he presented in a community exhibition. In Space-Media, he placed a blank rectangle in the newspaper Le Monde and inviting readers to fill it in with whatever they liked and mail it to him. Taking part in a popular television program, he made the screen grow black for a few seconds and invited spectators to fill that free space with the thoughts and comments that he then collected. On the occasion of the São Paulo biennale in October 1973, he organized a series of performances, including a procession through the city center with participants holding white placards: he was arrested by the junta police, who took it as a real protest. Jean-Paul Thénot distributed questionnaires with open or nonsensical questions that he analyzed with the statistical techniques used by opinion pollsters. Most of his polls reflected on the art world, as when he asked respondents to name the most representative French artist that would correspond to the mean average choice. Together, the three proponents of Sociological Art published manifestos, organized interdisciplinary performances, and conducted field experiments as in their large-scale artistic survey of the city of Perpignan. Rejecting aesthetic motivations, they argued that “sociological art has no style,” and they developed an ethics of nonintervention by providing raw data and community-based documents. 

I was completely unfamiliar with the episodes of contemporary art history that are described in this book. What I take from reading Disordering the Establishment is three things. First, Lily Woodruff succeeds in linking art to its historical context. Through her four case studies, she provides an alternative story of Les Trente Glorieuses, the three decades of robust economic growth, political dirigisme, and social upheavals that French citizens now remember with nostalgia and regret. Art is not estranged from its social and political environment: on the contrary, it reflects and contributes to the main debates of the day, projecting them on a different plane that makes the familiar look unfamiliar. By developing a critique of institutions, art brings disorder and dissonance into a well-ordered world. It reminds us that history always contains a part of randomness, of background noise and graphic disturbance that retrospective narratives tend to eliminate from the broad picture. When you switch the channel to this ambient noise, a different history appears, unfolding at street level and more attuned to the individual experience of passers-by. As a second contribution, the author brings contemporary art schools in close contact with intellectual history. I was in more familiar terms with the many intellectuals, social critics, and thinkers that Lily Woodruff quotes in abundance. The writings of Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Guy Debord, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, Jean-François Lyotard, Edgar Morin, and others are very relevant for understanding artistic developments in France and putting them into their ideological context, not least because these thinkers were themselves close watchers of the art scene and commented upon contemporary artists in their work. Intellectual debates at the time were as much about aesthetics as they were political or philosophical. The anti-establishment mood was widely shared and gave way to various expressions: taken together, they form the most valuable inheritance that we received from this period. Artists and critics developed a form of specific courage: their attack on the establishment was not only intellectual posturing. They walked the talk and drew the consequences of their radical political stance in their specific field of activity, without fear of confrontation and marginality. That some of them rallied later on to existing institutions and centers of power only shows the precarious nature of the artistic field, where only institutions or the market can guarantee independence over the long term. As a third point, Disordering the Establishment seems to me a good model of how to write about art. Especially when it comes to contemporary creation, I am all in favor of pedagogy and even didacticism in the appreciation of the arts. I believe art and literature ought to convey information and instruction, along with pleasure and entertainment. Artworks cannot do this by themselves: they have to be accompanied by a critical apparatus or scholarly material that allows the public to shape its perception and understanding of art. In her masterful essay on participatory art and institutional critique in pre- and post-1968 France, Lily Woodruff  provided me with such a companion to an intelligent understanding of some recent artistic creations.

Watching Crap Videos on YouTube

A review of Asian Video Cultures: In the Penumbra of the Global, edited by Joshua Neves and Bhaskar Sarkar, Duke University Press, 2017.

Asian Video Cultures

Reflecting on the uploaded content usually found on YouTube, legal scholar and political activist Lawrence Lessig made the following comment: “The vast majority of remix, like the vast majority of home movies, of consumer photographs, or singing in the shower, or blogs, is just crap. Most of these products are silly or derivative, a waste of even the creator’s time, let alone the consumer’s.” This is a book about crap. But it isn’t a crap book: as Charles Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin have taught us, there is meaning and enjoyment to be found in the transient, the fleeting, the contingent. It is by acknowledging these mundane aspects of everyday life that we can paint a true picture of modernity. Modernity as experienced by Baudelaire or Benjamin was Parisian, pedestrian, and picturesque. Our modernity falls under the sign of the global; and it is now in Asia, not on the streets of Paris, that new forms of contemporaneity are being experienced. Videos posted on YouTube and its regional equivalents—China’s Youku, Japan’s Niko Niko Dōga—as well as images circulating on low-tech video supports such as Video CDs and microSD cards are not only the crap of lived experience and a waste of consumer’s time. They are invested with imaginaries, intimacies, and identities that summon other ways of being in the world. As such, they provide weak signals, background noise, and narrow bandwidth communication to the careful observer attuned to Asia’s many presents and futures. But attending to these realities cannot be done merely from a computer screen. The various contributions in Asian Video Cultures emphasize ethnography as a crucial methodological tool for achieving better comprehension of video cultures at all levels of analysis and advocates anthropological case studies and cross-cultural analysis as foundational to a much-needed critical global media perspective.

Asian modernities

The “Asia” the editors have in mind is different from the landmass imagined by politicians, corporate executives, and ideologues. It is not defined by geography: art videos assembled by a gay Singaporean artist in Germany are as much part of Asia as the Bollywood movies that circulate in northern Nigeria. The book includes fieldworks studies taking place in Palestine and Lebanon, while other Asian geographies, such as Central Asia or Iran, are conspicuously absent. Articles about India dominate the count, and introduce us to fine-grained descriptions of localist movements such as the consumption of music videos by rigorist Meo villagers in the state of Haryana or the accession of Telangana to statehood through a politics of YouTube remixes and online comments. Some countries known for their digital modernity, such as Japan and Korea, only appear tangentially, while we are reminded that Indonesia has (or had) the second-highest number of Facebook users in the world. Just as the nation-state was molded by the printing press and the emergence of national literatures, imagined communities in Asia are currently being formed through the circulation of images and affects on online platforms and offline hardware devices. The YouTube video or its social media equivalent is at once intimate and political. It shapes an imaginary and carries values of immediacy, propinquity, self-expression, and affective engagement. Internet videos herald “the age of the amateur” which blurs the divisions between producer and consumer, media and content, uploading and downloading. They proliferate “in the penumbra of the global”, in the twilight hours between dusk and dawn when all cats are grey and dogs and wolves are confused.

The new media formations that the book chapters describe are often relegated at the margin of scholarly attention, statist projects, and corporate strategies. A common trope among intellectuals is to disparage media practices across the region as the emanation of a culture of copy, duplication and counterfeit, devoid of any intellectual creativity and adversarial to legitimate market value. According to this common view, the West is the originator of value and content, and the East free-rides on this authentic culture of innovation by offering knockoffs and low-cost imitations. The tolerance that Asian states grant to these intellectual property infringements is the sign of a retrograde political culture that is, in the end, adversarial to economic development. Another stereotype, which partly contradicts this first trope, is to view the state in Asia as authoritarian and manipulative. In his critique of Stalin’s Russia, Karl Wittfogel saw the authoritarian nature of communism as an extension of the need of totalitarian rule to control water that had shaped civilizations in most of Asia. This “oriental despotism” now takes the form of media censorship, Internet control, and political repression in densely populated cities and states that cannot tolerate political dissent. For the editors, these views, which still inform much of what passes as area studies in Euro-American university departments, are inspired by Cold War geopolitics and market neoliberalism: their objective is to make Asia fit for capitalism and democracy. They prevent us to register the profound social changes that are taking place at the level of the infra-political: most media practices described in this volume operate below the radar of the state and the market. They also make connections beyond and outside the borders of the state, giving way to transnational currents that are as constitutive to globalization as the movement of goods, services, and capital.

Bringing media to the village

Beyond the triumphant view of emerging Asia as a continent of skyscrapers and digital connectivity, one should not forget that Asia is also composed of slums, shantytowns, and remote villages. The economies of survival that sustain these margins also shape the technologies, idioms, and practices that characterize Asian video cultures. In “Video documentary and rural public China,” Jenny Chio describes how video is integrated into contemporary rural and ethnic minority livelihoods in China’s southwestern provinces. She shows that one can be modern and rural and ethnic at the same time. Video recordings of local festivals and folk performances of ethnic Miao communities find their ways to the smartphone screens and computer monitors of migrant workers and farming households living in factory towns or staying in isolated villages. They exist alongside, but not necessarily in conflict with, mainstream national media. The videographers who produce these videos are self-taught or, in some instances, beneficiaries of video-production training workshops run by local NGOs. They bring “media to the village,” but also participate in a rural public culture that allows for different forms of media representation and public participation. Slums and villages shouldn’t be identified as the “local” in opposition to the global. In another chapter on “Sensory politics in Northern Nigeria,” Conerly Casey takes the case of Muslim secondary-school girls who develop signs of spirit possession that include “dancing like they do in Indian masala films.” Qur’anic scholars who adhere to a strict interpretation of the Sunna immediately forbade Bollywood movies, while the local video movie industry produced song-and-dance copies of Bollywood productions and young adults circulated a PalmPilot version of the Kamasutra known as the Palmasutra. Stories of spirit possession, forbidden images, and sexual fantasies also played out in national politics when Nigeria’s strongman, General Sani Abaca, dropped dead after a late-night visit with two “Indian prostitutes”. The transnational circulation of images and content affect people at the level of the sensory, the intimate, the emotional, but also the religious and the political.

Another bias in media studies is to focus on large cinema screens and TVs or computer monitors, and to leave aside smaller screen displays and low-tech hardware supports. Products like VCDs, digital audio tapes, MiniDiscs, and SD cards were widely adopted in the region and successfully competed with DVDs and web uploads until smartphones became ubiquitous in the 2010s. The ethnographies collected in Asian Video Cultures attest that the preferred mode of diffusion is often off-line and through movable hardware devices that are passed on through informal networks of distribution and exchange. As Chia-chi Wu shows in her study of trans-Chinese screen practices, Asia is the continent of small-screen realities. In Chinese-language communities in the recent past, a growing lexicon of the “mini”, the “small” and the “micro” has developed in multifarious forms with radically different political and cultural meanings. “Wēi”, meaning “micro” in Mandarin, has been used in ubiquitous names like Wēibó (China’s version of Twitter), Wēixìn (WeChat in Chinese), and wēi xiǎo shuō (micro-fictions or SNS novels) or wēi diàn yǐng (micro-cinema or “micro film”). Other neologisms centering on the concept of small are also popular, such as xiǎo què xìng (small pleasures), wēi zhěng xíng (micro-plastic surgery) or wēi lǚ xíng (micro-travel). Asian minimalism, a film orientation associated with directors You Hsiao-hsien and Jia Zhang-ke, has given rise to the rejuvenation of short-film culture on a regional scale, as evident now in the flourishing of film festivals devoted exclusively to short films or micro-movies. Wēi diàn yǐng has almost completely replaced the Mandarin term for movie shorts, duǎn piàn, which now sounds old-fashioned if not obsolete. As Chinese consumers are enjoined to embrace “wēi” or “micro”, technologies that exploit the small, the mundane, the daily pleasures, and the quotidian begin to shape a specifically Asian or Chinese modernity. All these little things resonate with subtle, multilayered meanings about the production of a self-managing, complacent, and self-comforting subject that is compatible with market neoliberalism and state authoritarianism: of course, making “big” acts of disobedience is not tolerable or even imaginable in China.

Platform and content

Two terms dominate the formulation of corporate strategies and government policies in the digital sector throughout Asia: “platform” and “content”. The shared goal is to create home-grown platforms that would compete with the dominant players, such as Google, Facebook, Amazon or Apple, and to generate content targeted at global audiences. But video cultures show us that platforms can be improvised, such as in the exchange of microSD cards among traders and consumers, and that content is often user-generated with a very local audience in mind. Niko Niko Dōga, abbreviated Nico-dō, is a Japanese video-sharing service owned by Kadokawa Corporation as part of a media mix strategy that fuses platform and content. The media mix originally refers to the practice of turning books or manga into moving images or products and vice versa. It ties video together with print, games, plastic figures, comics, and novels in a tightly knit ecosystem. Unlike other video sharing site, comments generated by users on Niko Niko Dōga are overlaid directly onto the video, synced to specific playback times. This feature allows comments to respond directly to events occurring in the video, in sync with the viewer—creating a sense of a shared watching experience. Nico-dō delivers not only videos but also manga, novels, and magazines, via the same interface as its videos, and conjunction with its unique comments function.In Japan, the emphasis on platforms was a rather late addition in corporate strategic discourse. Previous priorities in the 1990s focused on contents and intellectual property, as policy makers entertained the hope that Japanese cultural goods would make up for the decline of Japanese industrial power. But once it was adopted in the 2000s, platforms became ubiquitous. Former telecom services such as NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode were reconceptualized as platforms, and business seminars with MIT professors were organized on the logic of multi-sided markets—as platforms are modeled among economists. The enthusiasm for platform reflected the craze about media theory that had developed among Japanese executives at the time of Marshall McLuhan’s book Understanding Media in the 1960s. Indeed, as Marc Steinberg notes in his contribution, “what we used to call media we now call platforms.”

There is a dark side of Asian video cultures that the authors of this volume do not really explore, and to which they refer only tangentially. In Asia as elsewhere, the Internet is a breeding ground for conspiracy theories, right-wing ideologies, racist provocations, and nationalist mobilizations that abuse free speech and undermine democracy. Evidence points to an Asian genealogy of some of these extremist forums. Japan’s infamous 2Channel (2ch.net), known as nichan, served as the model for the English-language 4chan, on which the hacker collective Anonymous and the far-right conspiracy movement QAnon first developed. First launched in 1999 as a bulletin-board where full anonymity was guaranteed, 2chan became known as a hub for the Net-Right or netto uyoku that bears some responsibility for the rightward swing of Japanese politics in the past two decades. Likewise, nationalism and anti-foreigner sentiment in China would never have developed to the extend it now has without the availability of Internet forums and text messaging services that allowed disgruntled youths to vent the anger they couldn’t direct at the authoritarian regime. The dark side of the net is also reflected in the proliferation of pornographic pictures and sex videos that affects individuals and communities in Asia as in other continents. Without going so far as saying that “mobile phones are responsible for rapes,” as the Karnakata legislature did to ban smartphones in schools and colleges across the state, the proliferation of smutty videos and pictures on modern social networks has certainly taken a toll on populations and especially on the most vulnerable: women, the young, those least able to navigate discriminately the new currents of online streams. With great freedom comes great responsibility.

The new Internet archive

The authors of Asian Video Cultures prefer to insist on the positive, creative and empowering aspects of new media. They offer vignettes of individual emancipation, community involvement, emergent solidarities, and artistic production that all point toward the same direction. Patricia Zimmermann describes a new-media portal in Indonesia that has been described as the “YouTube for Southeast Asia activists”. It focuses not on the national but on micro-territories and micro-practices such as the production of short documentaries for social media that address issues of environmental degradation, social mobilization, and migrant rights, thereby circumventing the mainstream media’s stranglehold on information. Tzu-hui Celina Hung documents how immigrant brides in multicultural Taiwan are able to better negotiate the terms of incorporation into their new household by exchanging information and sharing their stories on social networks. Rahul Mukerjee and Abhigyan Singh explain how young men from the Meo ethnic group in rural Mewat in northwestern India are able to escape the strictures of their rigorist community by appropriating the symbols of individual emancipation, the motorbike and the mobile phone. Feng-Mei Heberer analyzes the art videos of Singaporean artist Ming Wang who performs drag cross-dressing by impersonating the role of female protagonists in German classical movies, thereby giving a face to under-represented ethnic and sexual minorities in Germany. S.V. Srinivas studies the mobilization that led to the formation of Telangana State within India through online activities such as uploading videos and posting comments in the local language on YouTube. Like literacy in 19th century Europe, the diffusion of video cultures in contemporary Asia is conducive to the formation of new subjects and collectives. Unlike literacy, however, it largely escapes the sphere of the state and is not framed by national policies. Video documentaries and short movies are produced outside of the state media system and circulate beyond the realm of the market. Another key difference is that we are able to document 19th century history through the print archive formed by the collection of books, newspapers, pamphlets, and printed material kept in libraries and archival depots. How will future historians and researchers document our video cultures, and how will they deal with the crap that is uploaded daily on YouTube?

Straight From the Gut

A review of Animate Planet: Making Visceral Sense of Living in a High-Tech Ecologically Damaged World,  Kath Weston, Duke University Press, 2017.

Although published in a book series high in theory octane, Kath Weston is not interested in theory. She prefers to tell stories. She is mischievous about it: in a field where theory is everywhere and academics have to live by their theoretical word, she plays with theory like a kitten plays with yarn. She wiggles it, unrolls it, shuffles it around, drags it across the floor, and turns it into a story. For stories is what she is interested in. Of course, as she herself acknowledges, “in an era when ‘post-‘ is all the rage and everyone reaches for a beyond,” she cannot ignore postmodernism, posthumanism, postcolonialism, new feminisms, the narrative shift, or the ontological turn. Or, being published by Duke University Press (and handpicked by its editor, Ken Wissoker), vibrant matter, animacies, new materialisms, the affective turn, everyday intimacies, experimental futures, global insecurities, and new ecologies (to quote book titles or series from the same press.) But she knows her strength lies in storytelling, not theory-making or abstract criticism. She realizes her book will be remembered for the stories she tells (or for the haunting book cover she selected), not for the theories she discusses or the concepts she forges. She uses references to the academic literature, especially in endnotes, to make clear that her book should not be considered as fiction or reportage, but as an attempt, as the subtitle puts it, to make “visceral sense of living in a high-tech ecologically damaged world.” She avoids ontological claims or conclusions: when she elaborates on animates and intimacies, she explores contemporary ways of living—and not ontology-based corrections of an error called modernity.

Bedtime stories

Animate Planet begins with a bedtime story. Its meaning is rather confusing: there is a before and an after, inanimate agents with capital letters (such as Alienation and Capital), birds and humans (such as in the picture on the book cover), lords and lieges, turtles and sea otters, glass castles and islands, forests and deserts, water and ice. The whole seems oddly familiar and yet alien, as in the liminal state of consciousness when bedtime stories are told, as the mind drifts into sleeping and imagination roams free. This is, as the author tells, modernity’s story, the dream in which we are caught and from which we may never awaken. It is a story of ecological destruction, resource depletion, rising sea levels, disappearing species, damaged habitats, and inevitable disaster. This initial folk tale is to be followed by many other stories, drawn from anthropological literature or from the author’s own research. Most stories adopt a language of crisis and catastrophe, of precariousness and destitution; some stories end with a more positive ring, as they develop ways to live in an increasingly inhabitable planet. They take us to places as diverse as northern India suffering from drought and water pollution, Japan living under the spell of Fukushima, and Navajo reserves marketing homeland products in the United States. Four main families of stories emerge, linked to the themes spelled out at the beginning of each chapter: food; energy; climate change; and water.

The story of food starts in a Californian school where pupils were mandated to wear an identification badge containing a radio frequency identification transmitter, or RFID. In the United States, RFID technology is widely used to track cattle in the agribusiness industry. It responds to the perceived need to trace animal products “from farm to fork” and to connect the consumer to the processed commodity, beyond species exploitation and labor alienation. We ask technologies to supply the intimate knowledge that people have long derived from direct contact and interactions. This “techno-intimacy” is especially relevant for the way we connect with food (we need “food stories” to consume a particular wine or dish), with animals (“Wir geben Fleisch ein Gesischt,” advertises a German farm producer) and with children (although the RFID badge project in the Californian school was finally abandoned.) Under the guise of biosecurity, US agencies track livestock and poultry to secure the food supply chain and prevent epidemics, even while farm inspection budgets are being cut and meatpacking regulations are being loosened. We grant nationality to animals (“US beef”) even while we deny it to undocumented immigrants. As the author records, “a cow in the United States might have as many as five different identification codes associated with it, each keyed to a different program.” Meanwhile, genetically modified organisms enter the food chain without any regulation or tracking. The techno-intimacies that are experimented on animals find their ways into social applications designed to track humans and monitor their behavior. 

Japan’s radiation moms

Kath Weston was in Tokyo in March 2011 when the great earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima catastrophe took place. Every day brought news of fresh radioactive releases and monitoring radiation became part of daily life, with new benchmarks and units such as megabecquerels (MBq), millisieverts (mSv), or counts per minute (CPM). For every measurement that the government sponsored, activists associated with the small but growing antinuclear movement created one of their own. People with no particular technical training would take technology into their own hands and equip themselves with Geiger counters and other portable electronic devices. The Internet became the preferred medium for circulating the results of grassroots radiation monitoring that appeared in the form of crowdsourced radiation maps and databases. Meanwhile, “radiation moms” took the habit of taking their Geiger counter to the market and scanning their rice and seaweed before preparing dinner. For Kath Weston, the blurring of lines between bodies, technologies, and contaminated ecologies creates a “bio-intimacy” in which humans incorporate contaminating elements into their daily lives. Treating the body as something to be protected from an environment imagined as “out there” makes no sense: the surrounding milieu is already part of the body and reconfigures it through absorbed radiations, chemicals, and poisonous substances. The pollution of our environment creates unwanted intimacy with invisible matter that creeps into our cellular fabric and alters its physiology. 

The chapter on climate change begins with the story of climate skeptics for whom “it doesn’t feel hotter these days.” People have always used their body in order to decode shifts in both wether and climate, and talking about the weather has always been a favorite topic of conversation. Trusting the body makes scientific sense: it is part of the “visceral” knowledge referred to in the book’s title. Bodies have long been integral to scientific inquiry: Marie and Pierre Curie exposed themselves to radium burns and took precise measurement of the lesions produced, and the geneticist J. B. S. Haldane wrote an essay “On Being One’s Own Rabbit” in which he recounted using his body for experiments. This being told, bodily sensations are a poor instrument for assessing climate change: perceptions are fleeting and subjective, and they can not monitor shifts that take place on a yearly basis or at the scale of decades, if not centuries. The important point is to link bodily observations with broader narratives generated by climate science: this way, body sensations can assume evidential status, and scientific evidence of climate change can make visceral sense and generate political engagement. Weather reports now use the notion of “felt temperature” or “bio-weather” to tell people what effects they might experience in their bodies. This kind of bio-intimacy with temperature, humidity, wind, and hydration is as important and no less scientific than objective measurement. Referring to the useful data generated by bird watchers who record migratory patterns, Kath Weston calls for a grassroots climate science that would mobilize the potential of citizen science and amateur observation to document an increasingly damaged planet.

Holy water

Water in some parts of India is so polluted that even birds reject tap water and drink only from the filtered water that is offered to them. Many rivers can only be described as “sewers”, and most household equip themselves with water filtration systems. Meanwhile, a water-and-architecture extravaganza called the Grand Venice has been built in the Greater Noida suburb of New Delhi. The real estate development project advertises “eco” features for visitors and residents, allowing them to cultivate a spiritual connection with water that is constitutive to Indian culture; but the gondola rides and cascade fountains come at the price of severe strain on water resources and energy consumption. Water from the tap in ordinary households comes laden with heavy minerals and is incompatible with life; while water in the Grand Venice shopping mall quenches people’s inherent need for spectacle and entertainment. Kath Weston reminds us that in the urban ghettoes of the United States, people have always opened fire hydrants in the streets in hot summer to play around; similarly, in monsoon regions like northern India, people rush outside as soon as rain comes and raise their faces to the sky to greet the first raindrops. The transformation of Indian rivers into sewer canals gives rise to scatological humor and lively public protests. Drawing on Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin, she calls this drive for fun and merriment the “carnivalesque” and considers it fair play. 

The destruction of the planet has been amply documented. But ecological consciousness doesn’t lead to political action. As Kath Weston asks, “What does it mean to know but not to grasp, to have realization end in a shrug?” Or, to put it differently, “Knowing what we know, why are we stuck?” Her answer is to substitute intellectual knowledge with a “visceral” sense of living. Some of our thoughts and feelings are deeply entrenched and rooted in our bodily existence. They do not come from the brain or from the heart, but “straight from the gut.” What is visceral is not only human: it also originates from the bacteria and germs that populate our digestive organs and that have a major influence on our metabolism. Viscera are an inter-species composite that forms what scientists describe as the microbiome and that makes us plural: from the perspective of our internal organs, we are multitude. But of course there are risks in advocating a visceral shift toward a more intimate engagement with the world that surrounds us: gut feelings may be wrong and lead us astray. We know what usually comes out from our bowels, and we don’t want to play with it the way we engage with thoughts and emotions. As an example, Kath Weston reminds us of the “new car smell” that car salesmen never failed to point out to convince potential buyers, notwithstanding the fact that the smell came from potentially carcinogenic chemicals such as adhesives and solvents that were used in the production process. Making visceral sense of the world may lead us to the same blunders that have caused our predicament.

The unrelenting power of narratives

Another way to affect behavior and to trigger a spiritual conversion is to tell stories. Narratives stay with us and linger in our memory for a longer time span than do theories. From the fairy tales of our childhood to the myths and legends that form the basis of whole civilizations, we live in a world shaped by stories in which we incidentally take part. Theories are interested in the general and seek to describe the specific in non-specific terms, whereas stories are time- and space-bound. Any theory mistakes the provincial for the universal; it reduces the yet unknown to a particular, provincial conception of things human. It denies the possibility that things could be otherwise than they are; that mutations of the possible might occur that we cannot grasp with our already established ways of thinking and knowing. A theorist already knows (everything). But what if the thing one attempts to think through in terms of this or that theory, in its own dynamic, in its own singular configuration, were such that it actually defies the theory used to explain it? By contrast, narratives start with the recognition that the new and the different is conceptually incommensurable with the already thought and known. They create an intimacy—recall the book’s bio- and techno-intimacies—that makes us familiar with the unknown, the unprecedented, the queer and alien. Even theories can be understood as narratives for the figures they summon, the rhythm they create, and the conclusions they reach. I, for one, read nonfiction books (and particularly books by Duke University Press) as bedtime stories. I am interested in the vistas they open to the world, their openness to the unfamiliar and the unexpected, their capacity to decenter and to displace well-established borders and categories. Theories I read and tend to forget; stories I recall and I revisit. This is why Kath Weston’s Animate Planet, with its stunning book cover and its tapestry of narratives, will linger with me.  

Video Game Theory

A review of Respawn: Gamers, Hackers, and Technogenic Life, Colin Milburn, Duke University Press, 2018.

RespawnVideo games are now part of popular culture. Like books or movies, they can be studied as cultural productions, and university departments offer courses that critically engage with them. Scholars who specialize in this field of study take various perspectives: they can chart the history of video game production and consumption ; they can focus on their design or their aesthetic value; or they can analyze their narrative content and story plot. There is no limit to how video games can be engaged: some thinkers even take them as fertile ground for philosophy and theory building. Within the past few years, a handful of books have been published on video game theory. Colin Milburn’s Respawn can be added to that budding strand of literature. It is a work of applied theory: the author doesn’t engage with longstanding philosophical problems or abstract reasoning, but draws from the examples of a wide range of games, from Portal and Final Fantasy VII to Super Mario Sunshine and Shadow of the Colossus, to illustrate how they impact the lives of gamers and non-gamers alike. In particular, he considers the value of video games for shaping protest and political action. Video games, with the devotion that serious gamers bring to the task, introduce the possibility of living otherwise, of hacking the system, of gaming the game. Gamers and hackers develop alternative forms of participatory culture along with new tactics of critique and intervention. Hacktivist groups such as Anonymous use video game language and aesthetics to disrupt the operations of the security state and launch attacks on the neoliberal order. Pirate parties have won seats in European legislatures and advocate a brand of techno-progressivism, digital liberties, and participatory democracy largely inspired by video games. Exploring the culture of video games can therefore offer a glimpse into the functioning of our modern democracies in a computerized world.

Geek vocabulary

A culture is formed of various groups that may develop their own specific identity within the context of the larger social system to which they belong. Gaming culture can he treated as a subculture: a series of social codes, technological lore, and insignificant facts of history, popular culture, art and science. Subcultures create social groups by delineating their identities, beliefs, and habits as much as they exclude those who do not belong to the group. Geek culture is a subculture of computer enthusiasts that is traditionally associated with obscure media: Japanese animation, science fiction novels, comic books, and video games. Respawn is replete with trivia, code words, and key expressions that open for the noninitiate a window into the world of gaming. “All your base are belong to us” is the poorly translated sentence from the Japanese arcade game Zero Wing that is now used as a catchphrase for violent appropriation and technical domination. Used by the leader of the cyborg invasion force known as CATS, it signifies that a posthuman future is already inevitable, and presents an allegory of the information age in which mistranslations and malfunctions abound. Made popular by the website Something Awful, it is the feline equivalent of the Doge Internet meme that consists of a picture of a Shiba Inu dog accompanied by multicolored text deliberately written in a form of broken English. Variations on the CATS meme include the message posted by YouTube in 2006 that “All your videos are belong to us” or, following the Snowden affair and the exposure of NSA’s vast data-surveillance operation, various Internet images that proclaim: “All your data are belong to U.S.”

Another obscure lore sentence is the question: “Where were you on April 20, 2011?” that refers to the date the PlayStation Network was shut down as a retroactive security response to an external intrusion. Colin Milburn reconstructs the story of this particular episode, which exposes the troubled relations between Sony Corporation and various groups of hackers, of which the attack on Sony Pictures by operatives allegedly sponsored by the government of North Korea is only the last installment. It all began with Sony’s decision to make its PlayStation 3 open to homebrew programmers and technological innovators in order to encourage participatory science, peer-to-peer design, and do-it-yourself innovation. With its PlayStation Network or PSN, it even claimed to have created “the most powerful distributed computing network ever” and made it accessible to Stanford University’s researchers to simulate the mechanics of protein folding by installing the Folding@home software on all its stations. However, in January 2010, the young hacker George Hotz—more commonly known by his alias, GeoHot—announced that he had found a way to hack the PS3, gaining access to its system memory and processor and allowing users to make pirate copies of their games. Sony backpedalled on its open system policy and filed a lawsuit against GeoHot, which then found supporters among the hacker collective Anonymous who launched a massive DDOS attack against Sony servers. It is in this context that the PlayStation Network outage occurred, disabling gamers access to their favorite occupation and exposing them to the risk of leaked personal data, including passwords and credit card numbers that the hackers were able to extract from servers. Anonymous was quick to deny responsibility for the criminal intrusion, but it wasn’t the end for Sony’s troubles and the company was exposed to more attacks by malicious black-hat hackers. Meanwhile, the unsolved mystery of who hacked the PSN invited conspiracy narratives and dark humor mashups. “PlayStation Network was down so I killed Osama Ben Laden” was how a meme described president Obama’s reaction, while others noted the time coincidence between the PSN shutdown and the day the Skynet network took over the world in the Terminator movie.

Doing it for the lulz

The gamer culture intersects with hacking in the lulz, a form of corrupted laughter that derives pleasure from online actions taken at another’s expense. The “field of Theoretical Lulz” as depicted on Encyclopedia Dramatica includes trolling, gooning, griefing, and pranking, as well as the various forms of online harassment developed by hackers who, as they say, “do it just for the lulz.” Modding refers to the act of modifying hardware, software, or any aspect of a game, to perform a function not originally conceived or intended by the designer, or achieve a bespoke specification. Mods may range from small changes and tweaks to complete overhauls, and can extend the replay value and interest of the game. Respawn, a command-line first occurring in the game Doom, means to reenter an existing game environment at a fixed point after having been defeated or otherwise removed from play. It is the opposite of permadeath games that make players start over from the very beginning if their character dies. Yet another option is to play in “Iron Man mode” and try to reach the end of any game with only a single avatar life, eschewing the “save” or “respawn” functions. The hacker concept of “magic” refers to “anything as yet unexplained, or too complicated to explain,” but also to the command words in adventure games that included functions such as “XYZZY” or “PLUGH”. The word “pwn” is not a programming function or an instruction code, but a term of appreciation (as in “This game pwns”) that originated in the gaming community itself, probably born from a typographic error. According to the most enthusiastic critics, games raise philosophical issues. The role-playing game Portal includes the sentence “There will be cake” in its opening, but the player soon realizes that “The cake is a lie.” Of course, these two sentences have achieved cult status, and are repeated in countless Internet memes or signs carried at street demonstrations.

For Colin Milburn, games are closely correlated to the meaning of life. Many concepts from computer science draw parallels to the realm of organic life—worms, viruses, bugs, swarms, hives, and so forth. Sony has built upon this connexion by attaching its brand to an image of biological organism and vitality, from its 2007 “This Is Living” advertising campaign to its 2011 “Long Live Play” motto. Sony executives routinely speak about the PlayStation’s DNA, refer to its microprocessor as The Cell, and insist on the nucleic compatibility between successive generations of hardware products. For Colin Milburn, “‘respawn’ stands for a surplus of vitality, a reserve of as-yet unexpended life, a technologically mediated capacity to keep on going even while facing dire adversity.” He uses the term “technogenic life” to refer to the entanglement between organic life and digital media and the emergence of new life-forms, neither fully human nor artificial. This is of course a familiar trope in science fiction, and the author lists classic novels such as John Brunner’s Shockwave Rider, Vernon Vinge’s True Names, or William Gibson’s Neuromancer as part of any gamers’ portable library. Video games are experiments in applied science fiction: they allow players to test the limits of life, to engage with anticipation and foresight, and to make other futures imaginable. Gamers always have the possibility to reset, save, shut off, or reload. Games tend to encourage a playful and experimental attitude to life: working through error, overcoming failure, persevering toward the goal while staying open to the unexpected. Playing games can teach us how to live: indeed, they are part of our lives as Homo Ludens. Gamers respond to the injunction to “get a life” by arguing that they already have one, indeed many: “I am a gamer, not because I don’t have a life, but because I choose to have many.”

We Are Heroes

Gamers are also influenced by the subculture of comic books and superhero movies. Since 1978, when the first Superman cartridge appeared for the Atari 2600, the video-game industry has produced a steady stream of superhero adventures. One such game was City of Heroes, a massive multiplayer online role-playing game or MMORPG that attracted a large community of followers. In the game, players created super-powered characters that could team up with others to complete missions and fight criminals belonging to various gangs and organizations in the fictional Paragon City. When the South Korean company NCsoft decided to terminate its Paragon Studios development team and to shut down the game in 2012, massive protests arose. Online testimonies reflected feelings of camaraderie and shared culture, domestic and social belonging, comfort in times of sorrow, and personal accomplishment—indeed, all the qualities of “having a life”. Rallying under the motto “We are heroes. This is what we do,” participants envisaged various measures to keep the game operating past the announced date of closure. Their logic was straightforward: the company had made a game where players had spent the past eight years defending their city; it was only natural that they rose in protest against this attack on Paragon. Some decided to go rogue and keep the game running on servers based on the leaked source code. Like in the world of superheroes, the online community has always had its rogue elements, its vigilantes and its villains. The author is not sure where to categorize hackers such as the group Anonymous: “despite their roguelike appearances, hacktivists might even seem to be on the right side of history.” But the hate speech, misogynistic attacks, and racist slurs that circulate on forums such as Reddit or 4chan clearly fall into the villainy category. They represent “the dark side of the lulz,” the politics of terror and mayhem that is already familiar to the fans of Batman’s Gotham City and other superhero worlds.

Gaming also shapes a political imaginary. Numerous players have attested to the impact of gaming on their own political or ecological sensitivities. The dispositions and practices cultivated by gaming can inform political choices, responsible policy decisions, and collective action. Under the right circumstances, video games offer ways to experiment with the technopolitics of the present, to think otherwise even from the inside of a computer system. Edward Snowden has confessed that his motive for challenging the security state has developed partly through his lifelong interest in video games. According to Colin Milburn, video games frequently present interactive narratives about civil disobedience, social resistance, and transformation, becoming models for engagement. The quotidian act of saving or resetting gameplay data itself models an orientation to social change, affirming that duration and persistence are not givens but are always active processes of construction. Final Fantasy VII has encouraged a generation of players to consider “how deeply the fights for economic democracy and environmental sustainability are intertwined.” Gaming and hacking cultures are intrinsically correlated. The “primal scene of hacking” occurred in the early 1960s when MIT research scientists experimented with the university’s mainframe computer to create the first video game, Spacewar! The first online role-playing game, Adventure, which circulated on the ARPANET in the seventies, included a secret hideout place where the author left his unauthorized signature. Many games include hacking as a function, and offer the possibility to tweak the code or experiment with alternative commands even from the inside. But in the end, even those who resist the prevailing systems of control are likewise products of those same systems. Like in Ernest Cline’s novel Ready Player One, the only possible option may be to play through to the end or to quit entirely. Completing a game inevitably triggers the formula: “Game Over”.

Cultural studies

Colin Milburn advances the scholarly study of video games in several directions. First, he shows how to engage theoretically with video games. He borrows many of his tools from the cultural study of literature and cinema. For example, he focuses on particular episodes of video games, or he summarizes the plot of select games such as Final Fantasy VII. As in book or film reviews, his descriptions entail some disclosure of plot details that may constitute a spoiler for some gamers: if you don’t want to know the final scene in System Shock 2 or the location of the secret AVALANCHE hideout in Final Fantasy VII, you may have to skip some passages in the book. He also dwells on the psychology of some characters, just as a critic would do with a novel or a movie. In this sense, video game theory is not especially new: games are amenable to the tools used to analyze artworks that belong to the narrative genre. As a second contribution, Respawn offers a description of gaming culture. The author introduces the unfamiliar reader to a community brought together by code words, favorite expressions, a common history, and modes of engagement with video games and with life in general. Video game culture consists of a rich mythology of lore, trivia, fun facts, episodes, and images that are communicated through online discussions, the diffusion of Internet memes, and the participation in social events such as gaming conventions or cosplay parties. Thirdly, Colin Milburn underscores the transformative power of games, the subversive potential of role-playing and other forms of ludic recreation. The book traces the intersections of gaming with hacking and high-tech activism, focusing on several online campaigns launched by the hacktivist collective Anonymous. It underscores that lulz, fun, and games can no longer be thought as separate from issues of political or technological governance. Games allow other ways of being in the world: they create the possibility to act like a superhero, a vigilante or a villain, or to escape the laws of gravity by wavedashing or airdodging along with Super Mario. Most importantly, Colin Milburn demonstrates that video games matter—even for casual users or non-gamers. Video games have become increasingly sophisticated, not only in the evermore complex issues that they present, but also in revealing their own explicit and reflective awareness about theoretical issues. Video game theory may not just be about applying existing theory tools to video games, but also crafting new tools, concepts and theories brought forth by video games and that may be of broader relevance for culture and society.

Lord of the Crabs

A review of Improvising Medicine: An African Oncology Ward in an Emerging Cancer Epidemic, Julie Livingston, Duke University Press, 2012.

Improvising MedicineImprovising Medicine describes everyday life in a small oncology ward in Botswana, a Southern African country that has been decimated by HIV/AIDS and that now faces a rising cancer epidemic. AIDS, disease, heat, stench, misery, overcrowding, scarcity, death: the picture seems familiar, even cliché. But Julie Livingston warns (or reassures) her reader at the outset: this is not the book on Africa one has learned to expect (or to dread). As she notes, “the problems of pain, death, illness, disfigurement, and care that lie at the heart of this book are basic human ones.” This is, in essence, a book about human nature in the face of insufferable circumstances. It is told in the way anthropologists tell a story: with a concern for the local, the mundane, the quotidian. Improvising Medicine is based on an extended period of participant observation and hundreds of pages of research notes jotted down after long hours of assisting care workers in their daily chores. The particularities of ethnographic observation are reflected in the excerpts of the research diary that are inserted in the book, with the names and proclivities of each patient and coworker who, in the end, become familiar figures to the reader as they were for the fieldworker. And yet, between the localized setting and the universalist message, there are some conditions and lessons that pertain to Africa as a whole. The cancer ward in Princess Marina Hospital in Gaborone, Botswana’s capital, is referred to as an African oncology ward in an African hospital. The author routinely writes about an African ethic of care, about the defining features of biomedicine in Africa, or about the articulation between African practice and global health.

The local, the regional, and the global

Of these three overlapping planes of observation, the local that characterizes a specific cancer ward, the regional that makes it distinctly African, and the universal that is common to all humanity, let’s start with what is specific to Botswana. In the early 2000s, at the time of the book’s writing, the country had only one hospital ward dealing with cancer patients, with twenty beds and few medical equipments—radiotherapy had to be practiced in a private clinic nearby. It had no medical faculty or university hospital, and doctors had to be trained abroad or brought in as foreign experts. Botswana’s inhabitants looked up to neighboring South Africa as a place with more sophisticated and powerful medicine than was available in their country. On the other hand, Zimbabwe, Botswana’s eastern neighbor, was spiraling into a crisis of dramatic proportions, and patients or doctors who had previously relied on its health system were forced to look abroad. Unlike apartheid South Africa or dictatorial Zimbabwe, Botswana was and still is characterized by a robust social contract that has sustained a stable democratic life and steady economic growth. For over four decades, Botswana’s political leadership has proven remarkably adept, patient, and forward thinking in charting the course of development, stability, and peace under challenging circumstances. Botswana is the untold success story in a continent that is often associated with civil wars, military dictatorships, and continuous economic decline.

These characteristics of Botswana translate in the country’s health system. Healthcare is provided as a public good for citizens under a program of universal care. Most people rely on the public health system and pay only a minimal fee for its services, although the cost of transportation and hospitalization falls heavily on the poorest households’ budgets. Botswana’s democratic regime and relatively equalitarian society ensure that “Bushmen from the Kalahari lie in beds next to the siblings of cabinet ministers, and village grandmothers sit on chemo drips tethered to the same pole as those of young women studying at the university.” Its small population and dense communal life also ensures that “everybody knows each other,” and this familiarity among patients and with caregivers humanizes the illness experience. A day at the cancer ward usually starts with prayers in Setswana, the national language, as most of the nurses are devout Christians. Nursing in the oncology ward is an extension of the state’s commitment to care for its people, a manifestation of a national ethos of care and compassion, and nurses are expected to embody these deeply ingrained values. Unlike other places where nurses might look down on their poorest patients, in Botswana social differences are mediated by an equalitarian ideology, and many nurses make a point of resisting claims for extra resources (more bed space, time with the doctor, nursing attention, preferential treatment) made by the most elite patients.

Living with HIV/AIDS, dying from cancer

Of course, this picture of Botswana’s health situation wouldn’t be complete without mentioning AIDS. Botswana lives in the shadow of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Nearly a quarter of the adult population is HIV-positive, which means everyone has intimate knowledge of AIDS and its suffering. Antiretroviral therapies, distributed free of charge by an arm of the national healthcare program, have transformed HIV/AIDS from a deadly predicament into a chronic disease. People have learned to live with HIV; new terms have entered the local vocabulary, such are mogare (worm) to designate the virus or masole (soldiers) to refer to the CD4 count. Immunodeficiency increases the risk of co-infections by hepatitis, tuberculosis, but also certain forms of cancer. Co-infection with HIV renders cancer more aggressive and prognoses more ominous and uncertain. Before ARVs were available, many of Botswana’s patients died with a cancer, but from other AIDS-related infections. Since 2001, when Botswana’s ARV program began, however, many patients have survived HIV only to grapple wth virus-associated cancers made all the more aggressive and difficult to treat by HIV co-infection.The experience of cancer (kankere) has been grafted onto an already complex health situation. “If only I just had AIDS” was the ironic refrain the author heard repeated many times by the cancer ward’s patients.

Whereas HIV/AIDS originated in Africa and is often associated with the continent, popular opinion rarely associates cancer with Africa. According to Julie Livingston, many factors contribute to make cancer in Africa invisible: statistics are scarce, detection equipments are lacking, patented drugs are expensive and tailored for rich countries’ markets, and clinical knowledge is often ill-suited to African contexts. In addition, powerful interests conspire in perpetuating scientific ignorance about cancer in Africa: the mining industry often denies occupational exposure to uranium radiation or asbestos, and the African continent is targeted as the new growth market by tobacco companies. Cancers often go undetected until they have reached terminal stage, and then again they are not reflected in mortality data due to poor registry infrastructure. The paradoxical result is the shocking visibility of cancer among African patients. Readers are reminded that “while cancer with oncology was awful, cancer without oncology could be obscene.” A visit to the oncology ward conveys a vision from hell: the author’s fieldwork notes include descriptions such as “a friable mass of bleeding tissue eating its way into the vaginal wall and the bladder,” “a black swelling on the sole of her foot which had begun to ulcerate,” “throats blocked by esophageal tumors,” or “the necrotic stench of tumors that have broken through the skin and exposed rotting flesh.” It is this rot, and its accompanying stink and sight that in earlier decades made cancer an obscenity in North America and Western Europe. Very often, at this late stage, the only solution is brutal surgery: too many breasts, legs, feet, and testicles to be removed in a single day makes the author note in her diary, with grim humor: “It’s amputation day at Princess Marina Hospital.”

Invisible pain

Cancer in Africa is made invisible; similarly, pain among African patients is negated and marginalized. Pain is what propels many patients into clinics because they can no longer endure it on their own, yet many clinical staff are reluctant to use opioids and palliative care even for patients who are dying, despite long-standing WHO protocols encouraging their use and low-cost availability of morphine, codeine, and pethidine produced by the generics industry. This economy of pain is not only limited to Africa: the Global South, which represents about 80 percent of the world’s population, accounts for only about 6 percent of global consumption of therapeutic morphine. But the invisibility of pain in Africa takes on a particular racist twist: it is widely believed that Africans are less sensitive to pain, that they are more forbearing than whites and thus bear their pain in silence, and that they even smile under duress, laugh at pain’s expression, and make it a matter of ridicule. Racial ideas about pain are inherited from the colonial period and the slave trade, with its long history of forced labor, corporal punishment, and dehumanizing psychology. But African reluctance to perform pain loudly is also understood as a function of culture, as when African women laugh at the foolishness of white women moaning and screaming during childbirth, or in reference to initiation ceremonies when young adolescents had to endure beatings and suffering in silence in order to cross the threshold to adulthood. In the cancer ward observed by Julie Livingston, pain may be spoken of, but rarely screamed or cried over, and patient silence is interpreted as a sign of forbearance. But nurses are carefully attuned to nonverbal cues, reading facial expressions and bodily contact to gauge pain. Pain, even when it is repressed, denied, or laughed at, is a thoroughly social experience.

Efforts to socialize pain point to a wider lesson: disease is not only what happens to one person, but also between people and at the level of social interactions. Although cancer produces moments of profound loneliness and boredom for patients, serious illness, pain, disfigurement, and even death are deeply social experiences. It is sometimes said that we’re born alone, we live alone, we die alone. But from the moment we are born until we take our last breath, we are enmeshed in webs of social relations: we are never alone. This social embeddedness of life and disease that the author makes visible in Gaborone’s hospital is a defining feature of medicine beyond the African context. It is also what characterizes nursing, care work, and the ethics of therapeutics whatever its location or cultural context. Improvising Medicine is therefore a book with global relevance. Even the fact that improvisation is a defining feature of biomedicine in Africa can be generalized to other contexts. Confronted with life-or-death decisions, doctors always have to improvise in the spur of the moment, make choices under imperfect information, and even triage patients by determining who might get treatment and who might be left without medical attention. Of course, doctors are supposed to memorize procedures from books and follow rules. That’s why they attend medical school for so many years and pass stringent tests to be sure they know exactly how to handle each medical emergency according to the standard procedure. But an ordinary day in Princess Marina Hospital shows us life never goes by the book: doctors may be aware of the ideal way to deliver a certain treatment or to perform an operation, but they don’t have the equipment, staff personnel, infrastructure, or administrative support necessary to follow SOPs.

Third world conditions

Improvising Medicine reminds us that global health issues are indeed global, and that cancer, like medicine itself, is neither an exclusively African problem, nor a particularly Western one. The future of global health is shaped in large part by events and trends occurring in developing countries. The cancer epidemic is rising steadily across Africa and the Global South more broadly; it is aggravated by the fact that 40% of all cancers are associated with chronic infections. Co-infections are not limited to Africa: it is an important dimension of the current COVID-19 pandemic, as being already infected by a pathogen increases the sensitivity and morbidity to the new virus. But make no mistake: the situation in Africa is different. In a hospital that lacks a cytology lab, an MRI machine, endoscopy, and mammography, diagnosing and curing cancer is an impossible mission. The forms of cancer tumors that grow and blossom, exposing rotting flesh and necrotic stench, should never be allowed to develop. Critics sometimes claim that healthcare in North America or Western Europe has declined to third-world levels. They point to the long queues, shortage of equipment, and insufficient health coverage to denounce unequal access to medicine and rampant privatization of public services. The detailed description of an oncology ward in Africa should give them pause.

What Comes Next?

A review of After Ethnos, Tobias Rees, Duke University Press, 2018.

After EthnosWhat is anthropology? What should it be about, and how should it be pursued? These questions were raised with great intensity in the politically loaded context of the seventies. Radically different visions of anthropology were offered; people experimented with new forms of writing and storytelling; and the discipline was mandated to take a political stance in reaction to the issues of the day. As a result, anthropology was deeply transformed. The two canonical concepts that defined its academic status, culture and society, were discarded in favor of other constructs or organizing schemes—although modern ethnography is still referred to as cultural anthropology in the United States and as social anthropology in the United Kingdom. Fieldwork, the close and sustained observation of native customs and modes of thought by a participant observer, ceased to define the discipline. The methodology was adopted by other social sciences—or even by other occupations such as journalism, militantism, and even art—, while anthropologists experimented with multi-sited ethnographies or with research based on archival work. As Clifford Geertz and other anthropologists working in his wake made it clear, the collection of data by the ethnographer on the field is just the tip of the iceberg: it is based on years of reading other anthropologists’ work and attending academic lectures, and it is followed by the nitty-gritty work of reconstruction and composition that leads to the journal article or the scholarly volume. The anthropologist was recognized as a writer, as a maker of forms and a designer of concepts.

A designer of concepts

In his book, published in 2018, Tobias Rees takes these questions anew. After Ethnos grapples with the state of anthropology after the great surge of creativity and experimentation that followed the publication of the volume Writing Culture in 1986. It builds on an impressive bibliography of theoretical texts, as well as on countless seminar discussions, email exchanges, and tea corner conversations. It remains true to the creativity, artistic sensitivity, and  philosophically informed theorizing that redefined the discipline after the epistemological turn of the seventies and eighties. On the webpage of the Berggruen Institute in California, where he chairs the Transformations of the Human Program, Tobias Rees is presented as follows: “The focus of Rees’s work is on the philosophy, poetry, and politics of the contemporary. He is intrigued by situations that are not reducible to the already thought and known –– by events, small ones or large ones, that set the taken for granted in motion and thereby provoke unanticipated openings for which no one has words yet. In his writings, he seeks to capture something of the at times wild, at other times tender, almost fragile openness that rules as long as the new/different has not yet gained any stable contours. When it is (still) pure movement. His work on the brain, on microbes, snails and AI have increasingly given rise to two observations that have come to define his work. (1) A distinctive feature of the present is that the question concerning the human occurs less in the human than in the non-human sciences. Say, in microbiome research, in AI or in the study of climate change. (2) The tentative answers that are emerging from these non-human fields radically defy the understanding of the human as more than mere nature and as other than mere machines on which the human sciences were built.”

Tobias Rees claims that After Ethnos is a non programmatic book. And yet it reads like a manifesto of sorts, a rallying call aiming at offering a vision of what anthropology could look like after it has severed it ties to ethnos and, in a way, to anthropos. Many sentences indeed offer a programme or a platform for future anthropologists. New directions in contemporary research are assessed, lines of escape are drawn, and a new orientation for future research is proposed. The author doesn’t mean to condemn or be judgmental of certain forms of anthropology that remain tied to disciplinary traditions. But this is because traditional anthropology has disappeared from anthropology department in most American universities. As Rees soberly notes, “Classical modern ethnography has come to an end.” People who still focus on traditional societies now need an excuse for doing so. The burden of proof falls upon them to justify the choice of a research topic that was considered as mandatory by their predecessors. They insist on their distinctiveness from older forms of scholarship that were often tainted by racial prejudice and positions of power. Whereas it is still possible to situate oneself in the sociological tradition, paying tribute to the founding fathers and the great names of the discipline, the anthropological tradition is all but dead. It has been reduced to old books accumulating dust on libraries’ shelves, and that are turned open only to show how antiquated and prejudiced the founders of the discipline were.

The erasure of Man

For Tobias Rees, the conditions of possibility that have organized ethnography have become impossible to maintain. The abstract figure of “Man”, itself a recent invention, has been erased “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (to take Michel Foucault’s famous metaphor.) Likewise, the ethnos and its declinations—the ethnic group, the tribe, the singular people with its well-defined culture and mores, was understood as a social construct whose fiction was increasingly difficult to maintain. With these erasures, the great divides of modernity—man vs. nature, science vs. tradition, reason vs. emotion, human vs. animal, life vs. matter, etc.—have all been redrawn. Starting in the late 1980s or early 1990s a number of anthropologists began to enter—per fieldwork—domains that were formerly believed to be beyond the scope of anthropological expertise or interest, such as medicine, science and technology, media, the Internet, finance, and much more. The result was a flurry of innovative texts and monographs offering new departures for the discipline. Anthropologists took the perspective of the gingko tree or the matsutake mushroom that have been around from times immemorial to envisage the possibility of life without humans, to displace “Man” from the center and to make it little more than a late-coming and transient episode in the history of the earth. Others have described the world-making qualities of bacteria that effectively have produced and continue to produce our external and internal environment, from the steady production of oxygen in the atmosphere to their critical role in digestion and the immune system through the microbiome. The choice of topics for anthropologists seems limitless: there is now an anthropology of stones and rivers, of outer space and stellar systems, of the modern, the emergent, and the still-to-come…

As the author notes, it is not that the anthropologist after “the human” stopped caring about humans. On the contrary, a new sensitivity to emotions, attachments, suffering, and human care, came to inform many texts that were being produced. But classical categories like the social, the cultural, the historical, or the natural had to be discarded in order to give way to new formulations. New concepts were designed, borrowed in part from social theory or from philosophy: entanglements, assemblages, ensembles, apparatus, dispositifs, man/machine, multispecies, animacies… They each point to the composite nature of the stuff that anthropologists study, which is a combination of humans and artefacts, of nonhuman species and animate bodies. As pointed out, anthropologists have gradually expanded their inquiries to the nonhuman natural world. The emergence of an anthropology not concerned with humans, or taking humans only as an observation point entangled in technological and interspecies relations, reconnects our societies with non-Western worldviews that have always integrated nonhumans into their cosmology. Besides, “Man”, as it was formerly conceived and now seems to have faded away, is not something to be mourned or regretted. What appears in retrospect is the disarming poverty of the figure of “the human” on which anthropologists have been relying for so long. Their traditional interest in kinship systems, gift exchanges, rites of passage, and mythic structures now seems to us only to have scratched the surface. By decoupling curiosity about “things human” from the cultural construct of “the human”, anthropologists open up new possibilities and understandings. As Tobias Rees notes, “the reason I don’t want to start with ‘the human’ is that I want to ground my research not in an answer—but in a question, in boundless questions.”

Fieldwork-based philosophy

Rethinking and redesigning the discipline from the perspective of the “after” gives birth to what the author calls a “philosophically inclined anthropology.” Philosophy and anthropology have always entertained awkward relations. Many scholars were drawn to anthropology and fieldwork as a way to escape the abstract strictures of philosophy. Philosophers, for their part, often consider anthropology as an applied science in a division of labor that leaves philosophy the key role of providing general themes and ideas. Moreover, anthropologists tend to rely on a small sample of philosophical works, authors, and concepts. The great bulk of philosophical enquiry falls outside the purview of the discipline. For Tobias Rees, “once anthropologists break with ethnos, anthropology has the potential to venture into the terrain it formerly left, unwittingly or not, to philosophy.” The discipline can become philosophical by practicing fieldwork-based philosophy, or empirically grounded ways of “thinking about thinking.” Although he makes only a passing reference to Henri Bergson, I see a strong similarity between the kind of thought he advocates and Bergson’s conceptualizing of time and movement. Like Bergson, Rees wants to cut loose “the new” from any linear comprehension of time. His key concepts—the actual, the after, the movement—are meant to capture “something that which escapes.” He would be on familiar ground with Bergsonian notions of “la durée”, “l’élan vital”, “l’intuition” or “l’évolution créatrice.” Bergson conceived of philosophy as movement in thought and, ultimately, as dance. Similarly, Tobias Rees draws a parallel between his “anthropology of the actual” and artistic practice—its poetic aim “is to render visible instances of the invisible.”

Anthropology also has to cultivate a certain disrespect for theory. In a way, theories always already know everything. By contrast, anthropologists characterize themselves by the capacity to be surprised. They are drawn to the field by the possibility that “elsewhere” could be “different”. For Tobias Rees, “fieldwork is a bit like the desire to find—or to be found by—that which makes a difference.” It is to immerse oneself into scenes of everyday life in order to let the chance events that make up the stuff of discovery give rise to new concepts and metaphors. Anthropologists don’t go to the field to validate theories they have conceived in their ivory tower; nor do they practice armchair theorizing by exploiting the data collected by others. They never deny the possibility that things could be otherwise than they appear at first glance; they take nothing for granted. This is especially true for the new kind of anthropology that Tobias Rees has in mind. Rather than difference in place, the fieldworker seeks displacement in time. She wants to capture “the openings, the bifurcations, the troubles, the jumping forth, the new causes.”  Fieldwork has not disappeared; on the contrary, anthropologists have transformed countless sites into fields that were once thought to be far beyond the scope of the discipline. Nonetheless, Tobias Rees leaves open the question whether anthropological research can be dissociated from fieldwork. “Is there any obvious reason, he asks, why fieldwork would be the only, the sole, the authoritative form of anthropological knowledge production?” He leaves the question open—but answers it implicitly by making no reference to empirically collected results in his book.

So what?

I leave this book with two questions. Is there a way to reconnect with the anthropological tradition? How to make anthropology relevant for our present time? Tobias Rees makes some references to the great founders of the discipline. He reminds us that Bronislaw Malinowski invented fieldwork only serendipitously and as a result of adverse circumstances. As a citizen of Habsburg Austria he was considered a political enemy of the British Empire when the First World War erupted. The only way to escape encampment was to leave Australia and to live on the Trobiand Islands, where his lack of financial means led him to plant his tent among the natives. Tobias Rees treats classical anthropology as archive, as a repository of texts that remains available for critique and contextualization. Can we do more, and consider accumulated knowledge as a building stone for cumulative science, or can we jettison the whole edifice without great loss? In fact, many basic tenets of the discipline, or truths that for a long time were held as self-evident, have been refuted and proven wrong by advances in the life sciences. Any discipline preoccupied with the human nowadays cannot do without the findings and insights provided by the cognitive neurosciences, evolutionary biology, gene mapping, primatology, or brain science. As Charles S. Pierce once put it, “any inquirer must be ready at all times to dump his whole cartload of beliefs the moment experience is set against them.” As for anthropology’s relevance for the present, the proof of the pudding, as they say, is in the eating.

US-Bashing, Anti-vax, Animalism

A review of Bioinsecurities: Disease Interventions, Empire, and the Government of Species, Neel Ahuja, Duke University Press, 2016.

BioinsecuritiesThis book can be read as an anti-American tract, or an anti-vaccine manifesto, or as a justification of anti-speciesism, or as an attack on liberal ideas of democracy, equality, and scientific progress. Of course, this is not the intention of the author. Neel Ahuja didn’t write a tract or a manifesto, but an elaborate social science book with deep theoretical repercussions. He is more descriptive than prescriptive, and his political message is not spelled out in detail. He situates himself in a progressive movement that is unconditionally anti-racist, feminist, and anti-war. But he doesn’t take position on vaccines, on animal rights, or on speciesism. His goal is not to provide simple answers, but to complicate things and deepen our vision of mankind and its living environment as some truths long held to be self-evident are losing political traction. However, liberal arguments can be used for very illiberal ends. As I read it, Bioinsecurities gives credence to very nasty arguments which, taken to their extreme, articulate a very anti-liberal and regressive agenda. Of course, some readers, and the author with them, may argue that it is perfectly fine to be anti-American, anti-vaccine, or to stand for a radical vision of animal rights, especially considering the background of brutal imperialism, public health manipulations, and disregard for non-human animals that have marked our common history and still inform our present. We should work against the public amnesia and state-endorsed manipulation of truth that prevent the public to exercise democratic oversight and make informed decisions on matters of life and death that affect us most. But an author also has to give consideration to how a book might be read or perceived. For me, Bioinsecurities dangerously straddles the line between liberalism and illiberalism, humanism and anti-humanism, and progressivism and regression.

Settlers and immigrants

By using the word anti-American, I don’t intend to convey a political trial on academic activities that would represent a threat to the security and identity of the nation: I am certainly in no position to do so, and I feel only repulsion for this kind of political justice. But I would like to gesture toward a tension that often inhabits post-colonial literature when applied to the United States. Was America a nation of settlers or of immigrants? For most historians, this is a matter of chronology: settlers came first, then immigrants moved in. But at what moment should one draw the line between first movers and late arrivers? Were Apaches and Navajo Indians any less settlers than Spanish conquistadors when they arrived from their native lands of Alaska to the vast plains of the American South-West, at about the same time that Christopher Columbus discovered the new continent? Is there a fundamental difference between the four grand-parents of Donald Trump, who were all born outside the United States, and the father of Barak Obama, who was born in and returned to Kenya? Bostonians, who pride themselves to be descendants of John Winthrop, are not different from the Latino-Americans freshly arrived from their barrio to populate the periphery of Los Angeles. Who is the first American of America first? Seeing America as a settler nation reactivates the myth of autochtony that is so corrosive to the social fabric of old and new nations, from Ivory Coast to the Netherlands, from Marine Le Pen’s France to Donald Trump’s America. It calls for radical measures and deadly solutions: recall the Pan Africanist Congress’ rallying cry, “one settler, one bullet,” or Franz Fanon’s contention that “killing a European is killing two birds with one stone, eliminating in one go oppressor and oppressed: leaving one man dead and the other man free.” The United States has long prided itself to be a nation of immigrants, welcoming the “huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” It would be a pity if it modeled itself after the countries of racial apartheid and colonial exploitation.

Neel Ahuja sees America as an empire and its inhabitants as a settler society. For him, imperialism is a racial endeavor that exerts itself upon people, but also natural habitats and non-human species, including microbial ones. White privilege, the benefits that whites claim over non-white people, is inseparable from the privilege of man as opposed to woman and of humans as distinct from other species. Bioinsecurities explores empire as a project in the government of species and the management of biological life. The author explains the persistence of empire long after settler societies have given way to established communities by a phenomenon he calls “dread life”, or the turn from colonial occupation and settlement to the management of bodily vulnerability and diseases. Fear of contagion was an integral part of imperial expansion, and settlers were literally obsessed by disease. They tried to circumvent it, to quarantine it, to vaccinate against it, to weaponize it, or to use if for further expansion. The “smallpox blankets” that decimated the native American Indian population have their modern equivalent in the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in which six hundred African American men were used to study the progression of syphilis and denied proper medical information, informed consent, or the known effective treatments. For Neel Ahuja, disease interventions are a form of biopolitics, defined as the ongoing expansion of government into life itself. He studies the way settler colonialism intervened in the government of species and the domestication of bodies in five outposts of the American empire: the Hawaiian islands at the time of Hawaii’s annexation, Panama under military occupation of the Canal Zone between the two World Wars, Puerto Rico where a colony of rhesus monkeys was established during the Cold War, Iraq as seen from war planners in the corridors of power in Washington, and Guantanamo which harbored “the world’s first HIV concentration camp” during the Haitian refugee crisis in 1991-94. Race played a key role in the interventions of the US security state, which inherited the settler mentality and extended it to new terrains.

Fear of contagion

The case studies presented in Bioinsecurities all illustrate the fear of disease contagion and of racial intermingling that accompanied America’s expansion beyond its continental borders. Indigenous Hawaiians diagnosed with leprosy were segregated in quarantine camps on the island of Molokai and denied basic legal rights, while outbreaks of Hansen’s disease in the north central states of the United States (at times associated with Scandinavian immigrants) never attracted much public attention. Afro-Caribbean women involved in the sex trade in the Panama Canal Zone under US administration were arbitrarily arrested and tested for syphilis or gonorrhea and sentenced to hospitals for enforced treatment if tested positive, while US soldiers were only invited to “self-regulate” through moralizing and racially charged propaganda. The 1940s and 1950s witnessed a polio scare that led American scientists to import rhesus monkeys from India to Puerto Rico and harvest their bodies for vaccines, and the Iraq war had the US military prepare for a smallpox outbreak under the belief that Iraq had developed biological weapons and was ready to use them. Haitian refugees who tested HIV positive were segregated and imprisoned in Guantanamo during the years 1991-94. These are all shocking episodes, but should we read American history only through the lenses of “species wars”, “dread life”, and the “medicalized state of war” brought about by our modern bioinsecurities? The fact is that these cases rightfully provoke our moral indignation, as they did in the past when Jack London, who was both a socialist and a racist according to the author, visited “lepers’ island” and let the world know about the plight of Hansen disease patients in Hawaii. The history of the United States is by nature contested, and historians are right to point out sore spots and moral contradictions. But I don’t believe it can be reduced to the story of a security state bent on implanting settler exploitation in its imperial conquests.

In the wake of the animal rights movement and the development of animal studies as an academic field, new words have entered our vocabulary. “Speciesism” gives greater moral rights and value to human beings than to non-human animals. By contrast, “anti-speciesism” considers that this discrimination is unfounded and militates for its abolition. For animal rights advocates, speciesism is a prejudice similar to racism or sexism, in that the treatment of individuals is predicated on group membership and morally irrelevant physical differences. Their claim is that species membership has no moral significance. For their opponents, assigning the same moral value to all animal species is not just impractical, but ultimately absurd. Therefore, speciesism is unavoidable. Why, then, all the fuss about nonhuman animals and the moral obligations that we may have toward them? This shift reflects the influence of the radical critique of humanism and the rejection of anthropocentrism, voiced especially by the animal-rights movement and advocates of trans-humanism and post-humanism in popular culture since the 1990s. My point is not to discuss anti-humanism, animalism, or the rights of nonhuman animals. I know there are serious discussions out there, beyond the caricatures that each party draws of the opposing camp. Just because an animal is not a moral agent doesn’t mean that it cannot have rights or that moral agents can’t have duties towards them. Cruelty towards animals is clearly unacceptable; but so is violence condoned in the name of animal rights. And violence is a foregone conclusion for many animal rights advocates, who see the lack of public support for their cause as an added motivation to grab the headlines by spectacular action. Of course, supporting radical means and action is not the appanage of anti-speciesism, and one should not judge a cause by the violent actions of its most extreme elements. But comparing speciesism to racism or sexism—as many critics do in the name of intersectionality—or using words like “slavery” and “genocide” to describe the breeding and slaughtering of livestock, justifies in advance the most radical means. This slippery slope can only lead to hyperbolic conclusions.

Species wars

In effect, anti-speciesism or animalism usually concentrates its claims for right sharing to certain mammals, especially apes or non-human primates. On the book cover of Bioinsecurities, a rhesus macaque half soaked into water glances back at the viewer or the camera lens, with a gaze that can be read as angry, dissatisfied, or frustrated. This particular monkey is part of an imperial project: the import of 400 macaques from India to US-occupied territories in Puerto Rico to serve as guinea pigs for clinical research on poliomyelitis. In the name of producing polio vaccine, rhesus monkeys were, to use the author’s metaphor, “stabbed in the back” and inserted with spinal tap to extract polio serum. They were subjected to experimentations that would clearly fall outside what is now considered as proper and ethical laboratory norms. Could the antibiotic revolution have happened without animal experiments, and in particular primate vivisection? Before jumping to hasty conclusions, one should remember the crippling nature of polio disease, its devastating effects on children, and the public anxiety it generated. The argument made by the author that these fears of disease were themselves loaded with racial and class prejudice should in no way diminish the importance of biomedical research and vaccine production. In fact, Neel Ahuja shows that it is in the research labs and breeding stations that the modern categories of “almost human” primates and advanced sentient species originated. These categories “were less concerned with broadly questioning an anthropocentric hierarchy of species, and more involved with justifying vivisection on a mass scale.” They were the result of a complex history of Cold War politics, sovereignty claims, and ecological shifts that exceeded simple logics or science or profit. Rhesus monkeys imported from India to Puerto Rico for scientific use escaped their semi-free-ranging colonies and came to be viewed by many habitants as a pest. India protested the use of “sacred” species for biomedical research or nuclear testing and placed a moratorium on the primate trade. Regional primate research centers were established in many newly independent countries, giving rise to new disciplines such as ethology and primatology. Hollywood movies and urban legends fueled anxieties about interspecies intimacy and mad science experiments.

In place of the polio scare, new legends are emerging today about the proper role and effect of vaccines. The anti-vaccination (“anti-vax”) movement is a global phenomenon that has received a great deal of media attention. Anti-vaxxers usually don’t read or write social science dissertations and history books: they rely on word-of-mouth and social media to spread the message that the government and “Big Pharma” are colluding in a massive cover-up regarding the hidden dangers of vaccines. This has very serious public health consequences, as outbreaks of highly contagious diseases such as measles put vulnerable people, including newborn babies and people who have weakened immune systems, at great risk. My point here is not to discuss the positions of anti-vax propagandists (or “vaccine-hesitant parents,” as they prefer to describe themselves): I think that they are a menace to society, and that compulsory vaccine policies should be enforced. Any argument that reinforces their misinformation and conspiracy theories should be dealt with suspicion and care. This is why Neel Ahuja’s book is a matter of concern: he gives credence to arguments that identify vaccination policies with the police state, imperial endeavors, and neoconservative plots. Bioinsecurities’ introduction opens with two quotes relating to vaccine controversies: a 1905 legal opinion on Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a case of vaccine refusal that led to a well-publicized lawsuit, and an interview with Donald Rumsfeld in which the Defense Secretary assesses the risk of a smallpox epidemic in the lead-up to the Iraq war. Both cases are controversial: the Jacobson precedent was used to justify forced sterilization programs, and Donald Rumsfeld’s argument that Iraqis had developed biological weapons, including the variola virus that causes smallpox, proved to be unfounded. Although the author doesn’t make the link with modern vaccine controversies, the tainted nature of past “disease interventions” justifies skepticism towards modern public health policies.

Reductio ad absurdum

A good way to assess an argument is to push it to its logical extreme. To the argument about settler colonialism, one could ask: “You wouldn’t want to give it all back, would you?” In the case of America’s westward expansion, wouldn’t the Mexicans then have to give it all back to the Spanish, and then the Spanish to the indigenous populations they decimated, and then those peoples to the flora and fauna they displaced after crossing the land bridge from Siberia thousands of years earlier? The argument is absurd. Similarly, proselytizing vegans and animalists always have to face the argument that animals eat each other, and that even some pets require the death of other animals for their food. Anti-speciesism reasoning can be countered by the fact that insects, even bacterias and plants, can also be considered as sentient beings. Will we act accordingly, and with what consequences? These are some of the questions that may be raised after reading Bioinsecurities. The book’s main purpose is to describe the entanglement of human, animal, bacterial and viral bodies in the US project of imperial expansion over the course of the long twentieth century. But in doing so, it develops an anti-humanism that radically refutes the exceptional value of human life and democratic freedom and that gives credence to fringe arguments such as anti-vaccines. Some people may think that I read too much in this book and that I misinterpret its author’s real intentions. Others may argue that my own perception is biased, and that I am complicit in some conspiracy to justify US imperialism, denigrate animal rights advocates, and bolster the security state. Let me be clear: I don’t deny the interest of writing interspecies histories of American imperialism, paying tribute to those who resisted and paid the price of this imperial expansion, or documenting the cases of medical abuse in public health policies. But I worry that rather than inspiring its audience to protest against social injustice, this book may consolidate illiberal tendencies and a regressive turn in democratic governance.

A Typology of Filipino Women

A review of Transpacific Feminities: The Making of the Modern Filipina, Denise Cruz, Duke University Press, 2012.

Transpacific feminitiesOrientalism grew out of a fascination with Asian women. From the scantily dressed harem recluse to the romantic Madame Butterfly figure, from the mousmé to the congaï, or from houri to geisha, the Western male gaze was literally obsessed by Asian female bodies, and constructed its vision of the Orient around figures of stereotyped female characters. Philippines’ women or Filipinas stood in a peculiar position with regard to these Orientalist wet dreams. They never fully fit the category of the Oriental woman as popularly conceived. Neither black nor yellow, the term used to describe her racial identity is “brown”. When traveling abroad, she is often taken for a Chinese, a Vietnamese, an Indonesian, an Indian, a Mexican, or a South American. Even now, mentioning Filipinas in a Western context brings to mind images of overseas care workers, domestic helpers, mail-order brides, or leading politicians such as the flamboyant Imelda Marcos or the stubborn Cory Aquino. Filipinas never coalesce around one single category. They escape the attempt to hold them as representative exhibits of an Asian feminity that would define a distinct type of Orientalist fantasy. As domestic workers, they cultivate invisibility and diligence. As politicians and heads of state, they embody leadership and prominence. As mail-order brides, what is conspicuous about them is not their sex-appeal but their subservient attitude and willingness to do household chores or sustain a family in depleted rural areas. There seems to be no middle ground or common features between these polarized figures. None evokes the sexual desires, eroticism, and male fantasies that otherwise characterize Orientalist visions of Asian bodies.

Racial constructions

Unsuccessful attempts to reduce Filipinas to a single stereotype are not new. Categories to designate them were always plural. In the Spanish colonial era filipino had referred to Spanish creoles, those of Spanish ancestry born in the colony, while indios were the locals of Malay ancestry. The term mestizo could refer to someone of Spanish and indio birth but more often meant a racial mixture with indio and chino or Chinese elements. Non-Christian peoples like the Negritos and Igorots, who lived in the highlands, were considered as infieles, that is, animists or infidels, and their hunter-gatherer societies were held as most backward and primitive. Muslim peoples in the South were grouped under the category Moros or Moors, and were in perpetual conflict with the Spaniards. These ethnic categories gave rise to enduring types of Filipino women: the Spanish mestiza, the pure-blood morena, the Sinicized chinita, the dark-skinned negrita… Americans who took over from Spain after 1898 added their own racial constructions to this imperial mix. The “Filipino savage” who went bare-breasted and wore a banana-leaf skirt was seen as a nonwhite other whose alterity incorporated imaginaries cast from the conquest of the New World, the annihilation of Indian native cultures, and the legacy of African slavery in America. The Spanish-speaking Doña was perceived as aristocratic, virtuous, dutiful, and subservient, forever in the thrall of the Catholic Church. The modern Filipino girl was the most amenable to the rule of empire: she benefited from access to enlightened education, transatlantic mobility, and emancipatory sisterhood with white women. She was the young lady waiting for a chivalric savior, and cultural salvation was what Americans intended to procure under their policy of benevolent assimilation.

Denise Cruz’s Transpacific Feminities explores many topics and episodes: the typologies that were made by Filipinos and Filipinas themselves in the context of the discussions leading to female suffrage in 1937; the exclusion of women from the national debates about proper language for literary expression; the emergence of the urban, transpacific college girl who flouted traditional forms of proper feminine behavior; the challenge posed by Japanese occupation that cast women as victims or, in the case of ‘Colonel Yay’, as freedom fighters; and the role of transpacific Filipinas in the Cold War context. The figure of Maria Clara, the heroin of José Rizal’s novel Noli Me Tangere, casts a long shadow over the place of women in Philippine society. Recognized by many literary scholars as the first novel by a Filipino, this satire of Spanish imperialism was written in Spanish and published in Germany in 1887 to avoid censorship. It tells the story of a failed romance between Maria Clara and Crisóstomo Ibarra, a mestizo who returns to the Philippines after years abroad with a European education and a desire to spread reform by establishing a new school in his hometown. Ibarra’s school never materializes, for he becomes implicated in both familial and revolutionary plots that interrupt his ambitious plans and end his engagement to Maria Clara. After more twists and turns, the heroin enters a convent, where nuns are subjected to medieval treatment. This female character has become a classic figure in Filipino culture. For some, she represented everything a Filipina should be: modest and chaste, homebound and subservient. For others, she was the epitome of a dying tradition, symbolic of the shackles of Spanish catholic rule. Her mestiza status is unsettled by a horrible secret: she is the illegitimate daughter of a Spanish friar who abused his mother and then became the girl’s godfather. Noli Me Tangere (“touch me not” in Latin) has become part of the national curriculum, and in its English or Tagalog versions it is still compulsory reading for high school students.

Desiring subjects of empire

Filipinas were thought to be more amenable to the civilizing influence of the United States than men. American women in particular cast themselves as saviors and emancipators of their oppressed “little sisters” and described them as symbols of oppressed women in need of rescue. Domestic authors developed a critique of the American-produced constructs of Filipino feminity as desiring subjects of empire. As an alternative, they promoted a version of elite transpacific feminity that drew from the best of multiple worlds. Commentators took great care to distinguish their fellow countrywomen from Orientalized notions of Asian women as either mysterious and exotic damsels or as uncivilized savages in need of salvation by the West. In their view, model Filipinas maintained an ideal balance between the modern and the traditional, between East and West, and between Anglo-saxon, Latin, and native cultures. They resisted the imperial project of assimilation and maintained a kind a counter-narrative to rising American hegemony. But justifying resistance and autonomy by using the English language came dangerously close to accepting the legitimacy of U.S. rule. The role of English in an independent Philippines republic was vehemently debated in the 1930s and 1940s. Colonial languages were hegemonic, as English was seen as the new lingua franca of the intelligentsia and Spanish was still used in legal proceedings and worldly conversations.  In 1937, Tagalog was instituted as the national language but still had to compete with many vernacular languages and dialects regularly used by the Philippines population. For writers, using English was a means to join a transpacific commonwealth of educated readers and writers; but they could not escape a nagging sense that the literature they were producing was disconnected from the socioeconomic realities of life in the Philippines. As in other national contexts, a separation emerged between ‘high’ and ‘low’ literature, between ‘popular’ and ‘artistic’ writing that tended to overlap the distinction between English and Tagalog. But even though women were early producers of literature in English, male authors tended to sideline them in their debates about language and literature, and they portrayed women’s literary efforts as inferior and unremarkable. To the misogynist essay “What Is Wrong With Our Women Writers?”, two feminist authors responded in 1941 with an article titled “Our Men Writers Are Not So Hot.” The emerging canon of literature in English that emerged from these early years comprises mostly male authors: Manuel Arguilla, Bienvenido N. Santos, Nick Joaquin, Carlos Bulosan, N.V.M. Gonzales… But women writers were nowhere to be found in this roster of national literature in English.

The rise of the university-educated, Western-influenced, transpacific Filipino coed ushered a debate what it meant to be Filipina in an independent Philippines and how it related to the new constitution and universal suffrage. Three decades of occupation by the United States had provided educational and professional opportunities for many Filipinas, who fell under the spell of American culture’s influence. Young Filipina coeds imitated what they read in magazine pages and saw on movie screens: bobbed hair, short skirts, plucked eyebrows, painted lips. Modern girls were by this time a global regularity, appearing almost simultaneously in China, Japan, India, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries. Like her counterparts, the transpacific Filipina coed elicited both admiration and anxiety. Transgressive expressions of sexuality—going out without the supervision of a chaperone, dancing cheek-to-cheek and kissing in public—gave rise to attempts to stop the influx of popular culture from the United States and delineate women’s proper role. Scathing articles blamed the coed for the disintegration of Philippine morality. By reply, Filipina feminists called for recognition of educated women’s contribution to families, to communities and to society as a whole. Novels and short stories were used to negotiate unclear and indeterminate national fates and recalibrate a class hierarchy that was continuously fluctuating because of imperial shifts. Romance was the genre of choice to disseminate imperial narratives of benevolent assimilation and imagine the subversion of hegemonic formations. It was linked both to empire building and to its undoing by nationalist forces and individual aspirations.

Creating a national archive in English

Denise Cruz’s approach to her topic is very much dependent on the material she selects as her archive. She draws from a wide variety of sources—novels, memoirs, essays, newspaper articles, magazine illustrations—but, with the exception of José Rizal’s Spanish language novel Noli Me Tangere, she only uses texts written in English. She notes that authors were publishing in English only two decades after the U.S. occupation began, and that women were particularly active in this field because of the educational opportunities that were created by the American occupation. What defines the transpacific Filipino is, more than any social or psychological trait, the use of English in a cosmopolitan setting. The writers examined in this book were part of a privileged group, those who lived in Manila, who had access to a university education, who travelled abroad, and who spoke and read English. Promoting the use of English was an integral part of the American imperial project. The Japanese were highly conscious of this point, and severely restricted publications in English during their short-lived occupation. Philippines literature in English was the product of a deliberate design to spread liberal values and democratic mores through education and assimilation. Instruction in English, the establishment of English as the national language, and opportunities to study in the United States were part of this imperial design. The use of language itself as a strategy for rule was closely tied with the packaging of the American presence in the Philippines as a magnanimous civilizing enterprise. By choosing English to couch on paper their dreams, hopes and aspirations, these Filipino women examined in Transpacific Feminities transformed themselves willingly into the desiring subjects that the American empire was attempting to mold.

Isn’t there a similar work at play in today’s world? As the author notes, the recognition of the United States as an empire has now become a regular feature of academic discourse. But the notion of cultural imperialism still faces much resistance or denial, and the fact that the English language constitutes the main tool for this imperial hegemony is often overlooked. By choosing to restrict her archive to texts written in English and by examining the case of English-speaking Filipina authors, Denise Cruz partakes in in a new kind of imperial project that does not bear its name. Transpacific feminities are reduced to those forms of women’s expression that are directly accessible to an English language reader. These women may have spoken multiple languages, from the old colonial Spanish to the new national Tagalog, or from French and German to Cantonese, Japanese, as well as other domestic dialects, but they are only considered within the limitation of one single parameter: their use of English as a mean of written expression. Other idioms indigenous to the Philippines or used in worldly conversations are silenced and relegated to the margins. The United States considered themselves as the gatekeeper of women’s liberation in their empire; in a way, Anglo-American academics still play this role by deciding which texts should be worthy of archival consideration and which should be left in perpetual oblivion.

Literary value

The author of Transpacific Feminities boasts of having recovered an untapped archive of Philippines literature in English that has remained hitherto forgotten and understudied. Merging archive recovery with feminist analysis, she advocates additions to an Asia Pacific literary cannon that, at least for the period under consideration, is (in her opinion) too often limited to male nationalist authors. But one could object that these texts written in English were not abundant and sophisticate enough to sustain a national literary tradition. Readership in English was reduced to a small segment of the elite. This may explain why Filipino authors often tried to reach out beyond their country’s shores. Many publications were edited by expatriates and geared in part toward the American community. The goal was to convince the American public to share the benefits of empire, or to grant the Philippines the independence and individual rights for which its people craved. Including new archives into a cannon or a reading list should include considerations of literary value and intrinsic quality. But as far as I can judge from the few excerpts and plot summaries, the literary fictions that are surveyed in this book seem to me of appalling mediocrity. I subscribe to the judgment of a critic who characterized a novel by Felicidad Ocampo as “an entertaining little tale, providing he does not read it with too critical an attitude.” Besides, Daniele Cruz is the first to point out that the language used in these stories was often deficient. By inserting the editing term “sic” in bracketed form in many direct quotes from the texts, she underscores the misusage of English and improper spelling or grammar in a way that can only be read as patronizing. Filipino and Filipina authors who tried their best to use the language of empire didn’t need to be exposed to such ignominy. As a non-native speaker, I sympathize with their plight.

Global Production Networks and the Ideology of Seamlessness in Modern Filmmaking

A review of Media Heterotopias: Digital Effects and Material Labor in Global Film Production, Hye Jean Chung, Duke University Press, 2018.

Media HeterotopiasIt takes a lot of people to make a movie. It also takes a diversity of production sites, technologies, and product or service providers. The list of names, locations, companies, and generic technologies that were instrumental in making a movie are listed in the closing credits. A full set of credits can include the cast and crew, but also contractors, production sponsors, distribution companies, works of music licensed or written for the movie, various legal disclaimers, such as copyrights and more. Nobody really pays attention to this part, except for the theme song playing at full blast and the occasional traits of humor interrupting the credits scroll. These closing credits allow the spectator to make the transition between the world of fiction and the real world, and to put an end to the suspension of disbelief that made him or her adhere to the on-screen story. For Hye Jean Chung, who teaches cinema studies in the School of Global Communication at Kyung Hee University in South Korea, the spectator’s disregard for credit attributions is part of an operation of denial and erasure: denial of the work that went into making a movie, and erasure of the production sites and collaborative networks that increasingly place film production into an international division of labor. The ancillary bodies and sites of labor are erased from the film’s content and only appear in the end credits; but they somehow creep back onto the screen during the movie as well, producing what she calls “spectral effects” or traces that are rendered invisible and disembodied but that still haunt the movie like a ghostly presence. Taking on from Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, she defines “heterotopic perception” as a mode of criticism that is sensitive to these spectral effects, and “media heterotopias” as a digitally enhanced audiovisual realm of representation that superimposes different layers of realities, spatialities, and temporalities.

Assembling a collection of movies from the Asia-Pacific region 

These spectral effects and media heterotopias are particularly, though not exclusively, perceptible and legible in movies that use computer graphics, special effects, and digital technologies. Of the nine films that the author comments upon, six (Avatar, Oblivion, Interstellar, The Host, Godzilla, Big Hero 6) make heavy use of CGI and digital effects, while others use digital reediting (Wong Kar-wai’s Ashes of Time Redux) or animated sequences (Jia Zhangke’s The World). Only Tarsem Singh’s The Fall ostensibly insists on on-location filming (in more than 20 countries) and lack of special effects in its spectacular visuals. The conceptual framework proposed by Media Heterotopias is therefore amenable to many different kinds of movies, from Hollywood blockbusters to art-house films, from adventure fantasies to science-fiction flicks. A common thread running through this selection is the focus on Asia, as many of these films were shot or produced in Asia-Pacific; but the author insists that this book is not an area studies project, and she resolutely places her analysis in a transnational or global perspective. The focus of Asia-Pacific is thereby a reflection of the on-going trend that affects movie production and consumption as well as many other industries: the shift to a new center of gravity that includes East Asia and the western shores of the Americas, and that transforms the historical Eurocentric or Atlantic domination into a thing of the past.

Although Hye Jean Chung doesn’t identify herself as a Marxist scholar, her work is very much preoccupied with issues of capital accumulation, surplus value extraction, and commodity fetishism. Against a tendency to treat films as texts and material conditions as irrelevant, she reminds us that movies are made by real people engaged in a division of labor in which value created by some is appropriated by others. Theoretically, she situates her film studies in the legacy of Michel Foucault by picking up his concept of heterotopia. According to Foucault, the cinema itself (as a building) is an heterotopia in its ability of allowing several overlapping spaces to exist. A cinema theater is a room with a two-dimensions screen where a three-dimensions world is able to exist. Heteropias in cinema (films) are therefore increasing the amount of overlapping worlds and thus question the status of reality of any of those worlds. Another important if yet more implicit reference of the book is Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, where the heritage of Marxism is reclaimed by a new materialism acknowledging the haunting presence of ghosts and spirits. By being attentive to spectral effects and ghostly presences, Media Heterotopias offers a kind of spectral critique or hauntology that places human labor and production processes squarely at the center of media theory. 

The effacement of labor and the ideology of seamlessness

As many critics have pointed out, the world has been fundamentally altered by digital technologies. Our perception of reality itself is changing at a fast pace. Time is no longer a moving arrow flowing from past to present and toward the future: temporal linearity is now supplanted by intensive time, for which the only meaningful distinction is that of real time and delayed time. Digital technologies also transform our conception of space: they abolish the distinction between real space and virtual space, merging the two into a new augmented reality where digital signaling is ubiquitous. These new spatio-temporal formations have a strong impact on production and labor, and movie production is no exception. Nonlinear digital workflows are replacing linear production processes with a simultaneous collaborative workspace. Digital platforms such as video conferencing, instant messaging, and online file sharing allow massively parallel processes of collaboration to take place. To expedite and streamline the work process, the creative labor of digital film production is dispersed across geographically diverse companies in global production pipelines. Formerly disparate stages of preproduction, production, and postproduction are increasingly becoming fused with one another in a collaborative space. 

Globalization has developed an ideology of seamlessness: borders are no longer a barrier to the free flow of goods, capital, and images; and production processes are integrated into global value chains operating just-in-time and without friction.  For Hye Jean Chung, this fetishizing of a seamless integration conceals the actual living bodies and physical sites of labor that provide the material conditions of transnational activities. These bodies and locations are often firmly anchored to their national territories and regional infrastructures, with the cultural and geopolitical characteristics that are attached to them. The world isn’t flat, but a lot of work, including ideological work, goes into the task of making it appear as flat and frictionless. Similarly, both digital aesthetics and digital production processes partake in an ideology of seamlessness. Digital cinema produces a seamless effect when computer generated figures and sceneries are smoothly integrated with real actors, actual landscapes, and practical sets. By erasing material traces, visible joins and seams from the various stages of digital processing, the final product is made to look flawless and natural, even though digital images are composed of multiple layers of heterogeneous time and space. The photorealistic aspect of CGI makes it easy to suspend disbelief and create a pure spectacle of illusory seduction. This propensity toward the illusion of seamlessness has always been part of cinema’s attraction; but digital technology allows to make all traces of labor-intensive production invisible and well-hidden. Only remnants remain, coming back in the movie screen to haunt it as a spectral presence.

Self-referentiality and structural homologies 

In some cases, the ideology of seamlessness provides the material for the film story. This is particularly the case in science fiction movies, even when they are critical of capitalistic processes or technological developments. James Cameron’s Avatar offers a simplistic denunciation of technology-driven imperialism and an apology of a holistic, nature-centered, culturalistic worldview. But the heavy dependence on CGI and digital effects as well as the film’s reliance on global production and distribution networks contradict the explicit message of the movie. Who should we trust, the Na’vi and their natural utopia untainted by human technology, or the visual effects that replicate the mixing of human and alien DNA performed by Pandora’s greedy aggressors? Avatar treats body as media; migrating to a different body is reflexive of the digital filmmaking process itself. Another structural homology between movie content and filmmaking process is the act or cultural or geographical appropriation. Film commentators noted that each article of Na’vi clothing and jewelry was handmade and woven by a team of New Zealand costume designers. They underscored that the “alien” culture of Pandora was actually based on the indigenous Polynesian cultures of the Pacific Islands: for instance, the Na’vi gesture of touching foreheads is directly borrowed from the Māori’s traditional greeting, the hongi. Such acts of cultural appropriation go unnoticed or are even praised to illustrate the film’s cultural deftness. But it is doubtful whether Māori communities or other South Pacific Islanders received any benefits from these borrowings. Geographical borrowings, such as location shootings in fragile ecosystems or in scenic landscapes, are even more pernicious: they leave in their trail a legacy of environmental devastation, and often open the way for mass tourism and commercial exploitation of nature, as in the Pandora tours and Avatar-themed Na’vi wedding packages that are offered in the sites where some of the movie scenes were shot.

Another form of geographical exploitation consists of making a landscape alien, as in the science fiction movies Oblivion and Interstellar that were shot using real locations in Iceland. In these films, Iceland functions as an in-camera special effect by providing the image of a primitive or post-apocalyptic landscape that is then mixed with computer-generated imagery. Again, it is doubtful whether Icelanders received any benefit from the inclusion of their country’s natural assets as raw material in global value chains. As Hye Jean Chung notes, “certain sites of production develop as centers or nodes of production pipelines, whereas others are relegated to satellite sites of production or peripheral industries that provide human labor and natural resources to this centralized core that upholds and reinforces Hollywood’s hegemony.” Films like The Host or Godzilla however show that hegemony can be de-centered and that nations are in competition over the definition of a global imaginary. The composite body of The Host’s monster crosses genres and territories: although firmly anchored in the cultural specificity of Korean cinema, it cannot be interpreted “neither as a transplant of Hollywood’s conventions into a Korean background nor as a transfusion of Korean culture into Hollywood’s standards.” The monster, envisaged by director Bong Joon-ho as an imagined vision of “Korean-ness,” is in reality produced by a mix of Korean and non-Korean labor and technologies; and the film is itself a blend of heterotopic genres, from science fiction and monster movies to action films, family drama, political satire, and comedy. The 2014 Hollywood’s version of Godzilla, too, mixes imaginaries and straddles boundaries across the Pacific Ocean. Created by merging cross-border bodies and assets in both narrative and production spaces, it mobilizes a postwar Japanese myth born out of the atomic bomb and projects it on a global scale. The monster functions as a floating signifier, whose hybridity enables multiple national identities and transnational imaginaries to coexist. But the Hollywood’s production didn’t kill the indigenous gojira franchise: in Japan, the US-made monster was criticized as “out of shape” and as having a neck “like an American football’s athlete’s,” while the story lacked the denunciation of atomic warfare and the social critique that the Japanese versions developed.

Heterotopia is not only what movies make of it: it is inscribed in sites and territories, in imaginaries and aspirations. Theme parks like the World Park in Beijing and the Window of the World Shenzhen feature scaled-down replicas from various parts of the world; they offer the opportunity to travel abroad while staying at home. For the local migrants who work in these parks however, like the characters of Jia Zanke’s movie The World, the cosmopolitan lifestyle they showcase remains an simulacrum. Jia’s film deconstructs the transnational fantasy embedded in the World Park by revealing the various forms of uninspiring work that is necessary in producing and maintaining the illusion of cosmopolitanism. The characters’ lives are mediated by technology. They constantly send text messages on their cell phones and watch at digital video screens. Their dreams and fantasies, figured by animated sequences that punctuate the film, are made of simulated artifacts and reconstructions, as fake and artificial as the world they inhabit or the characters they are asked to impersonate. Big Hero 6 features another form of heterotopia in the hyperrealist scenes and cityscapes of “San Fransokyo”, a fictional metropolis that integrates the cultural iconography of Tokyo into the urban geography of San Francisco. This form of techno-Orientalism, reminiscent of the futuristic city displayed in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner, is indexed on a cultural reality: the role Asian migrants have played in shaping San Francisco, a city that is now heralded as the capital metropolis of the Asia-Pacific century. In Big Hero 6, which was produced as a Disney franchise, East meets West in a virtual space rendered seamless by transpacific collaborations in the field of computer graphics and creative urban design.

From post-Marxist analysis to new materialism

What does heterotopic analysis bring to the field of cinema studies? First, it brings together two strands of film critique that are often developed separately: content and context, internal versus external critique, semantic interpretation or industry analysis, the viewer’s perspective or the point of view of the producers. As Hye Jean Chung convincingly demonstrates, the border between the two realms is porous: the ideology of seamlessness erases all traces of human labor and technical work from within the movie, but reality creeps back into the film’s narrative, making the seams apparent and the labor traceable. Many movies, especially but not exclusively in science fiction, are self-reflexive about the filmmaking process and the technological tools used in film production. Analyzing the film’s content also offers a perspective on how it was conceived and developed. Second, Media Heterotopias offers a post-Marxist analysis of the global division of labor in cultural and creative industries. The author often refers to the long work hours, tight schedules, night shifts, physical migration, or sedentary confinement along complex networks of transnational collaboration. Value accumulates at the most capitalistic points of the value chain, while other parts of the production pipeline are submitted to ruthless labor exploitation or imperialistic appropriation of cultural and natural assets. As a third point, I see this book as a contribution to the literature on new materialism. The materiality of geographical location, physical labor, and industrial practices is put alongside processes of dematerialization and digitalization, giving rise to a new kind of mediated materiality. The layered nature of digital imagery makes it an assemblage of heterogeneous time-spaces, a composite of physical and virtual elements that give rise to spectral effects and phantomatic presence. Reality is what comes back to haunt us when the real has been dissolved into digital fictions.

Same-Sex Marriage With Chinese Characteristics

A review of Petrus Liu, Queer Marxism in Two Chinas, Duke University Press, 2015.

Queer Marxism.jpgSame-sex marriage in Taiwan became legal on 24 May 2019. This made Taiwan the first nation in Asia to recognize same-sex unions. You think it’s a progress for LGBT rights? Well, think again. In the midst of the clamor for legalized same-sex marriage, G/SRAT, a LGBT organization, marched to oppose the institution of marriage at Taipei Pride, proposing the alternative slogan of “pluralism of relationships” on their banner against “marriage equality.” Queer Marxism in Two Chinas is open to such perspectives that go against the grain of conventional wisdom and emerging consensus on gay marriage and LGBT rights. It argues that gay marriage legalization is a victory for neoliberal capitalism, which incorporates gay couples into its fold and wages a propaganda battle against communist China. If we define pinkwashing as the strategy to market oneself as gay-friendly in order to appear as progressive, modern, and tolerant, then Taiwan is pinkwashing itself on a grand scale. Threatened by the prospect of reunification with mainland China, Taiwan has focussed its diplomatic strategy on integrating into the global economy and on securing popular support from the West by promoting itself as a democratic regime with values similar to those in the United States or Europe. Granting equal rights to same-sex couples is fully congruent with these twin objectives, and it serves geopolitical goals as much as it responds to local claims for equal rights and justice for all.

The goal of pinkwashing in Taiwan is to paint China red.

Contrary to what most people may think, the author of Queer Marxism disagrees with the perception that political liberalism has advanced queer rights. On the contrary, if we follow Petrus Liu, the cause of gay and lesbian rights in Taiwan is used to cover up the many cases of human rights violations against queer subjects—be they prostitutes, drug users, AIDS patients, drag queens, transsexuals, illegal aliens, or money boys. These people living on the margins of society are excluded from the definition of a human being. Similarly, it is often advanced that gay visibility and LGBT rights have progressed along the path of economic reforms in mainland China: since 1997, homosexuality is no longer a crime, it has been removed from the list of mental disorders in 2001, while Gay Pride demonstrations, gay and lesbian film festivals, and gay cultural spaces have developed in the main Chinese cities. Modern critics therefore oppose a present and futurity of openness and visibility to a Maoist past where homosexuality was repressed and hidden. But this, according to Petrus Liu, is revisionist history, a reinvention of the past in which Maoist socialism is redefined as a distortion of people’s natural genders and sexualities. Homoerotic desires and longings were also present in Maoist China, albeit in a different form. This militates for a ‘homosexuality with Chinese characteristics,’ based on the recognition that China has a four-thousand-year record of tolerance and harmony when it comes to same-sex relations.

Why do some Asian queer theorists and activists appear as staunch opponents of same-sex marriage? How can they raise the question: “Is Global Governance Bad for East Asian Queers?” What do they want as an alternative to equal rights and entitlements? To answer this question, it is necessary to introduce unaccustomed readers to what ‘queer theory’ is about, and why its Chinese version might differ from the theoretical constructions developed in the West. Queer theory has emerged as a new strand of academic literature that criticizes neoliberal economies and political liberalism. Theorists point out that queer cultures are not always complicit with neoliberal globalization and the politics of gay normalization; nor are local LGBT scenes in Asia always replications of gay cultures in the liberal West. Queer critics underscore that Western liberalism has spawned a new normative order that dissociates acceptable homosexuality from culturally undesirable practices and experiences such as promiscuity, drag, prostitution, and drug use. As the majority of gay men and lesbian women are included into the fold of mainstream normality, other groups and individuals are categorized as deviant, pervert, queer, and socially unacceptable. To quote Judith Butler, a foundational author in queer studies: “Sometimes the very terms that confer ‘humanness’ on some individuals are those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility of achieving that status.” Or to borrow from another author, “the homonormative movement is not an equality-based movement but an inclusion-based assimilation politics with exclusionary results.”

The norms of acceptable homosexuality

According to some critics, gay cultures have lost their radical edge and are now engaged in a “rage for respectability”: the primary task of the gay movement is to “persuade straight society that they can be good parents, good soldiers, and good priests.” Homonormativity suggests that assimilating to heterosexual norms is the only path to equal rights. It sets the participation to the consumer culture of neoliberal capitalism as the ultimate political horizon of the gay rights movement. The new homonormativity advocates a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption. It is grounded in liberal values of privacy, tolerance, individual rights, and diversity. It is fully compatible with neoliberalism: indeed, it reinforces tendencies already at work in neoliberal economies. The bourgeois gay couple is a capitalist’s dream niche market: double-income-no-kids, urbanite and fashion-conscious, it has the reputation of pursuing a lifestyle filled with cultural leisure and touristic escapades. The norm of acceptable homosexuality also sets new standards of governance and regulation for countries that are evaluated along their degree of adherence to LGBT rights as defined by activist groups and legal reformers in Western societies. According to this new standard, governments that legalize gay marriage and gay adoption, make assisted reproductive technologies available for same-sex couples, and encourage manifestations of gay pride and LGBT visibility are deemed as democratic and progressive. Conversely, states that keep sodomy laws on the books, discriminate along sexual orientation, and stick to a traditional view of family and marriage are relegated to the bottom of democratic governance rankings.

For many international observers, Taiwan has been a poster child of economic liberalization and political democratization. As gay visibility and LGBT rights occurred after the lifting of the martial law in 1987 and the multiparty election in 2000, it is natural to assume that gay and lesbian rights are a byproduct of the advent of the liberal-democratic state. Similarly, the People’s Republic of China has turned less intolerant towards its homosexuals and has even let gay cultures flourish in its urban centers as they reached a level of economic prosperity on par with the West. Narratives of sexuality and gender rights are therefore intrinsically indexed to broader theories of economic development and political transitions. These liberal theories tend to translate liberty as laissez-faire capitalism, and democratization as the formal competition between political parties. Petrus Liu takes a different perspective. For him, “any discussion of gender and sexuality in the Chinese context must begin with the Cold War divide.” The geopolitical rivalry between the two Chinas is the underlying cause for Taiwan’s construction of a liberal, gay-friendly political environment. The Republic of China is the People’s Republic of China’s counterfactual: it presents itself as a natural experiment of what the whole of China would have become had it not been affected by the victory of Mao’s Communists over Chiank Kai-shek’s Nationalists. It presents the “road not taken” in communist studies: what would be China today without Maoism and the Taiwan straits division? Is the People’s Republic of China simply catching up and converging towards Taiwan’s level of economic development and standards of democracy, or does it chart a different course that Taiwan will at some point be forced to follow?

Queer China and the Taiwan Strai(gh)t

The question of China’s futures has real implications for the rights and livelihoods of queer people in the two Chinas. For Petrus Liu, it is very difficult to abstract a discussion on queer human rights from the concrete national interests and geopolitical stakes that frame these rights. The invocation of LGBT rights is always anchored in a national context and expresses a desire for national, rather than cosmopolitan rights and entitlements. Democracy and human rights have progressed in Taiwan because the Republic of China constantly needs to distantiate itself from its socialist neighbor. This creates a mechanism akin to Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’: history fulfills its ultimate rational designs in an indirect and sly manner, and liberalism advances for reasons that are, in essence, illiberal. It is always possible to mobilize the contradictions between national interests in the two Chinas for productive use, with the help of local and transnational coalitions. For instance, Taipei’s Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, who subsequently became President of the Republic of China, officially endorsed the Gay Pride in Taiwan’s capital for the first time in 2006 because he was prompted to do so by the Mayor of San Francisco, Taipei’s sister city, who sent a rainbow flag as a gift to his counterpart before the parade.

In East Asia, gay marriage as a social issue has often designated the marriage of a gay person with a heterosexual wife. This situation has provided the intrigue of many novels and movies, starting with Ang Lee’s Wedding Banquet. In Chinese language, gay men’s wives are designated as tongqi or ‘living widows,’ and their plight is a hotly debated topic on Chinese Internet forums and TV talk shows. Some estimates put their number at 16 million. For some critics, new sexual formations in Asia cannot be interpreted as the spread of Western models of homosexuality. Indeed, tongxinlian, tongzhi, and ku’er lilun may not even be translated as ‘homosexuality,’ ‘gay men,’ and ‘queer theory,’ as these concepts embody different histories and practices. The word tongxinlian reflects the era when sex between men was prosecuted under ‘hooliganism’ (liumang zui, disruption of the social order); and tongzhi, a political idiom meaning ‘comrade’, was appropriated by Chinese sexual countercultures in Hong-Kong and in Taiwan to refer to same-sex relations. Without endorsing the thesis that “Chinese comrades do it differently,” Petrus Liu acknowledges that sexual orientation and sexual practices are socially constructed. This echoes the arguments of historians who define homosexuality as a modern cultural invention reflecting the identities of a small and relatively fixed group of people, in distinction from an earlier view of same-sex desire as a continuum of acts, experiences, identities, and pleasures spanning the entire human spectrum. The argument of Chinese distinctiveness also reflects the often-made thesis that the individual doesn’t exist in Asian societies. Many Asian languages do not have a fixed term for the “I” as a sovereign subject who speaks with authority. They see the “I” as a result of social relations and as an effect of language. Consequently, in the Asian context, an individual doesn’t have rights; rights only exist in relation to others. Only when a person enters a set of social relations does it become possible to speak of rights. This sets severe constraints on individual freedom (gay persons may be obliged to marry the opposite sex for familialist reasons), but it also creates opportunities to press for a non-assimilationist, non-normative life escaping the strictures of homo- and heteronormativity.

“Better Red Than Pink!”

According to Petrus Liu, “Queer liberalism is a key tool with which Taiwan disciplines mainland China and produces its national sign of difference from its political enemy in the service of the Taiwanese independence project.” If the conclusion that he reaches is “better red than pink!”, then we are faced with a very serious case of intellectual confusion. A more generous interpretation would be to consider his text within the parameters of Western academic interventions, which offer a premium for radical provocations and disruptive ideas. But even so, Petrus Liu’s Queer Marxism pales in comparison to more conventional interpretations of Chinese queer cultures, such as the one proposed in reference to Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason.’ We saw that Taiwan uses a political ruse to promote its self-image as a liberal regime and tolerant society in opposition to mainland China; but this ruse of history has felicitous effects if it leads to the advancement of gay and lesbian rights. Similarly, one could always interpret marriage equality laws in Western Europe as a result of rising Islamophobia and as a contribution to a rhetoric of a clash of civilizations: this is, in essence, the thesis of homonationalism as expounded by Jasbir Puar in Terrorist Assemblages (which I review here). But this argument will only get you so far. The cunning of reason tells us that liberalism can sometimes be advanced through anti-liberal means. However, anti-liberalism more often leads to an erosion of individual freedom and a rise of authoritarian regimes.

Again, the case of China can be used as an illustration. In the post-Cultural Revolution period, political liberalism became an important system of thought against Maoism. Student demonstrators at Tiananmen Square built a replica of the Statue of Liberty; and Tocqueville remains one of the favorite reference of political reformers. On the other hand, Western cultural critics and academic genres such as postcolonial studies or postmodernism have been picked up in China by a clique of New Left academics, Neo-Maoist nationalists, and Communist Party apparatchiks. Critiques of Eurocentrism and of Orientalism are used to affirm the superiority of the Chinese culture and to support China’s rightful rise to world prominence after a century of humiliation. Like in the West, cultural critique in China is resolutely anti-liberal; but identity politics takes a very different form than in Western pluralist societies. It fuels cultural nationalism (wenhua minzuzhuyi) and nativism (bentuzhuyi), and it proclaims the irreducibility of national essence (guocuipai) and the superiority of Chineseness (zhonghuaxing). Queer theory, with its strong links to anti-humanism and anti-liberalism, could very much be mobilized for such ends, as in the arguments of the irreductibility of Chinese conceptions of homosexuality and queerness. There is no reason to fear that a book like Queer Marxism in Two Chinas won’t pass the test of censorship should it be published in Beijing in a Chinese translation. Like Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo wrote in an open letter protesting the sentencing of journalist Shi Tao in 2005, “Some writers in China say that nowadays they can write about anything they want. Yes, up to a point. They can write about sex, they can write about violence, they can write about human defects, but they cannot touch upon what is considered as potentially ‘sensitive’ information.” Petrus Liu doesn’t quote Liu Xiaobo in his book: by writing down his name on the free Internet, I am making this review potentially sensitive.